TOWARDS

Pakistan

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by

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TO

MY PARENTS

Dyarchy - Govt of India Act 1919

1928 Nehru Report
1906 League founded
1916 Lucknow Pact

Preface

THIS book is substantially based on my thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. It is an attempt to examine the major currents of Muslim politics in India between 1928 and 1940. Its terminal points are fixed by two events of capital importance in the history of Hindu-Muslim relations. The first was the publication, in 1928, of the so-called Nehru Report, which at once revealed the sharp differences between the two great communities with regard to the future constitution of India. The second was the adoption by the Muslim League, in March 1940, of the historic Lahore Resolution, which demanded a partition of India and the establishment of a separate state for the Muslims on the ground that they formed a distinct and separate nation. The Nehru Report was prepared by a small committee appointed by a conference of delegates representing most of the important parties in India. Not unnaturally it was dominated by the leaders of the Indian National Congress who had organised the conference, and in effect the Report became a manifesto of the Party. It was in essence the draft of a constitution for a unitary state in India, based upon the policy of the Congress Party as it had evolved since the introduction of Dyarchy under the Government of India Act, 1919. The formal adoption of this Report by the Indian National Congress in December 1928, and its immediate rejection by the All-Parties Muslim Conference, revealed a cleavage between the two communities which was destined to endure and to render abortive all efforts to preserve the unity of India under a constitution acceptable to both.

This open breach between Hindus and Muslims cannot be explained by reference merely to the events of the 1920's.

Behind it lay a long history of disagreement and controversy, marked at times by open violence. In the opening chapter an attempt is made to explain this historic background, more particularly as it affected the development of Muslim opinion and the reaction of Muslim leaders to the changes then being introduced by the British Government. It was during these years that the Muslims, originally under the influence and leadership of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, slowly emerged from the cloud of distrust and suspicion which had fallen upon them because of their alleged role in the revolt of 1857. By the early years of the present century they had become sufficiently conscious of their identity as a separate community to form their own political organisation. The Muslim League, organised in 1906, was the Muslim response to what they regarded as the increasing power and influence of the Indian National Congress. Despite the inclusion of some Muslim members the Congress was to them essentially a Hindu organisation, whose policy and programme threatened the interests of the Muslim community. The rivalry between the two parties, however, was not constant. In the Lucknow Pact of 1916 an attempt was made to bring them together on the basis of an agreed plan of constitutional reform; again in the post-1920 Khilafat agitation there was at least superficially some measure of co-operation between them. But this accomplished little, and in the years that followed the deep underlying differences between the two groups were revealed more and more openly.

The narrative which follows is a more detailed examination of the events which followed the appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission, under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon, in 1927. Particular attention has been given to the circumstances which led to the drafting of the Nehru Report and the reaction to it by the Muslim League and several other Muslim organisations. The publication of the Simon Report and the decision of the British Government to convene a Round Table Conference transferred the scene of Hindu-Muslim conflict from India to England. It was in these discussions at the Round Table Conference that the full extent of the divergence between the two groups on such matters as representation

and safeguards for minority groups was revealed. On both sides their position was now so firmly fixed that no effort by the British Government could break the deadlock. It was in these years too, no doubt because of this open discussion of differences, that Muslim leaders began to think and speak of their community not as a religious or political minority but as a nation. The work of one of the more influential of them, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, is examined in detail in a separate chapter, partly with a view to determining how far he was responsible for originating the idea of a separate and independent Muslim state.

The new Constitution embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935 satisfied none of the parties in India. Only the sections relating to the government of the Provinces of British India came into operation, and in most of these Provinces, where the administration was controlled by the Congress Party, this lasted only until the autumn of 1939. Events during these years further intensified the growing conflict between the two major communities. The Muslim belief that the Congress used its authority to discriminate against Muslim minorities powerfully contributed to the strength and influence of the Muslim League. When the Congress Ministries resigned in October 1939 the League had already emerged as by far the biggest organisation representing the Muslim community which had hitherto been divided and confused but which was now being rapidly consolidated under the leadership of a man no less determined in pursuit of his objectives than the leaders of the Congress Party. This is the period in which Muhammad Ali Jinnah rose to a position of leadership over the Muslim community such as no one before him had reached with the possible exception of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.

During the greater part of the period under survey Indian Muslims were divided on many issues. A large number of organisations sprang up to give effect to the ideas and policies of particular leaders or groups. The history of the more important of these organisations is related here with a view to extracting from their records such material as may contribute to an understanding of Muslim political thinking. Some of these were identified, more or less closely, with the Indian National Congress.

A few outstanding Muslims, Maulana Azad being the most prominent among them, rose to positions of leadership in the Congress organisation. Most of the Muslim organisations retained their separate identity and pursued their own particular objectives, inspired, in some cases, by a devotion to the religious ideals of Islam, in others, by a desire to promote social reform more rapidly and more completely than was suggested by the policies of any of the major parties. But the constitutional deadlock was always the central problem and a number of schemes were proposed to resolve it and, in one way or another, to provide safeguards on which the Muslims insisted without dividing the country. An attempt has been made to explain the more important of these proposals and to consider their practicability under existing conditions.

All these developments contributed to the gradual clarification of Muslim political thinking and to the creation of the situation as it existed in the spring of 1940. A decade earlier such a resolution as that adopted by the Muslim League at its Lahore session would probably have had little effect. In 1940, though it was not immediately welcomed by all Muslims, it made wider and more powerful appeal than a similar decision could have done earlier. The Lahore Resolution was regarded by its authors as a practicable solution of the communal conflict which had been developing for more than half a century and which then had reached a point at which no reconciliation within a united India seemed possible. Judged by its ultimate consequences this Resolution was one of the most momentous events in the history of Indian peoples. The text of the Resolution, the reaction to it by all parties concerned, and some obvious implications are therefore examined in some detail as a conclusion to this study.

I wish to take this opportunity of thanking my supervisor, Professor D. J. McDougall, not only for suggesting the subject of this work but also for his generous help and inexhaustible patience in going over it again and again as it was being written and revised. I honestly feel that it is almost impossible to condense into a few sentences the debt I owe to him. The written word cannot express the depth of my gratitude.

I am also very grateful to Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Professor Charles Adams, Professor Keith Callard, and Professor Fazlur Rahman. Their assistance and advice on many points were invaluable. My thanks are also due to Professor Abdul Hamid and Dr. K. K. Aziz for many useful suggestions.

The research for this study was done at Toronto, Montreal, Washington, and New York. Grateful recognition is especially due to Mr. W. J. Watson and Miss Maureen O'Shay, the Librarians of the Institute of Islamic Studies, University of McGill, whose generous and expert aid greatly lightened my task. The Library of the University of Toronto, especially in the Reference Room, Toronto Public Library, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Library, Toronto, Library of Congress, Washington, and the New York Public Library are also to be thanked for their generous co-operation.

A Note to the Second Edition

For this Edition numerous minor corrections and improvements have been made and some items added to the Bibliography.

Chapter 1

Introduction

(Historical Background 1858-1927)

I

All competent observers agree that after the holocaust of 1857 the Indian Muslims came under a dark cloud. It was perhaps natural for the new rulers to turn their backs on those who by religion were connected with the erstwhile rulers of India. The Muslims were not only dislodged from power but were also penalised. The Government singled them out for exclusion from any position of responsibility as it was very widely believed that the responsibility for the Sepoy Mutiny rested mainly on the Muslims. It was therefore quite natural again for the British authorities to suspect the Indian Muslims as potential rebels. The Muslims' share in the administration of the country was reduced to negligible proportions and their fortunes had sunk so low that a British Indian official writing in 1871 declared that "there is now scarcely a Government office in Calcutta in which a Muhammadan can hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink-pots and menders of pens."[1]

Coupled with this policy of repression by the Government was the Muslims' unwillingness to-reconcile themselves to the changed circumstances. They were loath to take to western learning as it would, they thought, produce disbelief in the Muslim faith. It was argued that to read English was forbidden

1. W.W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (Calcutta, 1945), p. 162. (This book was first published in 1871.)

by the laws of Islam. "Pride of race, memory of bygone superiority, religious fears and a not unnatural attachment to the learning of Islam"[1] kept the Muslims from accepting their new position. They were not prepared to change with the times. They were not even prepared to appreciate that the times had changed.

While the Muslims thus sulked in the corner brooding over their misfortunes, the sister community, with its traditional flexibility of mind, continued to make great progress. "While Bengali Hindus, Madrasis and Marathas inspired by the arts and sciences of Europe were experiencing an intellectual and moral renaissance, the Muslims all over India were falling into a state of material indigence and intellectual decay."[2]

This was, in general, the position of the Muslims in the second half of the nineteenth century. They desperately needed a bold leader who could pull them out of the quagmire and stem the tide of their further degeneration. It was at this time that Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) came forward to lead the destinies of his co-religionists and help them steer through stormy seas of ignorance and superstitions to safe shores of confidence and fresh aspirations.

Syed Ahmad Khan started his career by entering Government service as a *Sarishtadar* at Delhi in 1836 and by sheer dint of merit and hard work rose to be a *Sadr Amin*. He was posted at Bijnour in the latter capacity in the year of the Revolt. With his unfailing sense of reality he had come to believe that British power was invincible. It was this belief which led him to come to the rescue of many a British family, very often at the risk of personal danger.

After the Revolt had been quelled, he set himself to the herculean task of alleviating the miserable lot of the Muslim community. His task was by no means an easy one. On the one hand, he had to convince the British authorities that "nobody ever planned the Mutiny and that, at any rate, the

1. Syed Mahmood, *History of English Education in India*, quoted by H. Kraemer, "Islam in India Today," *The Moslem World*, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (New York, 1931), p. 154.

2. T. Morrison, in *Political India 1832-1932*, ed. Sir John Cumming (London, 1932), p. 87.

Muslim responsibility for its mass butcheries was negligible,"[1] and on the other to dispel the fanatical belief of Muslims that western education was inimical to their faith.

All discussion of Syed Ahmad's role in the Muslim political awakening must be prefaced with the statement that he was neither a politician nor a political leader. He was essentially a social reformer and his panacea for all the ills of his community was education. The connection between education and power was too obvious to be ignored.

"When Hindu clerks were promoted to posts in which they could give orders, when even policemen were chosen because they were good at their books, it was clearly time for the Moslems to reconsider their attitude to the new education. That was the doctrine preached by the greatest Indian Moslem of those days, Sir Syed Ahmad."[2]

To promote understanding between the rulers and the ruled Syed Ahmad wrote a bold pamphlet on *The Causes of the Indian Revolt.*[3] The pith and soul of this pamphlet is that the estrangement between the governors and the governed led to the Indian Mutiny. "Granted that the intentions of Government were excellent", he says, "there was no man who could convince the people of it; no one was at hand to correct the errors which they had adopted."[4] From this premise he reached the conclusion that had there been any member of the Indian community to represent their views in the Legislature, "these evils that have happened to us would have been averted."[5]

In addition to this plea to include Indians in the Legislative Council, he also felt called upon to defend his community against the charge of being the chief culprit in the Revolt. This thesis was propounded by him in *The Loyal Mohammedans of India* (1860). It was necessary because "whatever articles, pamphlets and books were written by Englishmen on the

1. A. Hamid, "Syed Ahmad Khan and the Genesis of Muslim Separatist Movement in Politics," *Illustrated Weekly of Pakistan*, Vol. III, No. 7 (Karachi, 1950), p. 13.

2. R. Coupland, *India: A Re-statement* (London, 1945), p. 92.

3. It was written in 1858 but was not published until 1863.

4. Quoted by G. F. I. Graham, *The Life and Work of Syed Ahmed Khan* (London, 1885), p. 38.

5. Ibid.

Mutiny, most of them were found to be against the Mussalmans."[1] The theme and tenor of this tract is that, "if in Hindoostan there was one class of people above another who, from the principles of their religion, from habits and associations, and from kindred disposition, were fast bound with Christians, in their dread hour of trial and danger, in the bonds of amity and friendship, those people were the Mohamedans."[2]

But it must not be supposed that he was anti-Hindu or a narrow communalist in his outlook. His efforts were directed towards the promotion and advancement of the interests of all his countrymen, with of course a special reference to the position of the Muslims as they were the fallen community. The Translation Society established at Ghazipur in 1864, later developed into the Aligarh Scientific Society, whose object was to translate books from European languages into Urdu, was being managed by Syed Ahmad's life-long friend Raja Jai Kishan Das. Similarly, the British Indian Association established in 1866 with the object of keeping in touch with the members of the House of Commons was composed of both Hindus and Muslims. He was evidently not addressing his own community alone when at the inauguration of the British Indian Association he said, "You will have only yourselves to reproach when in after years you see the European section of the community enjoying the well-earned concession while your wants remain still unredressed."[3]

A rude shock to his catholic outlook was, however, administered in 1867. This year is particularly significant in the life of Indian Muslims. Syed Ahmad was posted at Benares when he sent a communication to the Viceroy on behalf of the British Indian Association suggesting the establishment of a Vernacular University and a Bureau of Translation to translate university text books into Urdu. As a counter-proposal, certain Hindu leaders of Benares proposed that "the Urdu language written in Persian script should be discontinued in Government Courts and should be replaced by the Hindi language written in Devanagri script."[4] It was the first occasion, says the well-

1. Altaf Husain Hali, *Hayat-i-Jawed* (Urdu), (Lahore, 1957), p. 158.
2. C. H. Philips, ed., *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947: Select Documents* (London, 1962), p. 174.
3. Quoted in *Eminent Mussalmans*, Nateson & Co. (Madras, n.d.), p. 20.
4. Hali, op. cit., p. 193.

known Urdu biographer of Syed Ahmad, "when he [Syed Ahmad] felt that it was now impossible for the Hindus and Muslims to progress as a single nation and for anyone to work for both of them simultaneously."[1] A few days later when Syed Ahmad met the Commissioner of Benares and discussed the problem of Muslim education, the British official was surprised at the change. "This is the first occasion," he said, "when I have heard you speak about the progress of Muslims alone. Hitherto you have always been keen about thc welfare of Indians in general." Ahmad's reply was concise: "Now I am convinced that these two communities will not join wholeheartedly in anything . . . he who lives will see."[2] Dwelling on the same theme in a letter to Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, dated April 29, 1870, he wrote, "This is a proposal which will make Hindu-Muslim unity impossible. . . . . The result will be that the Hindus and Muslims will be completely separated."[3] This episode distressed Syed Ahmad considerably but, as we shall see presently, he did not abandon his mission of promoting unity between the two communities.

In 1869 the Government of India selected Syed Ahmad's second son Syed Mahmood for a scholarship to proceed to England for higher studies. The father who had long desired to see the working of the British educational institutions accompanied the son. Syed Ahmad stayed in England for seventeen months. There he was treated with courtesy and was received at the India Office by the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India. He was also presented to Queen Victoria. It was after a thorough study of the British universities that he decided to establish a Muslim residential university on the model of Oxford and Cambridge. The Muslim prejudice against western learning was to him a cause of grief and anxiety, and it was with a view to removing this bigoted and exclusive outlook that he determined to give them a lead by founding a college. He firmly believed that the crying need of the moment for his community was not their participation

1. Hali, op. cit., p. 193.
2. Ibid.
3. Quoted by A.H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India* (Lahore, 1950), p. 26.

in politics but a comprehensive plan of education to fit them for life in a changing world. The need for stress on education can be gleaned from the fact that in 1872 "out of three hundred students on the roll of the Hoogly College [which was maintained by the East India Company out of the income of a Moslem Educational Trust] only three were Moslems."[1] He returned to India in 1870 and at once started a monthly journal called the *Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq*. Its object was to bring home to the Muslims the need for liberalising their religious thoughts and turning to western education in order to regain their former prosperity. It will be seen that this two fold programme was closely connected with the founding of a Muslim educational institution. With his characteristic energy he threw himself headlong into the realisation of his ambition which in 1877 stood enshrined in the shape of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. The objects of this institution were clearly summed up in the address of Syed Mahmood which was presented to Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, on January 8, 1877, at the time of the inauguration of the College.

"To remove those prejudices which have hitherto exercised a baneful influence on our race; to reconcile oriental learning with Western literature and science; . . . to make the Mussulmans of India worthy and useful subjects of the British Crown; to inspire in them that loyalty which springs, not from servile submission to a foreign rule, but from genuine appreciation of the blessings of good government,—these are the objects which the founders of the college have prominently in view."[2]

The Aligarh College, though called Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, admitted Muslims and Hindus alike. Its portals were opened to students of all communities. In fact, in the earlier years of the College the Hindu students continued to outnumber their Muslim classmates.[3] Similarly, in the first group of Indian staff members the highest paid Professor was Mr. Jadu Nath Chakravarty.[4]

1. P.J. Griffiths, *The British Impact on India* (London, 1952), p. 307.
2. Quoted by Graham, op. cit., pp. 274-75. (For the complete address, see pp. 267-76.)
3. For detailed figures of the Hindu and Muslim students, see *Aligarh Magazine*, special Aligarh Number, 1953-54, 1954-55, p. 236.
4. Ibid., p. 237.

In 1878 Sir Syed was appointed a member of the Imperial Legislative Council by Lord Lytton. He was reappointed by Lord Ripon in 1881. It was in Lord Ripon's Council that he delivered his famous speech which has since become classic. Speaking in January 1883, on the Local Self-Government Bill he took exception to the introduction of the principle of "pure and simple" elections in India. He said:

"For socio-political purposes . . . the whole of the population of England forms but one community. It is obvious . . . that the same cannot be said of India. The system of representation by election means the representation of the views and interests of the majority of the population, and, in countries where the population is composed of one race and one creed, it is no doubt the best system that can be adopted. But . . . in a country like India, where caste distinctions still flourish, where there is no fusion of the various races, where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in its modern sense has not made equal or proportionate progress among all the sections of the population . . . the system of election, pure and simple, cannot safely be adopted. The larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community, and the ignorant public would hold Government responsible for introducing measures which might make the differences of race and creed more violent than ever."[1]

That he was here simply stating the facts of the Indian situation and not trying to win favours for Muslims at the expense of the larger community, is clear from another speech which he delivered at Patna in February 1883. He said:

"I say with conviction that if we were to disregard for a moment our conception of Godhead, then in all matters of everyday life the Hindus and the Muslims really belong to one community as children of the soil and not two, and the progress of the country is only possible if we have a union of hearts, mutual sympathy and love."[2]

In 1884 Sir Syed went on a tour of the Punjab and addressed numerous gatherings of Hindus and Muslims. He was nowhere treated as a Muslim leader but as an Indian

1. Extract from proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of India, 1883. Quoted by R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem 1833-1935* (London, 1943), Appendix II, pp. 155-56.

2. Quoted by H. K. Sherwani, *Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration* (Lahore, 1945), p. 234.

to whom all sections of the population could look for guidance and leadership. Sardar Dyal Singh, while welcoming him on behalf of the Indian Association of Lahore, said:

"Not the least remarkable feature of your public career has been the breadth of your views and your liberal attitude towards sections of the community other than your coreligionists . . . your manly and faithful representation of national views and your vigilant regard for national interests, while acting in that body [Legislative Council], deserve the warmest acknowledgments from us and our countrymen."[1]

While addressing a gathering at Gurdaspur he told his audience that "we (i.e. Hindus and Mohamedans) should try to become one heart and soul and act in unison. If not, the effect of one against the other would tend to the destruction and downfall of both." He did not confine himself to Hindus and Muslims only but "all persons, whether Hindu or Mahomedan even the Christians who reside in this country, are all in this particular respect belonging to one and the same nation."[2] To bring unity between Hindus and Muslims, he went so far as to suggest that "if by abandoning cow sacrifice there can be love and friendship between Hindus and Muslims, not sacrificing the cow is a thousand times better than sacrificing it."[3]

The next year, in 1885, the Indian National Congress came into existence. It was founded by a retired civilan Allan Octavian Hume, with the full 'go-ahead' benediction of the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin. Although "its appealing glances were all directed to the authorities above,"[4] it demanded "reform and expansion of the supreme and existing legislative councils, by the admission of a considerable proportion of elected members."[5] Sir Syed would not have anything to do with a political body. True, he had himself asked in *The Causes of the Indian Revolt* for nomination of Indians to the Legislative Council but he was against elections. He wanted it to be conferred from above and

1. Quoted by Graham, op. cit., pp. 342-43.
2. Quoted in *Eminent Mussalmans*, p. 32.
3. Syed Ahmad Khan, *Akhari Mazameen* (Urdu), (Lahore, n.d.), p. 70.
4. Rabindra Nath Tagore, "The Congress," *Modern Review*, Vol. LXVI, No. 1 (Calcutta, 1939), p. 90.
5. C.H. Philips, op. cit., p. 151.

not to be generated from below. He knew what 'demands' could lead to. The memories of 1857 were still fresh in his mind. He was against Indian, at any rate Muslim, participation in political activities. He full well realised how fatal it could be to their interests. Their greatest need, according to him, was advancement in the educational sphere. Their place was in the classroom and not on the public platform. Muslim participation in 'politics' was his pet aversion. The Muslims were backward economically and educationally. They were hardly yet freed from the suspicion which the Government had been harbouring against them. Any co-operation with the Congress which was bound to become a political organisation would arouse the distrust of the Government and probably have unfortunate consequences for the Muslims.

How far he was correct in his fears of British revival of suspicion against the Muslims, should they give any chance, is clear from the statement of the Governor of Madras who once said, "An eagle does not care a bit for the chirping of sparrows (i.e. Hindus) but if a falcon (i.e. Muslims) dares to oppose him, he at once breaks its neck."[1] This move of opposing the Congress was not motivated by any hostility towards the Hindus but was due solely to his sincere belief that the salvation of the Muslims lay in co-operation with the Government. "Doctrinally he was a broadminded and tolerant man sincerely appreciative of the Hindus, but as a political and a social unit he was of the opinion that the Muslims of India had to work out their own salvation."[2] Moreover, the prospectus issued, even before the first Congress met in 1885, stated that "indirectly this conference will form the germ of a native parliament, and if properly conducted will contribute in a few years an unanswerable reply to the assertion that India is still wholly unfit for any representative institution."[3] It was this fear of the introduction of representative institutions in India which led Sir Syed to oppose the Indian National Congress. He firmly believed that if

1. B. A. Dar, *Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan* (Lahore, 1957). pp. 82-83.

2. H. Kraemer, op. cit., p. 158.

3. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya., *The History of the Indian National Congress*, vol. I (Bombay, 1946), p. 16.

a system of representative government was introduced in India, it would ultimately lead to the disguised rule of the majority community. He said:

"Long before the idea of founding the Indian National Congress was mooted I had given thought to the matter whether representative government is suited to the conditions of india.... I reached the conclusion that the first requisite of a representative government is that voters should possess the highest degree of homogeneity. In a form of government which depends for its functioning upon majorities, it is necessary that the people should have no differences in the matter of nationality, religion, ways of living, customs, mores, culture, and historical traditions. These things should be common among a people to enable them to run a representative government properly; only when such homogeneity is present can representative government work or prove beneficial. . . I consider the experiment which the Indian National Congress wants to make fraught with dangers and suffering for all the nationalities of India, specially for the Muslims."[1]

In December 1886 Sir Syed formed the Muhammadan Educational Conference to promote education and social reform among the Muslims. Although it came into being to spread the intellectual message of Aligarh, it was also used as a political mouthpiece of the Indian Muslims and later became the forerunner of the All-India Muslim League. At the very first conference its founder reiterated his earlier plea. "I do not agree," he said, "with those who believe that political discussion would be conducive to our national progress. I regard progress of educatien as the only means of national progress."[2] As a practical counterblast to the Congress, Sir Syed formed still another association, the United Indian Patriotic Association, in August 1888 which was open to members of all communities and about which he wrote to his friend and biographer, Col. Graham: "I have undertaken a heavy task against the so-called National Congress, and have formed an association."[3]

In 1893 there occurred serious communal riots in Bombay.

1. W. T. De Bary, ed.. *Sources of Indian Tradition* (New York, 1958), pp. 746-47.

2. Quoted by Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims, A Political History*, (Bombay, 1959) p. 65.

3. Quoted Ibid., p. 67.

This occasion was used by certain militant Hindus led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak who "not only convoked popular meetings in which his fiery eloquence denounced the Mohamedans as the sworn foes of Hinduism but he started an organisation known as the "Anti-Cow-Killing Society," which was intended and regarded as a direct provocation to the Mohamedans."[1] The cult of Sivaji, the Maratha Hindu hero, who more than two centuries earlier had killed Afzal Khan, a Muslim General, was revived, and verses extolling the exploits of Sivaji became popular.[2] The Sedition Committee which sat under the presidentship of Justice Rowlatt (1918) reported:

"Public Ganpati festivals appear to have arisen out of an anti-Muhammadan movement started after riots which broke out in the city of Bombay in 1893 between Hindus and Muhammadans. . . . The idea appears to have been to make the procession in which the god is carried to his final resting place in the water as offensive as possible to Muhammadans."[3]

In the face of this anti-Muslim campaign the Muslims grew apprehensive and quickly formed the Muhammadan Defence Association in December 1893. Its aim was to acquaint the authorities with the views of the Indian Muslims and also to prevent them from participating in political agitation.

Thereafter Sir Syed took little part in political controversies. He was now devoting more time to academic pursuits and affairs of the College. His two-fold efforts in advancing the cause of Muslim education and of promoting sentiments of loyalty among his co-religionists had been amply rewarded. Muslim education was flourishing rapidly and the confidence of the Government had been in a large measure regained. That in supporting the Government he was not seeking personal advantage, is demonstrated by the following fact. Immediately after the Revolt was over, the Government handsomely rewarded those Indians who had been helpful to the Government in its difficult days. "A big Taluka, yielding an annual rental of 1½ lakh of rupees" was recommended by Mr. Shakespeare, the Collector of Bijnour, for Syed Ahmad also but he refused it, for "his conscience did

1. V. Chirol, *Indian Unrest* (London, 1910), p. 43.

2. V. Lovett, *History of the Indian Nationalist Movement* (3rd edition, London, 1921). p. 48.

3. *Sedition Committee Report* (1918), (Calcutta, 1918), p. 1.

not permit him to enjoy an estate the price of which was the blood of his countrymen."[1]

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was neither a traitor nor a turncoat. He sincerely believed that Muslims were backward educationally and economically, and were far behind the Hindus in every respect. There could be no co-operation between them in a political struggle unless they were on a footing of equality. He, therefore, worked ceaselessly to divert the Muslim energies into literary rather than political activities. Co-operation with the Government was their only chance. He therefore advised the Muslims, "brooding over the loss of power and prestige, and suspected of secret disaffection, to lie low and live down their unmerited reputation."[2] There was undoubtedly a change of emphasis in his earlier and in his later utterances. He started out as a nationalist and ended up as a champion of Muslim rights. But he was never a communalist in the sense communalism was understood in India in later years. "He was not opposed to the National Congress because he considered it predominantly a Hindu organization; he opposed it because he thought it was politically too aggressive. . . . He was in no way anti-Hindu or communally separatist."[3]

II

After the death of Sir Syed in 1898, there began to appear cracks in the edifice which he had so laboriously built. In March 1898 certain influential Hindus petitioned the Government of the United Provinces to sanction the use of Hindi written in Devanagri script as the official vernacular. The Government accepted this petition and accordingly passed orders in April 1900 substituting Hindi for Urdu which had been in use in the Government offices for a long time. This action of the Governor of the United Provinces, Sir Anthony Macdonell, was considered to be a partisan act. Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the Secretary of Aligarh College and in all respects a successor of Sir Syed, took upon himself the responsibility of representing the Muslim point of view. A meeting of protest was held at Aligarh in May 1900 where he

1. *Eminent Mussalmans*, p. 7.

2. Afzal Iqbal, ed., *Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali* (Lahore, 1944), pp. 4-5.

3. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York, 1946), p. 347.

delivered a strong speech, and a resolution asking the Government to withdraw the orders was passed. This action on the part of 'loyal' Aligarh was naturally resented by Sir Anthony who himself came to Aligarh and threatened to discontinue the Government assistance if the opposition to his orders was not abandoned.[1]

The next event of considerable significance in the life of Indian Muslims was the partition of Bengal. An English historian informs us that "the Lt. Governor of Bengal had to administer, in 1903, an area of 189,000 square miles, with a population of 78,000,000 and a gross revenue £7,500,000. No other Provincial administrator in India had so huge a charge and it was complicated by the obstacles to rapid travel."[2] Accordingly partition of the Province was suggested, accepted and ultimately announced in July 1905. A new province called Eastern Bengal and Assam was created with its capital at Dacca. Soon after this announcement the Bangali Hindus registered their protest followed by a boycott of British goods and organised violence. They believed that it was a plot hatched in favour of the Muslims. The partition was interpreted as an attempt to weaken their nationalistic demands. "An old folk song, Bande Materam, My Mother . . . . was resuscitated as the 'Marseillaise' that was to carry young Bengal to the storming of the British Bastille."[3] A loud cry was raised that the Bengali nation would be cut in two. The charge that the despotic Viceroy was implementing the policy of 'divide and rule' was also made since it was claimed that the division gave to Eastern Bengal and Assam a Muslim majority. Dr. Ambedkar, discussing the partition, says:

> "The Bengali Hindu had the whole of Bengal, Orissa, Assam and even U.P. for his pasture. He had captured the civil service in all these Provinces. The partition of Bengal meant a diminuation in the area of this pasture. . . . The opposition to the partition of Bengal on the part of the Bengali Hindus was due principally to their desire not to allow the Bengal Mussalmans to take their place in Eastern Bengal."[4]

1. S. M. Ikram, *Mauj-i-Kausar* (Urdu), (Karachi, n.d.), p. 111.
2. Lovat Fraser, *India Under Curzon and After* (London, 1912), p. 369.
3. V. Chirol, *India* (New York, 1930), p. 118.
4. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India* (3rd edition, Bombay, 1946), p. 111.

Another report suggests, "There were other motives too, less ingenious. Lawyers in Calcutta feared the competition of the new law courts to be set up in Dacca, and business men also disliked the prospect of competition from new enterprises that might spring up in the new Province."[1] A Bengali Hindu records in his biography that

"... it was not the liberal political thought of the organisers of the Indian National Congress but the Hindu revivalism of the last quarter of the nineteenth century ... a movement which previously had been almost wholly confined to the field of religion ... which was the driving force behind the anti-partition agitation of 1905 and subsequent years."[2]

Whatever may have been the motives of the Hindus in opposing the partition, the fact remains that the Muslims benefited by it. They suddenly found themselves in a majority numbering eighteen million as compared with twelve million Hindus. Since it was an occasion of mourning for the one and of rejoicing for the other, the relations between the two communities had naturally been embittered and at the Benares Session of the Congress in 1905 there were only 17 Muslims out of a total of 756 delegates.[3]

In 1906 a new instalment of 'Reforms' was under consideration. It spurred the Muslims to action as the quasi-electoral system of 1892 had clearly revealed their weakness. They had secured only half of the seats to which they were numerically entitled.[4] If the elective principle was to be confirmed and extended, as was probable, the Muslim position would become weaker still. It was, therefore, to safeguard against this weakness that a strong deputation of Muslims headed by the Aga Khan waited upon Lord Minto on the morning of October 1, 1906, at the Viceregal Lodge, Simla, and presented an address which contained the following demands:

(*i*) Communal representation in accordance with their numerical strength, social position and local influence, on district

1. T. W. Wallbank, *A Short History of India and Pakistan* (New York, 1958), p. 110.
2. N. C. Chaudhuri, *An Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (London, 1951), p. 226.
3. P. J. Griffiths, op. cit., p. 309.
4. R. Coupland, *India: A Re-statement*, p.105.

and municipal boards.

(*ii*) An assurance of Muhammadan representation on the governing bodies of universities.

(*iii*) Communal representation on Provincial Councils, election being by special electoral colleges composed of Muhammadan landlords, lawyers, merchants, and representatives of other important interests, university graduates of a certain standing and members of district and municipal boards.

(*iv*) The number of Muhammadan representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council should not depend on their numerical strength, and Muhammadans should never be in an ineffective minority. They should be elected as far as possible (as opposed to being nominated), election being by special Muhammadan colleges composed of landowners, lawyers, merchants, members of Provincial Councils, fellows of universities, etc.[1]

To this address Lord Minto replied:

"You point out that in many cases electoral bodies, as now constituted, cannot be expected to return a Muhammadan candidate and that if by chance they did so, it could only be at the sacrifice of such a candidate's views to those of a majority opposed to his community whom he would in no way represent; and you justly claim that your position should be estimated not only on your numerical strength, but in respect to the political importance of your community and the service it has rendered to the Empire. I am entirely in accord with you."[2]

For a clear comprehension of the Muslim demands and Lord Minto's reply it has to be borne in mind that the Muslims constituted 62 million out of the total population of 294 million, but the percentage of Muslims to Hindus was much larger than these figures suggested. There were millions belonging to the 'Depressed Classes' who, though not Hindus, were classified as Hindus. The total Muslim population, even without giving any consideration to its importance in proportion to the Hindus, "was greater than the populatien of any first-class European state except Russia."[3] But in spite of their seemingly impressive numerical strength, they were not adequately represented under the Indian Councils Act of 1892. Even the reservation of fixed

1. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* (London, 1931,) Vol. I, p. 184.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 183.

Muslim seats was not acceptable to them. Nothing would secure them faithful representation unless Muslim members were elected only by Muslim voters. Under any system of joint electorates the Hindus would have secured the return of non-representative Muslims. Hence the Muslim demand for separate electorates.

Rajendra Prasad has strongly insinuated that the Muslim deputation of 1906 was "engineered"[1] by Mr. Archbold, the British Principal of Aligarh College. Albiruni has, with equal vehemence, tried to prove that it was "a model of moderation, restraint and political acumen."[2] The more important thing to remember, however, is that it was the logical culmination of the Muslim fears of domination by the more numerous and more powerful Hindus. Even if it is accepted that Archbold did "engineer" the Muslim deputation, it need not startle anyone. After all the Indian National Congress too owed its inspiration to Hume and Dufferin. Furthermore, there was nothing new in the Muslim Memorial. As early as 1883, Sir Syed had voiced the Muslim grievances against "pure and simple" elections. It is the same fear to which the Aga Khan has alluded in his *Memoirs.* He says:

"We were acutely aware that we had long been neglected, that to the Hindu majority—as represented by its leaders in the Congress Party—we seemed a tiresome splinter in the flesh of the body politic, and that there was great talk of nationalism, we were not even considered in the aspirations that were being fostered, the plans that were being laid. They continued to send to the Viceroy's Legislative Council third-rate yes-men instead of truly representative Muslims, with the result that our separate identity as a community and the status that would have appertained to it had been forgotton by the British."[3]

After having secured a favourable reply from the Viceroy, Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, a prominent member of the deputation, wrote to the Aga Khan, "The deputation which went to Simla should be kept alive, and I suggest that a committee of members of the deputation should be appointed to correspond with

1. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided* (3rd edition, Bombay, 1947), p. 113.
2. Albiruni, op. cit., p. 94.
3. Vhe Aga Khan, *The Memoirs of Aga Khan* (New York, 1954), p. 122.

Government for the realization of the representation made. This is the work of an All India Association, and if you agree, I shall make detailed proposals."[1] The Aga Khan agreed and certain Muslim leaders in a meeting at Dacca on December 30, 1906, where the All-India Muslim Educational Conference was meeting, laid the foundation of the All-India Muslim League, with the Aga Khan as its President. The aims and objects of the League were set out in its first resolution which was as follows:

"(*a*) To promote, among the Mussalmans of India feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconceptions that may arise as to the intention of Government regard to any of its measures.

"(*b*) To protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government.

"(*c*) To prevent the rise among the Mussalmans of India any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other objects of the League."[2]

The fears of the Muslims were allayed by the Morley-Minto Reforms (1909) which provided for separate electorates for Muslims in all the Provinces except in Burma, Central Provinces, North-West Frontier Province and the Punjab. The Muslim reaction to the Reforms was, in general, one of acceptance and co-operation. The Aga Khan, addressing the League's annual session at Delhi, in January 1910, said, "I am glad our just demand has been recognized . . . we must accept it as final in an appreciative spirit, worthy of our tradition."[3] But the Muslim rejoicing was not destined to last very long. In December 1911 the "settled fact"[4] of Lord Morley was unsettled by the annulment of the partition of Bengal. It was a rude shock to Muslims and their grief was eloquently expressed by Khwaja Sir Salim Ullah, President-elect of the Sixth Session of the All-India

1. Quoted by Azim Hussain, *Fazl-i-Hussain, A Political Biography* (Bombay, 1946), p. 97.

2. C. H. Philips, op. cit., p. 194.

3. Quoted in *Eminent Mussalmans*, p. 189.

4. Lovett, op. cit., p. 88 (footnote).

Muslim League. He said:

"The annulment of the Partition . . . has appeared to put a premium on sedition and disloyalty, and created an impression in the minds of the irresponsible masses that even the Government can be brought down on its knees by a reckless and persistent defiance of constituted authority."[1]

More important from the point of view of later developments was the reaction of Nawab Viqar ul-Mulk, the second successor of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan at Aligarh. "It is now manifest like the midday sun", he wrote in the *Aligarh Institute Gazette* of December 20, 1911, "that it is futile to ask the Muslims to place their reliance on Government. Now the days of such reliance are over. What we should rely on, after the grace of God, is the strength of our right arm, for which we have the example of our worthy countrymen."[2] It is, however, important to remember that he was by no means suggesting that the Muslims should join hands with the Congress. In fact he spurned such advice and said on another occasion, "It is true that many a time disappointments point the way to suicide, and the suggestion that we should join the Congress is a result of similar disappointments—for which the present Government is responsible—but suicide is never advisable."[3] Although they did not join hands with the Congress, the Muslims were, nevertheless, drifting away from the path along which Sir Syed had led them. His policy, it seemed to many, had outlived its usefulness. They were taught to be loyal to the Government but it was agitation and not loyalty that was benefiting the other community. Their political inanition, they thought, was responsible for their being relegated to the cold shade of neglect. They had come to believe that obstruction would pay more than co-operation. Some other events, too, had taken place which added to their anxieties. In September 1911, war had broken out between the Ottoman Empire and Italy following an Italian attack and occupation of Tripoli. After a little over a year,

1. Quoted by Mohamed Ali, Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
2. Quoted by Albiruni, op. cit., 110-11.
3. Quoted ibid., p. 112.

in October 1912, followed the Balkan War, as a result of which the Turkish Sultan's dominions in Europe were further reduced. This fate of Turkey, whose Sultan was also the Caliph (Khalifah) of the entire Muslim world, further alarmed the Indian Muslims. They began to see a clear connection between their miseries at home and abroad and attributed it to the treachery of British diplomacy, which, they thought, was being employed to subjugate the Muslims everywhere. In addition to the religious reasons which bound the Indian Muslims to the Turkish Sultan, the British Government itself was responsible for promoting loyalty of their Muslim subjects to their Khalifah. "For a long time during the XIXth century", says Chirol, "It was her policy to bolster up the Ottoman Empire against Russia for many other reasons besides the danger which Russian expansion in Central Asia seemed to portend for the safety of the Indian North-West Frontier."[1] Against this background it is not difficult to see why a number of anti-loyal Muslim newspapers and periodicals began to appear in India. Of particular significance among these journals was *Al-Hilal* (1912) started by an exceptionally brilliant young man who later became famous as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. The pungent style and the pleasant get-up of the journal took India by storm and within two years *Al-Hilal* reached a circulation of 26,000 copies per week, a figure which was till then unheard of in Urdu journalism.[2]

Abul Kalam Azad was perhaps the most vocal and the most successful exponent of the 'rebels' who opposed the policy of Aligarh. In a letter to a friend, soon after he started *Al-Hilal*, he wrote:

"Aligarh movement has paralysed the Muslims. The real aim is the promotion of Pan-Islam, which is the true foundation and link for the progress and reform of Islam, and for this there will never be a better opportunity than we have now. Today no local or national movement can benefit the Muslims, even if it be the tall talk of the [Aligarh] University. So long as the whole world of Islam does not come together in an international and universal alliance, how can small tracts help the forty crores

1. V. Chirol, *India*, p. 217.
2. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom, An Autobiographical Narrative* (Bombay, 1959), p. 8.

of Muslims."[1]

Azad's activities, in the earlier phases of his political career, lay mainly in the realm of religious revivalism and Pan-Islamism, and through that his influence in spreading anti-British feeling was tremendous.

Another Muslim who appeared on the political scene at about the same time and who later achieved eminence was Maulana Muhammad Ali. He also started his career as a journalist by the foundation in 1911 of an English weekly, the *Comrade*. But, unlike Azad, he did not condemn the policy of Sir Syed. Speaking some years later, in 1923, from the Congress presidential chair, he said, "He [Sir Syed] realized to the full that nothing would suit the temper of the Muslims of his day better than the vocation of critics of their British supplanters in the governance of India. . . . I still think the attitude of Syed Ahmad Khan was eminently wise."[2] Unlike Azad again, Muhammad Ali, in the first phase of his political activities, was more interested in domestic politics than in Pan-Islamism. His prescription for the cure of Muslim maladies was the promotion of unity between Hindus and Muslims. Writing in the first issue of the *Comrade* he said:

"It is our firm belief that if the Muslims or the Hindus attempt to achieve success in opposition to or even without the co-operation of one another, they will not only fail, but fail ignominiously. . . . We may not create to-day the patriotic fervour and fine national frenzy of Japan with its forty millions of homogeneous people. But a concordat like that of Canada is not beyond the bounds of practicability. It may not be a love-marriage, born of romance and poetry. But a *marreage de convenance*, honourably contracted and honourably maintained, is not to be despised."[3]

The creation of anti-British political consciousness on the one hand and desire for more cordial relations with the Hindus on the other also resulted in a change in the constitution of the All India Muslim League. In 1913 it changed its creed and was henceforth to advocate "the attainment under the aegis of the British Crown of a system of self-government suitable to

1. Quoted by Albiruni, op. cit., p. 135.
2. Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., p. 251.
3. Ibid., p. 257.

India through constitutional means, by brining about, amongst others, a steady reform of the existing system of administration by promoting national unity, by fostering public spirit among the people of India and by co-operation with other communities for the said purpose."[1]

It was at this stage of the Muslim League's history that Mr. M.A. Jinnah, a staunch Congressman, whom the Aga Khan in his Memoirs described as "our doughtiest opponent in 1906,"[2] joined the Muslim League. But Jinnah's entry into the League was not unconditional. "His two sponsors were required to make a solemn preliminary covenant that loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause, to which his life was dedicated."[3]

III

The outbreak of the world war in which Turkey was engaged as an active belligerent against England created serious perplexities for the Indian Muslims. Their spiritual allegiance to their Khalifah and their loyalties to the King Emperor pulled them in opposite directions. They, however, remained loyal to England and fought her battles in distant theatres of war. But the situation on the home front was different. The anti-British feeling which had been gaining momentum for some time past grew apace and brought the Muslim League even closer to the Congress. In 1916 both Congress and the League held their annual Sessions simultaneously at Lucknow. Jinnah presiding at the Muslim League Session made a strong plea for unity. "Towards the Hindus", he said, "our attitude should be of goodwill and brotherly feelings, co-operation in the cause of our motherland should be our guiding principle. India's real progress can only be achieved by a true understanding and harmonious relations between the two great sister communities."[4] These

1. G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement Historic Documents* Karachi, 1967) p. 25.
2. Aga Khan, op. cit., p. 124.
3. (Mrs.) S. Naidu, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: An Ambassador of Unity*, p. 11; quoted by H. Bolitho, *Jinnah* (London, 1954), p. 58.
4. Quoted by M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah* (2nd edition, Lahore, 1953), pp. 101-02.

overtures of goodwill and friendship were fully reciprocated by the Congress and the result was a League-Congress agreement familiarly known as the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Hitherto there had been sharp differences on the issue of electorates. These differences were patched up at Lucknow and Muslims were conceded separate electorates not only where they had existed previously but in the Punjab and the Central Provinces where they did not exist under the provisions of the Indian Councils Act of 1909. Muslims 'weightage' was substantially increased in Muslim minority Provinces. In the Provincial Councils Muslims were to get their share as follows: Punjab—50 per cent; Bengal—40 per cent; United Provinces—30 per cent; Bihar—25 per cent; Central Provinces—15 per cent; Madras—15 per cent; Bombay—35 per cent. The Muslims were to constitute one-third of the elected members in the Central Council. It was further provided in the Pact that no bill affecting a particular community should be proceeded with in any Council if three-fourths of the representatives of that community opposed it. The Muslims were, however, to abandon their existing right to vote in general as well as separate electorates.[1]

The Lucknow Pact was followed by a historic announcement of British policy towards India. In August 1917 Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, made the now famous declaration:

"The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."[2]

Soon after this announcement the Secretary of State paid a lengthy visit to India and personally interviewed the Indian leaders of various shades of opinion. The result of the joint deliberations of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy was the drafting of what came to be known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which became the basis of the Government of India Act,

1. A.B. Keith, *Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy 1750-1921* (London, 1922), Vol. II, p. 125.
2. Ibid., p. 133.

1919. Two noteworthy features of the Act were the continuation of separate electorates for the Muslims and the allotment of Muslim seats at the Centre as well as in the Provincial Councils in accordance with the agreement reached at Lucknow. Althongh Jinnah advised his countrymen to "treat the Report . . . with due respect and serious consideration,"[1] the bulk of Muslim opinion was interested more in Muslim Turkey and its fate than in domestic politics.

With the Allied victory at the end of the war the Muslims became apprehensive about the probable destiny of Turkey. They demanded that *Jazirat-ul-Arab* including Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine with the holy places situated therein must always remain under the direct suzerainty of the Khalifah. October 27, 1919, was observed as the 'Khilafat Day' and the well-known Khilafat movement was started. To secure the acceptance of their demands a body known as the 'Khilafat Conference' was instituted at a meeting of Hindus and Muslims on November 23, 1919, at Delhi after a few preliminary meetings in different parts of the country. Mr. M. K. Gandhi took a leading part in these discussions and it was he who advised the Muslims to resort to non-co-operation to get their demands accepted by the Government.[2] The Khilafat Conference held its first session in December 1919 at Amritsar under the presidentship of Maulana Shaukat Ali.[3] It was at this session that the decision was taken to send a delegation to Europe to plead the cause of the Khilafat and explain the Muslim point of view. This deputation headed by Maulana Mohammad Ali reached Europe early in March 1920, and addressed various meetings in Paris and London. Appealing for the preservation of the Khilafat in Turkey, Mohammad Ali put forward his threefold claim in a speech at Paris on March 21, 1920:

"That the Khilafat shall not be dismembered, but that the Khalifa shall have sufficient temporal power for the defence of the Faith, that in the Island of Arabia there shall be exclusive

1. Quoted by H. Bolitho, op. cit., p. 79.
2. B. R. Ambedkar, op. cit., p. 139.
3. Tufail Ahmad Manglori, *Mussalmanon Ka Raushan Mustaqbil* (Urdu), (5th edition, Delhi, 1945), p. 510.

Muslim control without mandate or protection, and that the Khalifa shall remain as heretofore the Warden of the Holy Places."[1]

Speaking in London two days later, on March 23, he warned that "Turkey cannot be torn into fragments like Germany and Austria, because the day you tear the Empire of the Khilafat to fragments you outrage the feelings of seventy-five millions of your own people. That is where the principle of self-determination comes in."[2] But in spite of these entreaties and threats the delegation returned home empty-handed in October 1920. In the meantime the Treaty of Sevres had been published. It imposed a severe peace on Turkey and under it all that remained of the Ottoman Empire was a small Turkish state confined mainly to the interior of Asia Minor. The Muslims felt that they had been betrayed. They believed that the promises made to them during the war had not been redeemed.[3]

Even prior to the publication of the Treaty of Sevres, the Khilafat Conference had met at Calcutta, in February-March 1920, and decided to launch a non-co-operation movement to get their wrongs redressed. This decision was reaffirmed at a meeting of the Conference at Allahabad in June 1920. In the interval between these two meetings of the Conference Mr. Gandhi used all his influence to persuade the Congress to join the Muslims in their campaign of non-co-operation. It was not easy even for a man of Mr. Gandhi's influence as there was a powerful section of opinion in the Congress who were opposed to their participation in an agitation which was purely religious and exclusively a Muslim affair. But Mr. Gandhi insisted that the Congress should join hands with the Muslims in their hour of trial. For him it was "such an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Mohammadans as would not arise in a hundred years."[4]

1. Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., p. 159.
2. Ibid., p. 179.

3. Lloyd George had declared in January 1918, "Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race" (T. Morrison, in J. Cumming, op. cit., p. 94). Yet after the war Greece was to administer Smyrna and South-western Asia Minor, and to add eastern Thrace to her realm.

4. Quoted by G. T. Garratt, *An Indian Commentary* (London, 1928), p. 147.

That many of the leading Congressmen remained unconvinced is clear from the following remarks of Mrs. Annie Besant, "It was found that the Khilafat was not sufficiently attractive to Hindus, so at the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held at Benares on May 30 and 31, the Punjab atrocities and the deficiencies of the Reform Act were added to the list of provocative causes."[1] It was only after this important change had been made that the Congress agreed on the non-co-operation programme at a special Session at Calcutta in September 1920. This decision was later confirmed and elaborated at the annual Session of the Congress at Nagpur and the following practical steps were recommended: (1) surrender of all British titles; (2) refusal to attend any Government functions; (3) withdrawal of all students from schools and colleges; (4) boycott of British law-courts by lawyers and litigants; (5) no service by Indians in the British Army in Mesopotamia; and (6) no participation in the coming elections either as electors or as candidates.[2]

This Session of the Congress is significant for another reason. It was at this point that Mr. Jinnah finally left the Congress never to return. As a strict constitutionalist he could not subscribe to the methods now being favoured by the Congress Party. He was not opposed to agitation or even to strong measures in support of India's claim but he disliked and distrusted the kind of programme the Congress Party had now adopted. He remained unbending and inflexible in spite of the severe opposition from the audience and told Mr. Gandhi that "Your way is the wrong way: mine is the right way—the constitutional way is the right way."[3] Besides his distaste for unconstitutional methods, he took exception to the Gandhian programme even on practical grounds. "He could not contemplate how this movement could last, if all the boys were withdrawn from schools and colleges without substituting the existing educational institutions by national ones."[4] But this discordant and solitary voice

1. (Mrs.) A. Besant, *The Future of Indian Politics*, p. 250, quoted by S. Sen, *The Birth of Pakistan* (Calcutta, 1950), p. 70.

2. W. R. Smith, *Nationalism and Reform in India* (New Haven, 1938), p. 117.

3. Quoted by H. Bolitho, op. cit., p. 85.

4. M. H. Saiyid, op. cit., p. 191.

of Mr. Jinnah was not heard. The country was in no mood to listen to him. Popular feeling was deeply stirred and the demand was for leaders who could keep the agitation against the 'Khilafat wrongs' and in favour of 'Swaraj' at fever heat. Such leaders were already at hand. Mualana Muhammad Ali, his elder brother, Maulana Shaukat Ali, and Mr. Gandhi became the idols of millions—Hindus and Muslims alike. A period of instense and exciting activity ensued. Mr. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers toured the country and spoke fervently to enlist the joint support of Hindus and Muslims in what was described as the common cause of the whole country.

In spite of this ostensible show of amity and goodwill between the Hindus and Muslims, the emphasis of Mr. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers was not quite the same. Commenting on this campaign, the *Modern Review* pointed out that "Reading between the lines of their speeches, it is not difficult to see that with one of them the sad plight of the Khilafat in distant Turkey is the central fact, while with the other attainment of Swaraj here in India is the object in view."[1] Mr. Gandhi retorted sharply that "I claim that with us both the Khilafat is the central fact, with Maulana Mohamed Ali because it is his religion, with me because, in laying down my life for the Khilafat, I ensure the safety of the cow, that is my religion, from the Mussalman knife."[2] Whether Mr. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers were speaking with two voices or one, it is a fact that the scenes of co-operation between the two communities were unprecedented. Judged by the mass support the Khilafat non-co-operation movement enjoyed, it was unsurpassed in the history of India. "In terms of sheer physical proportion it was one of the greatest movements of the world."[3] It can safely be said that if the lack of political unity between the Hindus and the Muslims had been the only obstacle in the way of freedom, India had surmounted it during the Khilafat agitation days. But much more important than the presence of political unity was the absence of social unity which had always

1. Quoted by B, R. Ambedkar, op. cit., p. 140.

2. M. K. Gandhi, *Young India*, October 20, 1921, quoted by S. Sen, op. cit., p. 73.

3. W. J. Waston, *Mohammad Ali and the Khilafat Movement*, an unpublished M. A. Thesis (McGill University, 1955), p. 62

stood like the great wall of China between the two communities. It cannot, however, be denied that an advance was made even in that direction. There were frequent occasions when Hindus and Muslims drank water from the same cup. On one occasion the Muslims even invited Swami Shardhanand, a Hindu religious leader, to address a Muslim gathering in a Delhi mosque. But these fits of sanity were so few and this phase of the Indian communal problem was so short-lived that nothing constructive was achieved. It did appear at the time that the traditional hostility had been composed, but in fact the cracks were only papered over and not filled. It was an unreal alliance of strange bed-fellows in common misery and not an enduring unity which springs from purity of hearts and thorough understanding.

It is estimated that during the months of December 1921 and January 1922 about 30,000 people belonging to both the communities went to jail.[1] Even in the prisons the division between the Hindus and Muslims persisted. Some interesting details were recorded by Ch. Afzal Haq who was himself confined to prison at this time. The situation in the Punjab seemed to have been specially severe. Muslim confined as 'C'-class prisoners were obliged to line up at a distance from the Hindu cooks who threw them their loaves of bread. Every care was taken to avoid 'pollution.' "The Muslim political workers had to put the iron cups in a row and retire. The non-Muslim cooks never put cooked vegetables or pulses if the cup was in the hands of the Muslim. because there was the danger of his polluting touch."[2]

IV

In February 1922 the non-co-operation campaign was called off by Mr. Gandhi after the tragic incident at *Chauri Chaura* where twenty-two policemen who interfered with a procession were burnt alive by the frenzied crowd. Even before the tragedy of *Chauri Chaura* two equally painful incidents—the *Hijrat* movement and the Moplah rising—had taken place. Such incidents seriously discredited the movement and reawakened the latent hostility between the two communities.

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London, 1936), p. 80.
2. Ch. Afzal Haq, *Pakistan and Untoucahability* (Lahore, 1941), p. 53.

The *Hijrat* or the mass exodus of August 1920 was the outcome of a suggestion by certain Muslim religious leaders, and according to one report,[1] it was Maulana Azad who was the first to prescribe this remedy of mass migration to a Muslim country as a means of escape from the infidel British rule. Acting upon this advice some 18,000 Muslims, mostly from Sind and North-West Frontier Province, marched towards Afghanistan where, they were told, the Amir of Afghanistan was ready to receive them. But the Afghan authorities declined to admit these intending emigrants and they were turned back, with hundreds dying on the roadside due to the difficulties of the journey. Leaving behind them the roads dotted with graves of old men, women and children, "when the unhappy Muhajarin (emigrants) returned, they found themselves homeless and penniless; their property which they had sold for a tithe of its value was in the hands of others."[2]

The other incident was the Moplah uprising. Along the Malabar coast of India in the Province of Madras there lived a fearless, fanatical and poverty-stricken group of Muslim people known as the Moplahs. Excited by the Khilafat and non-co-operation agitations, in the summer of 1921, they rose first against the British authorities and then, surprisingly enough, against their Hindu neighbours. "The Moplahs were bitter; bitterly anti Hindu, bitterly anti-British, bitter against the world that gave them only misery."[3] Martial law was proclaimed and order was restored after a great deal of bloodshed. According to "a conservative estimate," the total loss of life was 10,000.[4]

This was, in sum, the Khilafat Movement of India. Although in lingered on even after the institution of the Caliphat was officially abolished by the Turks themselves in March 1924, the movement lost such effectiveness as it had ever possessed when the non-co-operation agitation was suspended by Mr. Gandhi. As a reaction to the short-lived unity during the agitation days, a rich crop of communal riots followed all over India.

1. Mazhar Ansari, *Tarikh-i-Muslim League* (Urdu,) (Delhi, 1940), p. 275.
2. T. Morrison, in J. Cumming, op. cit., p. 97.
3. W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (Lahore, 1943), p. 235.
4. W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 316.

Now two important questions emerge which merit consideration. First, why did Mr. Gandhi throw himself into the Khilafat agitation when it was so exclusively a Muslim issue? This question becomes particularly pertinent when it is remembered that he insisted, against the opposition of many prominent Congressmen, that they should unite with the Muslims and make the Khilafat issue a central point in their opposition to the British Government. A Muslim student discussing Mr. Gandhi's role in the period under review suggests:

"Even a man with the least grain of common sense could easily understand after that event that all the measures propounded in the non-co-operation programme were indirectly aimed at bettering the lot of the Hindus. The most important item was that which propounded the migration of the Muslims from India after leaving the country to the Hindus. If the scheme had been successful, Gandhi would have achieved what the armies of Rana Sangas, Prataps and Baji Raos could not do in the course of a thousand years."[1]

This is to attribute to Mr. Gandhi a design for which he was clearly not responsible. It is true, and we have already noted, that non-co-operation was proposed by Mr. Gandhi at a meeting held at Delhi in November 1919. But the seal of a *Fatwa* (religious approval) which was incomparably more important for the Muslims came from elsewhere. It again came from no less a person than Maulana Abul Kalam Azad himself who, while presiding at a meeting of the Khilafat Conference at Calcutta, on February 29, 1920, for the first time provided a religious sanction to the non-co-operation programme.[2] Hijrat episode and its responsibility has already been discussed. The facts, therefore, do not bear out the assertion that Mr. Gandhi was responsible for the miseries of Muslims. Mr. Gandhi had a very different reason for urging co-operation with the Muslims. He saw in the Khilafat movement an opportunity to strengthen the Congress. By bringing the Muslims into line with the Congress, in which he succeeded, though temporarily, he could make the Congress a power in the country and with himself at the head of the Congress, he could bargain with the British Government as the sole spokeman of all the sections

1. A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League Yesterday, and Today*, (Lahore, 1948) p. 32.
2. Tufail Ahmad Manglori, op. cit., p. 511.

of the Indian population.

The second question with regard to the Khilafat Movement is about the role of Muslims themselves. Why did they feel so concerned about distant Turkey? True, it was the religious affiliation which bound them with their Turkish brethren and equally understandable is their love and concern for the institution of the Khilafat which was a symbol of the strength and unity of Islam. But was it mainly religious as one authority tells us that "Pan-islamism in India was not in the main political. With the vast majority of Indian Moslems its appeal was purely religious"[1]; or was it, as was suggested by another scholar, "more a political than a religious movement, though its religious phraseology attracted the Indian masses."[2] The former view does not seem to be very plausible. After all Islam was not confined to the borders of India. There were Muslims all over the world but they were not stirred as the Indian Muslims were. The truth of the matter would seem to be that Indian Muslims were weak and therefore insecure. They always looked for something to lean upon for strength and security. In the earlier years they had leaned upon the British support under the leadership of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. But many things had happened in recent years to weaken their confidence in this support. Now they were on the lookout for a fresh anchor and they found it in the 'Khilafat'. It has been quite rightly said that "it was perhaps more semi-consciously, a bid for finding Muslim security in a future independent India over a non-Muslim majority".[3] It is, however, by no means being suggested that there was no religious sentiment behind the Khilafat Movement or that it was not genuine It was there and it was genuine too. But at the more intelligent levels, it was the fear of Hindu domination which has all along been the hall-mark of Muslim politics in India.

1. M. A. Ansari, in Preface to Halide Edib's *Conflict of East and West in Turkey* (Delhi, 1935), p. vii.

2. A. Yusuf Ali, in *Modern India and the West*, Ed. L.S.S. O'Malley (London, 1941), p. 409.

3. F. Rahman, "Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (London, 1958), Vol. XXI, No. 1, p. 89.

V

It is now time to return to the fortunes of the Muslim League. During the years when Khilafat and non-co-operation agitation was at its height, the Muslim League had been almost forgotten. The Muslims were enamoured of a more dynamic and stormy organisation like the Khilafat Conference. During the early twenties the Muslim League was in a moribund state. The Provincial branches had practically gone out of existence and Muslim interest in the League had almost become extinct.[1]

After a period of steady decline, the League was again revived and it held its annual Session at Lahore in May 1924. Mr. Jinnah who had taken little part in politics since the historic Session of the Congress at Nagpur in 1920, where he had been snubbed, presided at this meeting. He made another plea for unity:

"The advent of foreign rule and its continuance in India is primarily due to the fact that the people of India, particularly the Hindus and Muslims, are not united and do not sufficiently trust each other . . . . . I am almost inclined to say that India will get Dominion Responsible Government the day the Hindus and Muslims are united."[2]

It was at this Session of the League that a resolution of far-reaching importance was passed. It ran as follows:

"Whereas the speedy attainment of Swaraj is one of the declared objects of the All-India Muslim League and whereas it is now generally felt that the conception of Swaraj should be translated into the realm of concrete politics and become a factor in the daily life of the Indian people, the All-India Muslim League hereby resolves that in any scheme of a constitution for India, that may ultimately be agreed upon and accepted by the people, the following shall constitute its basic and fundamental principles:

"(a) That existing Provinces of India shall all be united under common Government on a federal basis so that each Province shall have full and complete Provincial autonomy, the functions of the Central Government being confined to such matters only as are of general and common concern.

1. In 1922 only 23 out of 1,093 members paid their annual subscription (Mazhar Ansari, op. cit., p. 300).

2. Quoted by H. Bolitho, op. cit., p. 89.

"(*b*) Any territorial redistribution that might at any time become necessary, shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority of population in the Punjab, Bengal and N.-W.F. Province.

"(*c*) The basis of representation in the Legislature and in all other elected bodies shall be population, except that very small minorities may be given representation in excess of their numerical proportion in those cases in which they would remain entirely unrepresented in the absence of such exceptional treatment subject however to the essential proviso that no majority shall be reduced to a minority or even to an equality.

"(*d*) Full religious liberty, i.e. liberty of belief, worship, observances, propaganda, association, and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.

"(*e*) The idea of joint electorates with a specified number of seats being unacceptable to Indian Muslims, on the ground of its being a fruitful source of discord and discussion and also of being wholly inadequate to achieve the object of effective representation of various communal groups, the representation of the latter shall continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present, provided that it shall be open to any community at any time to abandon its separate electorates in favour of joint electorates.

"(*f*) No bill or resolution or any part thereof affecting any community, which question is to be determined by the members of that community in the elected body concerned, shall be passed in any legislature or in any other elected body, if three-fourths of the members of that community in that particular body oppose such bill or resolution or part thereof."[1]

Another resolution of the same Session described the Reforms of 1919 as "wholly unsatisfactory and altogether inadequate to meet the requirement of the country," and went on to demand "a complete overhaul of the Government of India Act, 1919."[2]

Although Mr. Jinnah had parted company with the Congress and was now leading the Muslim League, he had not become an arch communalist, not yet. He still chose to call himself a nationalist. Speaking on the floor of the Legislative Assembly in 1925, he said:

"I say that I am nationalist first, a nationalist second and a nationalist last . . . . . I once more appeal to this House, whether

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from May 1924 to December 1936* (Delhi, n.d.) pp. 1-2.

2. Ibid., p. 3.

you are a Mussalman or a Hindu, for God's sake do not import the discussion of communal matters into this House and degrade this Assembly which we desire should become a real National Parliament. Set an example to the outside world and our people."

The communal situation, however, continued to worsen. Since the Khilafat Movement had petered out, Hindu-Muslim relations steadily deteriorated. The respect for order and authority was gradually lessening. The short-lived unity had evaporated in the thin air and recurring communal riots seemed to be a usual feature of Indian life. The whole landscape was overshadowed by the lowering clouds of communal passion and unchained religious fanaticism.

It was against this background of mounting tension and mutual suspicion that a group of prominent Muslims, mostly members of the two chambers of the Central Legislature, met at Delhi on March 20, 1927, to find a way out of the existing political impasse. Mr. Jinnah presided at this meeting. As a result of these Dehli deliberations, which later on came to be known as 'Delhi Muslim Proposals' the following formula was evolved:

"Muslims should accept a settlement on the basis of the following proposals, so far as represention in the various Legislatures in any future scheme of constitution is concerned:

"(1) Sind should be separated from Bombay and constituted into a separate Province.

"(2) Reforms should be introduced in the N-W.F. Province and in Baluchistan on the same footing as any other Province. In that case, Muslims are prepard to accept a joint electorate in all Provinces so constituted, and are further willing to make to Hindu minorities in Sind, Baluchistan and N.-W. Frontier the same concessions that Hindu majorities in other Provinces are prepared to make to Muslim minorities.

"In the Punjab and Bengal the proportion of representation should be in accordance with the population. In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation shall not be less than a third, and that also, by a mixed electorate."[2]

Tbree days later, on March 23, 1927, the Hindu members of the Central Legislature met in Delhi and put forward the following proposals in reply to the 'Muslim Proposals':

"(1) There should be joint electorates for all the Legislatures

1. Quoted in *Eminent Mussalmans*, p. 435.
2. Quoted by M. H. Sayid, op. cit., pp 238-39.

throughout India.

"(2) Everywhere seats should be reserved on the basis of population.

"(3) Religious and quasi-religious rites should be safeguarded by specific provisions in the constitution.

"(4) The question of the rearrangement of Provinces should be left open for the present."[1]

With these two proposals coming one after the other it was clear that no material change had taken place in Hindu-Muslim relations. The 'Muslim Proposals' were, however, viewed differently and given better consideration in May 1927 by the All-India Congress Committees which passed a resolution "substantially accepting the Muslim Proposals."[2]

The next step was taken by the Congress at its annual meeting at Madras in December 1927 which passed the following resolution :

"Having regard to the general desire of all political parties in the country to unite together in setting a Swaraj constitution ... this Congress authorises the working committee . . . to confer with similar committees to be appointed by other organisations . . . to draft a Swaraj constitution for India . . . and to place the same for consideration and approval before a special convention to be convened in Delhi not later than March next.[3]"

A few days later the All-India Muslim League at its annual Session at Calcutta in December 1927 passed the foliowing resolution :

"The All India Muslim League authorises the Muslim League Council to appoint a Sub-Committee to confer with the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress and such other organisations . . . having regard to the following proposals. . . .

"(1) That Sindh should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and constituted into a separate Province.

(2) That reforms should be introduced in the North-Western

1. *India* in *1996-27*, a statement prepared for presentation to Parliament (Government of India, Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, 1928), p. 18, hereafter referred to as *India*. with appropriate dates.

2. Rajendra Prasad, op. cit., p. 127.

3. *All parties Conferencz 1928*, Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference to determine the Principles of the Constitution for India, published by the General Secretyry, All-India Congress Committee (Allahabad, 1928), p. 19, hereafter referred to as *Nehru Report*.

Frontier Province and in Baluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces;

"(3) That in the present circumstances the representation of Muslims in different Legislatures of the country through separate Muslim electorates is inevitable, and that Muslims will not accept any scheme involving the surrender of this valued right unless and until Sindh is actually made a separate Province and the Reforms aforesaid are actually introduced in the North-Western Frontier and Baluchistan Provinces, and that when these requirements are fully satisfied, Muslims will be prepared to abandon separate electorates in favour of joint electorates with reservation of seats fixed on the basis of the population of the different communities, subject to what is related hereinafter;

"(4) In Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-Western Frontier Provinces the Muslim majority should make the same concession in regard to proportion of the seats reserved to the Hindu minority that Hindu majorities in other Provinces would make to Muslim minorities over and above the proportion of population of the Provinces which shall be the minimum basis;

"(5) In the Central Legislature the Muslim representation shall not be less than one-third."[1]

With these resolutions of the Congress and the League the political horizon was again brightened and a solution which had lately baffled the Indian leaders seemed within the realm of possibility. At least it appeared that the ground of differences had been narrowed and that the difficulties which remained might be removed by a process of bargaining between the two parties.

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

Chapter 2

The Parting of the Ways

(1928-1935)

I

SECTION 84-A of the Government of India Act, 1919, prescribed that the first inquiry into the possibilities of further constitutional advance should be undertaken after a period of ten years. Such a commission was to inquire and report "whether and to what extent it was desirable to establish the principles of responsible government or to extend, modify or restrict the degree of responsible government existing therein."[1] The British Government, however, decided to anticipate that date and, in November 1927, a Statutory Commission under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon was appointed. The Commission consisted of six other members of Parliament.

It was a foregone conclusion that the Indian National Congress would boycott the "all white" Commission, and it did. The decision was taken at its annual Session at Madras in December 1927. It called upon various congress organisations in the country "to organize mass demonstrations on the day of the arrival of the Commission in India . . . so as to persuade Indians of all shades of political opinion effectively to boycott the Commission."[2]

Dr. M. A. Ansari, the President of the Madras Congress,

1. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, p. xvi.
2. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, op. cit., P. 318.

remarked: "No sane or self-respecting Indian can ever admit the claim of Great Britain to be the sole judge of the measure and time of India's political advance. We also know our needs and requirements best and ours must be the decisive voice in the determination of our future."[1]

The Muslim League, on the other hand, was by no means unanimous in its co-operation with, or boycott of, the Commission. There was a clear split between what were called the right and the left wings of the Muslim League. The former, led by Sir Muhammad Shafi, a Punjabi Muslim, who was at one time a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, was particularly strong in the Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Provinces. This group was in favour of co-operation with the Simon Commission in the belief that the Muslims had more to gain by co-operating with the British. The latter group led by Mr. Jinnah, which was strong in the Muslim minority Provinces, was anxious to consolidate its opposition to the Commission.

These divisions became all the more sharp at the time of the annual meeting of the All-India Muslim League in December 1927. Even the venue of the Session was a point of dispute between the two groups. Mr. Jinnah and his supporters wished the Session to be held in some city other than Lahore, whereas Sir Muhammad Shafi, because of his strength in the Punjab, wanted it to take place at Lahore. At a special meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League held at Delhi in December, it was decided by a majority vote that the Session should take place at Calcutta. Sir Muhammad Shafi, who had been elected President for the year, refused to preside at the Session proposed to be held at Calcutta. Finally, two Sessions of the League were held, one at Lahore and the other at Calcutta. The Lahore Session was presided over by Sir Muhammad Shafi and the Calcutta Session met under the presidency of Moulvi Muhammad Yaqub, the Deputy President of the Indian Legislative Assembly. Jinnah of course was the "leading light and guiding spirit"[2] of the Calcutta Session.

1. Quoted by Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League, Its History, Activities and Achievements* (Agra, 1954), p. 183.

2. Rajendra Prasad, op. cit., 128.

The Lahore Session of the League passed resolutions advocating separate electorates, the separation of Sind from Bombay, the extension of reforms to the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan and co-operation with the Simon Commission.[1] The Calcutta Session of the League, as we have noted in the previous chapter, passed a Hindu-Muslim unity resolution, on the lines of that passed at the Madras Session of the Congress, but with the proviso that separate electorates should be abandoned only on condition that the Muslim programme was carried out in Sind, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

At the same Session it was resolved that "Mussalmans throughout the country should have nothing to do with the [Simon] Commission at any stage or in any form."[2] The proposer of this resolution, Sir Ali Imam, referring to the joint select committees which were to assist the Simon Commission at the Centre and in the Provinces, said, "The position of the select committees would be that of witnesses. Is that partnership? Misuse of language cannot go further."[3] Mr. Jinnah, who was no less bitter said, "Negotiations for a settlement are not to come from our side. Let the Government sue for peace. We will resist the new doctrine to the best of our power. Jallianwala Bagh was physical butchery. Simon Commission is the butchery of our soul."[4] In this very Session the action of Sir Muhammad Shafi and his colleagues "purporting to hold a separate Session at Lahore in contravention of the constitution of the League"[5] was severely condemned and the Punjab Provincial Muslim League was disaffiliated.

II

BEFORE considering the reception accorded to, and the findings of, the Simon Commission, it seems necessary to trace at some

1. *India in 1927-28* (Calcutta, 1929), p. 62.

2. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions o the All-India Muslim League, from May 1924 to December 1936* (Delhi, n.d.), p. 36.

3. Quoted by Muhammad Noman, *Muslim India: Rise and Growth of the All-India Mnslim League* (Allahabad, 1942), p. 264.

4. Quoted ibid., pp. 264-65.

5. Liaquat Ali Khan, op. cit., p. 39.

length the efforts made and the results achieved by the Indian National Congress and the left wing of the Muslim League to frame a constitution for India.

We have already seen that ths Congress reaction to the 'Delhi Muslim Proposals of March 1927' was favourable. The All-India Congress Committee at Bombay in May 1927, though accepting the 'Muslim Proposals' in substance, made one change in the original proposals, viz. "Sind should not be separated on communal grounds but on general grounds applicable to all Provinces."[1] It was at the annual Session of the Congress at Madras in December 1927 that a concrete step was taken in asking other organisations to join hands with the Congress in framing a Swaraj constitution and it was this invitation to which the left wing of the Muslim League had responded heartily with certain conditions which have already been detailed. Similar invitations were sent to many other organisations and the outcome was an 'All-Parties Conference' which held its first meeting at Delhi on February 12, 1928, and intermittently continued its deliberations till the middle of March. This Conference was not fully representative of Muslim opinion as the right wing of the League led by Sir Muhammad Shafi had refrained from attending it, though Jinnah and his followers attended it. The Conference was thus an incomplete representation of political India, but it made an honest and determined attempt to find a solution of the thorny problems of the retention or abolition of communal electorates, the extension of reforms to the North-West Frontier Province and the separation of Sind from Bombay.

It was apparent almost from the very start that there was a wide divergence on some of these issues between the views of the representatives of the Hindu Mahasabha, the body which represented the orthodox and militant elements of Hinduism, on the one hand, and the Muslim representatives, on the other. It was, therefore, decided on March 11 to entrust this work to two sub-committees, one to inquire into the financial aspect of the separation of Sind, and the other to consider the feasibility of the system of proportional representation.[2] These two sub-committees

1. *Nehru Report*, p. 19.
2. Ibid., p. 22.

were to report to the All-Parties Conference to be held at Bombay in the following May.

When the Conference met at Bombay on May 19, 1928, the breach which had appeared at Delhi had been further hardened and widened. The two sub-committees appointed at Delhi had presented no reports. The President of the Conference, Dr. Ansari, informed the delegates that "no agreement had been reached on the subject of the electorates and that the report of the sub-committee to consider the question of the separation of Sind from Bombay was not yet ready for submission to the Conference."[1] Thus no progress had been made since the Delhi Session. In fact, the hopes held out at the commencement of the Conference at Delhi had been falsified and it seemed probable that the Conference would break up in disorder. But due to the efforts of certain members the Conference continued and after much discussion it was decided to appoint a small committee for "viewing the communal problem as a whole and its relation to the constitution."[2]

A Committee was accordingly constituted as follows :

(1) Pandit Motilal Nehru	(Chairman)
(2) Sir Ali Imam	(Muslims)
(3) Mr. Shuaib Qureshi	(Muslims)
(4) Mr. M.S. Aney	(Hindu Mahasabha)
(5) Mr. M.R. Jayakar	(Hindu Mahasabha)
(6) Mr. G.R. Pradhan	(Non-Brahmin)
(7) Sardar Mangal Singh	(Sikh League)
(8) Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru	(Liberals)
(9) Mr. N.M. Joshi	(Labour)

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was to act as the Secretary. The Committee was instructed "to consider and determine the principles of the constitution of India before 1st July next."[3] Three members of the Committee took little or no interest in its proceedings. Mr. Jayakar declined to serve. Mr. Joshi stated that he could take part only when the rights of labour were being considered, but as a matter of fact he did not attend any sitting of the committee. Sir Ali Imam attended only one meeting.

1. *India in 1928-29* (Calcutta, 1930), p. 26.
2. *Nehru Report*, p. 23.
3. Ibid., p. 17.

The extensive plan prepared by the Committee is generally known as the Nehru Report. For the purposes of this survey the important points of the Report are as follows. With regard to separate electorates it said:

"Everybody knows that separate electorates are bad for the growth of national spirit . . . [and] are still worse for a minority community. They make the majority wholly independent of the minority and its votes are usually hostile to it. Under separate electorates, therefore, the chances are that the minority will always have to face a hostile majority, which can always, by sheer force of numbers, override the wishes of the minority. . . . Separate electorates must therefore be discarded completely as a condition precedent to any national system of representation."[1]

Regarding the question of reservation of seats on the basis of population, the Report stated that "general reservation of seats for any community whether found in minority or a majority is a full recognition of communalism and differs little from communal electorates."[2]

A far-reaching proposal which came up before the Committee in this connection was that the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind should be united to form a single Province, and that there should be no reservation of seats in this area. It was rejected as "it would mean the creation of an unwieldy Province sprawling all over the North and North-West."[3] Discussing the Muslim demand for reservation of Muslim seats in the Punjab and Bengal where Muslims constituted a majority, the Report stated:

"A majority reservation or rather fixation of seats is incompatible with real representative and responsible government . . . it is not only a negation of representative government but is in direct conflict with the principle on which responsible government rests. . . . It is absurd to insist on reservation of seats for the majority and claim full responsible government at the same time. Responsible government is understood to mean a government in which the Executive is responsible to the Legislature and the Legislature to the electorate."[4]

These arguments were backed by a detailed examination of the

1. *Nehru Report*, p. 30.
2. Ibid., p. 38.
3. Ibid., p. 37.
4. Ibid., pp. 39, 40, 42, 43.

local distribution of the Muslim population in the Punjab and Bengal which went to show that, without reservation of seats, the Muslims were certain of elected majorities and that in consequence they "can certainly have nothing to fear from a free electorate without any reservation of seats in these two Provinces."[1] The Report, however, agreed "to make an exception in favour of Muslim minorities by permitting reservation of seats ... in proportion to their population both in the Central and the Provincial Legislatures."[2] But they described it as a necessary evil under existing conditions, and declared that, wherever reservation of seats existed, the arrangement should be continued for no more than ten years.

'Weightage' which had been agreed to under the provisions of the Lucknow Pact and incorporated in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was disallowed because "such representation is only possible in separate electorates and has no place in joint or mixed electorates."[3] The number of seats reserved, it was argued, must be in strict proportion to the size of the community. The right to contest more seats than actually reserved was conceded. Dwelling further on the Muslim demand for reservation of one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature, the Committee reported: "The Muslims are a little less than one-fourth of the total population of British India and they cannot be allowed reservation over and above that proportion in the Central Legislature."[4] Regarding the form of government in the North-West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan the Report declared that "the status of these areas must be made the same as that of other Provinces."[5]

The consideration of separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency also engaged the attention of the framers of the Nehru Report and they dealt with this subject in great detail. They said:

"It is stated on behalf of the Hindus of Sind and elsewhere,

1. *Nehru Report*, p. 44.
2. Ibid., p. 52.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 54.
5. Ibid., p. 31.

that they are strongly opposed to the creation of 'communal' Provinces. . . . There is no question of creating of 'communal' Provinces. We have merely to recognise facts as they are . . . to say from the larger viewpoint of nationalism that no 'communal' Provinces should be created is in a way, equivalent to saying from the still wider international point of view that there should be no separate nations. . . . But the staunchest internationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to create this international state. So also without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation. We suspect that the real opposition to separation is not due to any national consideration but to grosser economic considerations; to the fear of the Hindus that their economic position might suffer if Muslims had the charge of affairs in a separated area. We are therefore of the opinion that even communal grounds justify the separation of Sind."[1]

Judging the case of Sind on the basis of linguistic affinity and the wishes of the people, the drafters of the Report were of the view that "Sind certainly satisfies both these tests. It is a definite linguistic area and the great majority of its people may be taken to demand separation. . . . We have yet to know that even a single Musalman opposes it, and Musalmans are 74% of the population."[2] Two other important provisions of the Nehru Constitution were the introduction of adult suffrage[3] and the assignment of the residuary powers[4] to the Central Legislature.

These, in brief, were the provisions of the Nehru Report.[5] The Report was considered in its entirety at the next meeting of the All-Parties Conference, held at Lucknow on August 28, 1928. The most noteworthy feature of this Session was a long resolution on the separation of Sind, introduced by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, a prominent Mahasabha leader:

"Simultaneously with the establishment of government in accordance with the Nehru Committee Report Sind shall be

1. *Nehru Report*, pp. 31-33.
2. Ibid., p. 66.
3. Ibid., p. 104.
4. Ibid., p. 105.
5. Mr. Shuaib Qureshi, one of the Muslim members of the Committee, recorded his vote of dissent and refused to sign the final draft. See ibid., p. 124.

separated from Bombay and constituted as a separate Province provided that:

"(1) after enquiry it is found (*a*) that Sind is financially self-supporting; (*b*) in the event of its being found that it is not financially self-supporting, on the scheme of separation being laid before the people of Sind with its financial and administrative aspects, the majority of the inhabitants favour the scheme and express their readiness to bear the financial responsibility of the new arrangement."[1]

In the event of separation being effected Sind would become a Governor's Province and non-Muslim minority would be accorded the same political rights as were granted to Muslims in Provinces where they formed a minority.[2]

The reaction of the Muslim community to the Report was distinctly unfavourable. Their objections were on points which they regarded as fundamental in the future constitution of India. The gulf between the two parties was at once revealed; separate electorates and the reservation of seats which the leaders of the Congress regarded as obstacles to the growth of Indian nationality were insisted upon by the Muslims as the absolute minimum which they would accept. Among the critics there were not only conservatives like Sir Muhammad Shafi in the Punjab and Sir Abdul Karim Ghaznavi in Bengal, but also staunch nationalists like Maulana Shaukat Ali, the famous Khilafatist leader, who stood for "reservation of seats as a condition of the acceptance of joint electorates even in the Provinces where Muhammadans were in a majority."[3] He even went so far as to say that "as a young man he had been a keen owner of greyhounds, but had never seen greyhounds deal with a hare as the Hindus proposed to deal with the Moslems."[4] Mr. Jinnah, one of the original and chief supporters of the All-Parties Conference, was in Europe during these hectic days of political activity. He was, however,

1. *All-Parties Conference (1928)*, Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference to determine principles of the constitution of India, together with a summary of the proceedings of the Conference held at Lucknow, published by the General Secretary, All-India Congress Committee (3rd edition, Allahabad, 1928), p. 162.

2. Ibid.

3. *Round Table Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 73 (London, 1928), p. 106.

4. J. Coatman, *Years of Destiny*: *India 1926-1932* (London, 1932), p. 214.

in touch with the latest developments in India. A copy of the Nehru Report which had been published in August had reached him before he landed at Bombay on October 26. He did not at once join the chorus of disapproval and his first reaction was that of appreciation of the "great endeavour" that the framers of the Nehru Report had made "towards Hindu-Muslim unity." He added, however, that "the Nehru Report and the decisions of the Lucknow Conference are not—like the laws of the Medes and Persians—the last word in the matter."[1] He advised those who did not agree with the Lucknow Proposals "not to rebel but to keep calm." There was, he said, "no reason for consternation and stampede," but "Muslims should organise themselves, stand united and should press every reasonable point for the protection of their community."[2]

For the purpose of eliciting public opinion on the Draft Constitution prepared by the Nehru Committee, an All-Parties Convention was called to meet at Calcutta on December 28, and invitations were issued to all important political organisations. The Muslim League, which met for its annual Session at Calcutta at about the same time, appointed a strong committee of twenty-three members to "endeavour to bring about an adjustment of the various outstanding questions between Hindus and Mussalmans arising out of the Nehru Report."[3] The Central Khilafat Committee which was meeting in Calcutta at the same time also decided to attend the All-Parties Convention.

On the fourth day of the Convention, a sub-committee of thirty-seven members including Mr. Gandhi, Dr. Ansari, Maulana Azad, Sir T.B. Sapru and Mr. Jayakar was eppointed by the All-Parties Convention to meet the representatives of the Muslim League and the Khilafat Committee. Jinnah represented the twenty-three Leaguers and Mr. T.A.K. Sherwani the forty-five Khilafatists.

The League Committee had formulated some suggestions, similar to the 'Delhi Muslim Proposals' of the preceding March, to be incorporated in the form of amendments in the draft of the

1. Quoted by H. Bolitho, *Jinnah* (London 1954), p. 93.
2. Quoted by M. H. Saiyid, op. cit., P-264.
3. Liaquat Ali Khan, op. cit., p. 43.

Nehru Report. The main amendments referred to four points:

(1) That the Muslim representation in the Central Legislature should not be less than one-third.

(2) That in the event of adult suffrage not being granted as proposed in the Nehru Report, the Punjab and Bengal should have seats on population basis and no more, subject to re-examination after ten years.

(3) That residuary powers should be vested in the Provinces and not in the Centre.

(4) That separation of Sind from Bombay and the elevation of the North-West Frontier Province as a Governor's Province should not be made contingent on the establishment of the Nehru Constitution.

As all the four amendments were rejected by the Committee, Mr. Jinnah decided to fight his case before the open session of the Convention. Since the debate that took place on December 28 is of great significance, it needs to be dealt with in some detail.

It was, he said, absolutely essential that a settlement should be reached between Hindus and Muslims and that the two should co-operate in the establishment of government acceptable to both. He said:

"Majorities are apt to be oppressive and tyrannical and minorities always dread and fear that their interests and rights, unless clearly and definitely safeguarded by statutory provisions, would suffer and be prejudiced, but this apprehension is enhanced all the more when we have to deal with communal majority."[1]

He dealt with each of the amendments in turn, beginning with a statement of his reasons for insisting upon the demand that one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature should be reserved for the Muslims. The Nehru Committee had predicted that under the plan which it proposed, the Muslims would obtain one-third, or even a higher proportion of the seats in the Central Legislature. This calculation was based on the assumption that in the Punjab and Bengal they would secure a larger representation than was strictly warranted by their numbers, and that

1. *The Proceedings of the All-Parties National Convention, Calcutta, 1928*, published by Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, Secretary, All-Parties National Convention (Allahabad, 1929), p. 78.

in those Provinces where seats were reserved for Muslim minorities they could count on electing representatives in an exact proportion to their numerical strength. Jinnah rejected this argument and the reasons upon which it was based. He looked upon the Muslims of India as a single community with common interests, and not as a number of groups scattered in varying proportions through the different Provinces. The Nehru Plan would, in his opinion, add to the political strength of Muslim groups in areas like the Punjab and Bengal where it was not required and diminish that of those Provinces where they formed only small minorities. To avoid this it was essential to retain the principle of 'weightage' in those Provinces in which the Muslims formed a small minority of population. "We wish," he said, "to restrict the Punjab and Bengal according to their population and desire that the excess should be distributed amongst the minority Muslim Provinces." "Let us," he added, "carve out of this 1/3rd as the Musalmans wish."[1]

He illustrated the point by reference to those Provinces in which the Muslims formed but small minorities of the population:

"Take the case of Madras and Bombay—it is not always the only criterion—viz. counting of heads; but the importance of these two Provinces. Take the case of the United Provinces again: it is the centre of Musalman culture and heart, and it will be unfair that they should be restricted according to the number of their population in the representation in the Central Legislature. These three Provinces, Sindh being separated, will then, so far as the population goes, be in this position: the United Provinces with the 14 per cent Musalmans, Bombay about 8 per cent and Madras about 6 or 7 per cent. The method that we want to be adopted is that the excess between 1/3rd and 1/4th should be distributed amongst the other Provinces according to their relative . . . importance to the Musalmans and not according to population. . . . It really comes to this that the Nehru Report makes a gift of extra seats over and above the population basis to Punjab and Bengal; whereas we propose that this extra 7 or 8 should be distributed among the minority Muslim Provinces."[2]

His next amendment was that in the event of adult suffrage

1. *The Proceedings of the All-Parties National Convention, Calcutta, 1928*, p. 79.
2. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

not being established—and he saw no possibility of this change—the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal should have seats reserved on a population basis and should not be allowed to contest for more. He said:

"I am not going to enter the pros and cons but it is an admitted fact that although the Musalmans in Punjab and Bengal are numerically in the majority, their voting strength is far below in proportion to their population and they, therefore, would not secure sufficient representation and it is feared that under these circumstances their representation will be far below their proportion. It is now devised to meet this undoubted fact by the Nehru proposals and the Report proposes the substitute of adult franchise, and from those premises it is argued that there is no need for reservation in Punjab and Bengal; but we wish to provide for the contingency which is most patent and probable that in the event of the adult suffrage not being established there should be reservation for Musalmans in Punjab and Bengal according to their population, but they should not be entitled to additional seats. And we therefore attach very great importance to this modification."[1]

Turning to his third amendment he maintained that the form of the constitution should be federal with residuary powers vested in the Provinces. "This question," he declared, "is by far the most important from the constitutional point of view and the future development of India and has very little to do with the communal aspect."[2]

Finally, he proposed that the raising of the North-West Frontier Province to the status of a Governor's Province and the separation of Sind from Bombay should not be made contingent on the establishment of the Nehru Constitution but should be taken up at once. There was generel agreement on the desirability of constitutional changes in the North-West Frontier Province. What Jinnah insisted upon was that these changes should be carried out at once without reference to whether the Nehru Report was adopted or not. The question of the separation of Sind from Bombay was more difficult. On the ground that Hindu and Muslim delegates from Sind had agreed to postpone consideration of this plan until further investigations of its

1. *The Proceedings of the All-Parties National Convention, Calcutta, 1928*, pp. 80-81.

2. Ibid., p. 81.

practicability had been carried out, the All-Parties Convention maintained that the question could not now be re-opened. Jinnah replied that the All-India Muslim League had not been represented at Lucknow and "was not a party to any such resolution."[1]

There was clearly a division of opinion here which threatened the measure of agreement that had been reached in the previous years on the general plan of the new Constitution. Following Mr. Jinnah's presentation of his proposals Sir Tej Bahadar Sapru, the distinguished leader of the Liberal Federation, made a powerful appeal to the delegates to sink their differences and to consider the problems before them from the larger viewpoint of national interest. "If you leave this *pandal* with failure," he said, "you will have done a great damage to the country from which it may not recover for a quarter of a century."[2] He did not agree with Jinnah's argument that the Muslims were entitled to one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature. But he dismissed the question as unimportant. "If he is a spoilt child, a naughty child I am prepared to say, give him what he wants and be finished with it."[3] As regards Sind, Sir Tej said that "this Convention had of course full authority to upset any arrangement arrived at at Lucknow, if it so wished."[4]

This plan for unity was not heeded by all. Mr. Jayakar, representing the Mahasabha, at once attacked Mr. Jinnah's position. He pointed out that Mr. Jinnah represented only a fraction of Muslim opinion and that he did not speak for the large body of Muslims led by Sir Muhammad Shafi and others. There was, therefore, he declared, no prospect of winning over the entire Muslim community even if Jinnah's amendments were accepted. He also warned the House that, "If you accede to Mr. Jinnah's demands the Report will be torn to pieces and will be rejected by important communities who have now accepted it as the final word in the matter."[5] Winding up the debate on his amendments Jinnah replied:

1. *The Preceding of the All-Parties National Convention, Calcutta, 1928*, p. 82.
2. Ibid., p. 84.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 85.
5. Ibid., p. 91.

"What we want is that Hindus and Musalmans should march together until our object is obtained . . . here I am not speaking as a Musalman but as an Indian. And it is my desire to see that we get seven crores of Musalmans to march along with us in the struggle for freedom. Would you be content with a few? Would you be content if I were to say, I am with you?"[1]

His plea was for unity, but for unity under conditions that would safeguard the interests and dispel the fears of religious minorities. Majorities, he said, and particularly religious majorities are apt to be "tyrannical and oppressive." It was essential therefore that arrangements should be adopted under which all minorities would have a complete sense of security. Referring to similar difficulties in other countries, he asked, "Was the adjustment between French Canadians and British arrived at on population basis or on the ground of pure equity? Was the adjustment between the Copt Christians and Musalmans in Egypt regulated by such considerations?"[2] These were, he said, great practical issues which concerned the future of an Indian nation:

"We are dealing in politics. We are not in a court of law and therefore it is no use resorting to hairsplitting and petty squabbles. . . . If you do not settle this question today, we shall have to settle it tomorrow, but in the meantime our national interests are bound to suffer. . . . Believe me there is no progress for India until the Musalmans and Hindus are united and let not logic, philosophy or squabble stand in the way of our coming to a compromise; nothing will make me happier than to see the Hindu-Muslim union."[3]

But he argued in vain. All his proposed amendments were rejected. This was the end of the efforts at *rapprochement*. Not all of Jinnah's dialectical skill could move the delegates from the position which they had taken up. The decision was that of the Congress majority, and the question arises why they abandoned the position which they had taken up in May 1927, when they had accepted the 'Delhi Muslim Proposals' of the preceding March. Jinnah's amendments differed in no essential point from the earlier Muslim proposals. The Congress leaders were of

1. *The Precedings of the All-Parties National Convention, Calcutta, 1928*, p. 93.

2. Ibid., p. 94.

3. Ibid.

course under heavy pressure from the representatives of the Mahasabha and the Sikh League. But what puzzled and disturbed the Muslims was that the Hindus and Sikhs were opposed to the reservation of seats for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal, even on population basis, despite their reiterated belief that under a joint electorate the Muslims would obtain a substantial majority of seats in these Provinces. The contention of the framers of the Nehru Report was that it was undesirable to secure to any community a statutory majority in the Legislature of any Province. The Muslim reply to this objection was contained in an address of the League President in 1931. He said:

"It is conveniently forgotten that at the Centre as well as in the minority Provinces the allotment of a fixed amount of representation to the minorities necessarily results in the grant of a statutory majority to the majority community and the statutory majorities are far in excess of the majorities which the Muslims claim in the Punjab and Bengal."[1]

If the Nehru Committee was sincere in its belief that the Muslims would secure 60 or even 65 per cent of seats in the Punjab and Bengal, it was surprising, as a contemporary observed, that they should not "consent to reserve for us 55 and 54 per cent of seats respectively in the Punjab and Bengal, and remove the danger of the Hindus being reduced to 40 or even 35 per cent in the Councils of these Provinces."[2]

The Muslims, further, could not understand why they were being refused 'weightage' in Muslim minority Provinces when it had been conceded under the Lucknow Pact and later, on that very basis, incorporated in the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. It would nowhere reduce the representation of the majority community to "less than 65 per cent which certainly is an effective majority."[3] There was obviously no parallel between the position of Muslims in Muslim minority Provinces and the position of non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal, as in the latter

1. M. Zafarullah Khan, *Presidential Address Delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi, 1931* (no place of publication and n.d.), p. 21.

2. Talammuz Husain, *The Case of the Muslims* (Gorakhpur, 1928), p. 78.

3. M. Zafarullah Khan, op. cit., p. 24.

named Provinces "Muslim representation on the basis of population would amount roughly only to 55 per cent and the minorities in these Provinces would always be in a very much stronger and securer position than are the Muslims in minority Provinces."[1]

The Muslims also objected strongly to the introduction of adult suffrage which had been made the basis of the Constitution proposed in the Nehru Report. They felt that it would be particularly harmful to their interests as Muslim women with their strict *purdah* system could not go to polling stations as freely as could their Hindu sisters. "The Nehru Report very ingeniously tried to fool the Muslims by talking of adult franchise. . . . But fortunately or unfortunately women become adults as well as men, and for twenty years at least Muslim women when they become adults will not go to the polling booths."[2]

Nor could the Muslims understand why the separation of Sind from Bombay should be made conditional on the acceptance of the Nehru Constitution. The proposal for separation had originated in the 'Delhi Muslim Proposals' in March 1927. It had been supported by the Congress Committee in May and again in December 1927. The drafters of the Nehru Report, as has been shown above, had also spent much of their energy in arguing in favour of separation. The reaction of the Muslims to the change proposed by the Nehru Committee was aptly expressed by a writer a few years later: "in spite of the strong recommendations of these influential bodies one fails to understand why the All-Parties Conference at Lucknow (*vide* their Resolution No. 4) made the separation conditional."[3]

The objectives of the Nehru Committee were twofold. In the first place, to answer the statement of Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, that Indian nationalism was unconstructive and, in the second, to achieve unity between Hindus and Muslims in regard to certain political differences of fundamental importance. The Constitution was offered as a concrete plan for the establishment of free democratic government in India as a

1. M. Zafarullah Khan, op. cit., p. 24.

2. Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., p. 480.

3. Mian Ahmad Shafi, *Sir Abdoola Haroon, A Biography* (Karachi, n.d.), p. 81.

Dominion within the British Commonwealth. But it was accompanied by the proviso that "in case the British Government did not accept the Nehru Report which provided that India should have the status of a Dominion within a year by the 31st December, 1929, the congress would give up the Report and insist on Independence." The framers of the Constitution believed that they had answered Birkenhead's criticism. But the success of their plan depended upon the realisation of their second objective, viz. the settelment of differences between Hindus and Muslims; and their efforts to achieve this objective wholly failed. By an irony of fate the Report and the ensuing discussion had sharpened and stimulated the old dissensions that were to have been reduced or totally eliminated.

Mr. Jinnah's reaction was stated in one incisive sentence. "This," he said, "is the parting of the ways."[2] Other Muslim leaders of various shades of opinion were also quick to express themselves. In a letter to the President of the All-Parties National Convention, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Secretary of the Central Khailafat Committee, challenged him "to have it [Nehru Report] tested in any conference which is open to all adult Muslims and not confined merely to the supporters of the Nehru Report."[3] Maulana Muhammad Ali, in his presidential adress to the All-India Khilafat Conference held at Calcutta in December 1928, was even more bitter. He said:

"I ask when you boast of your nationalism and condemn communalism, show me a country in the world like your India—your nationalist India. . . . You make compromises in your constitution every day with false doctrines, immoral conceptions and wrong ideas but you make no compromise with our communalists—with separate electorates and reserved seats. Twenty-five per cent is our portion of population and yet you will not give us 33 per cent in the Assembly. You are a Jew, a Bania."[4]

Criticism of the Nehru Report was not confined to the Muslim Leaguers and the Khilafatists. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-

1. Rajendra Prasad; op. cit., pp. 132-33.

2. Quoted by H. Bolitho, op. cit., p. 95.

3. For text of the letter, see *The Proceeding of the All-Parties National Convention*, p. 128.

4. Quoted by B.R. Alembedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India* (3rd edition, Bombay, 1946), p. 280.

Hind, formed at the time of the Khilafat agitation, also expressed itself strongly against the Report.[2]

III

ONE immediate and important result of the Nehru Report was that it gave a powerful impetus to union among the hitherto divided Muslims. The next development was an earnest attempt on the part of Muslims to achive unity of action so that their community might be better able to uphold its claims. The attempt of Indian Muslims to consolidate their position culminated in the All-Parties Muslim Conference held at Delhi on December 31, 1928-January 1, 1929, under the chairmanship of the Aga Khan. This most representative[3] conclave of the Muslims adopted a long resolution summarising the constitutional demands of their community.

The basic demand was for a Federation rather than a unitary state, with the residual powers vested in the Provinces. "In view of India's vast extent and its ethnological, linguistic, administrative and geographical or territorial divisions, the only form of government suitable to India is a federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent units."

The resolution insisted upon the maintenance of the existing system of separate communal electorates. This plan, it was said, was essential "in order to bring into existence a really representative democratic Government." In addition the demand was made for a due share in the Central and Provincial Cabinets, the enjoyment of the majority position in the Provinces in which

1. The word *Ulema* literally means scholars and they are treated as specialists on points of Islamic law and its interpretation. Jamiat-ul-Ulema was an avowedly anti-British organisation and had gone with the Congress through the fiery ordeal of non-co-operation.

2. For detailed criticism, see Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hay* (Urdu), (Delhi, 1946), Part II, pp. 147-60.

3. Jinnah was the only important leader who did not participate in the Conference though many of his supporters did. It was attended by Muslims representing almost all shades of political opinion. In addition to Sir Muhammad Shafi and Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the famous poet and philosopher, the Ali Brothers and the representatives of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema were also present. For further details, see Abdul Majid Salik, *Sarguzasht* (Urdu), (Lahore, 1955), p. 257.

they constituted a majority of the population and a representation in other Provinces which should in no case be "less than that enjoyed by them under the existing law." Mr. Jinnah's demand for one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature was repeated, together with a demand for an "adequate share along with other Indians in all services of the State and on statutory self-governing bodies." Finally, the Conference insisted "that the Indian Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for protection and promotion of Muslim education, languages, religion, personal law and Muslim charitable institutions." The resolution closed with a significant warning that "no Constitution, by whomsoever proposed or devised, will be acceptable to Indian Musalmans unless it conforms with principles embodied in this resolution."[1]

The above resolution, read along with the Nehru Report, clearly indicates the divergent opinions held by Hindus and Muslims on the future constitution of India. The Hindus, while conceding a measure of Provincial autonomy, desired to strengthen the Central Government at the expense of the component units. The Muslims, on the other hand, insisted on a Federation in which the powers of the Central Government would be reduced to a minimum, and those of the Provinces expanded as widely as possible. Their reasons for this stand are clear. As a minority community in the whole of India tehy could not hope to exercise much influence upon the Central Legislature nor upon the policies of the Central Executive. But in some of the more important Provinces they formed a majority of the population and their strength in the Government of these Provinces would, they believed, enable them to bargain for better terms for their co-religionists in other Provinces where the Hindus formed the majority. Moreover, as compared with the Hindus, the Muslims were economically weak even in those Provinces where they formed a numerical majority; and they were naturally uneasy at the prospect of a change which would place even greater power in the hands of the Hindus. As a British official, writing some years later, has expressed it, they feared that their progress would be halted, that their position of inferiority would be frozen if Hindus

1. For the text of the resolution, see *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* (London, 1930), Vol. II, pp. 84-85.

added political to economic power.[1]

Their other major demand, i.e. the retention of separate electorates, was also the outcome of their fear of domination, and to some even of extinction, at the hands of the majority community. Muslim opinion firmly held that their abolition would be disastrous to the peace and quiet of the country. It was described as the "sheet anchor" of their politics; a safeguard which could not be removed without their consent. Without it, it was declared, "India will be thrown into a vortex of communal strife, from which it will take her a long time to recover."[2]

Although the All-Parties Muslim Conference (later transformed into All-India Muslim Conference) was attended by a cross-section of almost the entire Muslim community, the breach between the two sections of the League had not been healed. In fact, the Muslim League was further sub-divided as among Jinnah's supporters there was one section which stood for the acceptance of the Nehru Report. It was this group, "flattered and cajoled by Mr. Gandhi,"[3] which shortly afterwards at Allahabad in July 1929[4] formed the All-India Nationalist Muslim Party under the leadership of such men as Maulana Azad, Dr. M.A. Ansari, Sir Ali Imam and Dr. Muhammad Alam. The objects of this Party were "to counteract the 'reactionary activities of the so-called All-Parties Moslem Conference,' to promote a spirit of nationalism among Moslems, to develop a mentality opposed to communalism and to induce Moslems and Hindus to treat one another in a spirit of broadminded patriotism."[5]

The events which followed, however, facilitated reunion of those sections of the Muslim League led by Mr. Jinnah and Sir Muhammad Shafi which had divided over the question of

1. Sir Frederick Puckle, "The Pakistan Doctrine: Its Origins and power," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1946), Vol. XXIV, No. 3, p. 536.

2. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, "The Hindu-Muslim Problem," *Indian Affairs* (London, 1930), Vol. I, No. 2, p. 67.

3. W. R. Smith, op. cit., P-364.

4. This party remained in existence only for about three years. It disappeared from the political stage towards the end of 1931. For details, see Tufail Ahmad Manglori, op. cit., P-439-40.

5. W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 363.

co-operation with the Simon Commission in 1927. Mr. Jinnah's rejection of the Nehru Report, following the refusal of the All-Parties National Convention to agree to his amendments, removed the chief cause of difference. An agreement between the two was reached in March 1929 with the avowed purpose of reuniting the League. It was arranged that the two wings should meet simultaneously in Delhi at the end of March and pass identical resolutions in favour of a joint sitting.[1] For the forthcoming session Mr. Jinnah prepared a draft resolution on the basis of which a sttlement could be made. The resolution ran thus:

"Whereas the basic idea on which the All-Parties Conference was called in being and a Convention summoned at Calcutta during Christmas week 1928 was that a scheme of reforms should be formulated and accepted and ratified by the foremost political organizations in the country as a National Pact; . . . and whereas the reasonable and moderate proposals put forward by the delegates of the All-India Muslim League at the Convention in modification were not accepted, the Muslim League is unable to accept the Nehru Report.

"The League after anxious and careful consideration most earnestly and emphatically lays down that no scheme for the future constitution of the government of India will be acceptable to Mussulmans of India until and unless the following basic principles are given effect to and provisions are embodied therein to safeguard their rights and interests."[2]

Although Jinnah was not present at the All-Parties Muslim Conference, his own resolution was, in effect, a re-statement and an elaboration of that adopted by the Conference. It was this draft resolution which contained all the provisions which afterwards became famous as 'Mr. Jinnah's Fourteen Points.'[3]

By March 28, 1929, the delegates to the meetings of the two wings had assembled at Delhi but as a serious illness prevented Sir Muhammad Shafi's attendance, the proceedings of the proposed meeting did not go according to plan. Disagreement developed between the two groups especially on the question of the permanent maintenance of separate electorates. As a result the followers

1. *India in 1928-29* (Calcutta, 1930), p. 42.

2. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, *Speeches and Dacuments on the Indian Constitution, 1921-47* (London, 1957), Vol. I, pp. 245-46.

3. For the text of these Forteen Points, see Appendix A.

of Sir Muhammad Shafi refused to join the open meeting. In addition, a rowdy element appeared at the meeting evidently determined to turn the affair into a fiasco and Jinnah was forced to dissolve the meeting.[1] Thus the schism between the two wings of the League remained as it had been and "Jinnah's belief that he had produced a foolproof and comprehensive charter of Muslim demands and his hope that he would be able to rally all sections of Muslim behind him were belied."[2]

IV

AFTER having examined the respective positions of Hindus and Muslims on the constitutional future of India, attention must now be directed to the work and conclusions of the Simon Commission. When the Commissioners arrived in India in February 1928, they were greeted by the Congress volunteers with the slogan "Go back Simon." They soon discovered that they were up against heavy odds. The Congress had unanimously decided to boycott the all-British Commission. The League, as already mentioned, was badly split. The section under Jinnah had also decided to boycott the Commission, though the supporters of Shafi were inclined to co-operate. In spite of these initial difficulties, the Commission was able to complete it work during its two visits, the first lasting from February 3 to March 31, 1928, and the second from October 11, 1928, to April 13, 1929.

The Report of the Commission was published in two volumes. The first entitled "Survey" dealt with the first part of the Commission's task, which was to "enquire into working of the system of government, the growth of education and the development of representative institutions in British India, and matters connected therewith."[3] The second entitled "Recommendations" contained the recommendations "together with a statement of the reasons which have led us to put them forward."[4]

The Simon Commission, after a detailed study of the Indian constitutional problem, reached the conclusion that there were no

1. *India in 1928-29* (Calcutta, 1930), p. 45.
2. Ram Gopal, op. cit., p. 220.
3. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, p. 5.
4. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1.

real political boundaries between Indian India and British India, and that they could no longer be treated separately. They were "convinced of the impossibility of continuing to look at one-half of India to the exclusion of the other."[1] Thc question of the integration of the states, however, was not easy. The states were not British territories and their subjects not British subjects. They had treaty relationships with the Crown as the paramount power. The British Government was responsible for the states in their external relations and for the preservation of their territorial integrity. The nature of governments in the states further complicated the problem of unification. British India was steadily moving towards full democracy while most of the Princes were holding on strongly to autocracy. This was obviously a serious difficulty, but the Commissioners were confident that it would be overcome. After a carefull study of the problem they concluded that the rulers of the states recognised "more and more the need for adjusting their future relationship to the rest of India." "We believe," they went on to say, "that they will only be too ready to come into the larger whole when they can see that their rights and position will be safeguarded."[2]

The existing artificial division formed a serious obstacle to the development of the country as a whole. Geographic, political and economic unity and common needs such as defence, communications and important social matters all required an all-India solution. Harmony between states and Provinces was absolutely necessary for the peace and prosperity of India. From this premise, the Commissioners concluded that "it is only in a federal constitution that units differing so widely in constitution as the Provinces and the states can be brought together while retaining internal autonomy."[3]

There were other reasons, too, due to which a Federal from of government seemed the best, if not the only solution of the Indian constitutional problem. As the Commissioners stated:

"It is only in a federal structure that sufficient elasticity can be obtained for the union of elements of diverse internal constitution and of communities at very different stages of development

1. *Report of the Indion Statutory Commission*, Vol. II, p. 9.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Ibid., p. 13.

and culture. The need for this appears not only when contemplating the prospect, perhaps distant, of the ultimate federation of the States with British India, but when the immediate facts of the situation inside Britsh India are examined."[1]

In the proposed Federation the Provinces were to have the greatest possible measure of autonomy. Dyarchy was to be abolished and it was recommended "that in future each Province should be as for as possible mistress in her own house."[2] Regarding the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency, the Commission sympathised with the claim but reported that "there would have to be a close and detailed enquiry into the financial consequences which would follow from such a step before a decision could be taken."[3] The position of the North-West Fronier Province, too, was cosidered and the Commission did recognise the need for constitutional advance in that area, but it did not favour the establishment of the same measure of responsible government as that in the Governors' Provinces. In their view, "the inherent right of a man to smoke a cigarette must necessarily be curtailed if he lives in a powder magazine."[4]

On the vexed question of communal representation their conclusions were clear and emphatic:

"We are unanimous in holding that communal representation for the Muhammadans of a Province must be continued and that Muhammadan voters could not be deprived of this special protection until a substantial majority of Muhammadan representatives in the Provincial Legislature declared themselves in favour of the change."[5]

By way of explanation the Report added:

"It is impossible to shut one's eyes to the force of the argument that the mere reservation of seats in order to secure a guaranteed amount of representation for the Moslem minority, is far from securing the return to the legislatures of Moslems who would be regarded by their co-religionists as authoritative and satisfactory representatives."[6]

1. *Report of the India Statutory Commission*, Vol. II, pp. 14-15.
2. Ibid., p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 25.
4. Ibid., p. 103.
5. Ibid., p. 60.
6. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

The Commissioners had already met the Hindu allegations that communal representation had tended to exacerbate rather than mitigate the communal tension. "There is no solid ground for supposing that if communal representation were abolished communal strife would disappear. The true cause lies deeper and arises from conditions which are far more difficult to change than the mechanics of representation."[1] This was, the Commissioners believed, a problem which the two communities must solve for themselves.

"No third party, however friendly and disinterested, can do what the two communities might co-operate in doing for themselves by mutual agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, we are compelled to assume, in reference to this matter, a continuance of separate communal electorates."[2]

On the other hand, while favouring the maintenance of 'weightage' in the Muslim minority Provinces, they rejected the Muslim demand for the reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal.

"It would be unfair that Muhammadans should retain the very considerable weightage they now enjoy in six Provinces, and that there should at the same time be imposed, in face of Hindu and Sikh opposition, a definite Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the electorate."[3]

Similarly, the Commissioners rejected the demand of the Muslims for one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature. Instead they recommended a system of proportional representation for elections to that body.[4]

Another important principle suggested by the Commission pertained to safeguards in the interest of the minorities. Under existing conditions such safeguards were necessary.

"Until the spirit of tolerance is more widespread in India and until there is evidence that the minorities are prepared to trust to the sense of justice of the majority, we feel that there is indeed need for safeguards . . . . the only practical means of protecting the weaker or less numerous elements in the population is by the retention of an impartial power, residing in the

1. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. II, p. 29.
2. Ibid., p. 63.
3. Ibid., p. 71.
4. Ibid., pp. 123 and 126.

Governor-General and the Governors of Provinces to be exercised for this purpose."[1]

A no less difficult problem was that of the composition of the Provincial ministries. It was necessary, the Commissioners believed, to adopt some method by which the minorities would be ensured of fair representation in the Executive as well as in the Legislature. "In some Provinces we conceive that a reasonably stable ministry is hardly possible without the inclusion of ministers from the main minority groups. In others prudence would dictate the adoption of a similar course, even when it is not inevitable."[2]

For the purposes of this study these were the most important recommendations of the Simon Commission. Sir John Simon, after completing the work entrusted to him, observed that there ought to be no more periodical revisions of the Constitution because nothing can reach its full stature that has not the opportunity to grow. "It is," he said, "difficult for a plant to grow if it is being pulled up by the roots and examined."[3]

Among the Muslims the Report was given a mixed reception. There was general satisfaction with the proposal that the future government of India should be a Federation, and with certain other concessions. But the Muslims in general were disappointed at the failure of the Commission to support their claims on other points, such as representation in the Central Legislature and the future position of Sind and the North-West Frontier Province. Their reaction was reflected in a resolution adopted by the Muslim Conference at Lucknow in July 1930:

"This Conference, while appreciating the principle of a federal system of government and the retention of separate electorates for the Moslem minority, records its dissatisfaction at, and disappointment with, the Simon Commission Report, as it fails to concede most of the demands formulated by Moslems of all shades of opinion assembled at Delhi on January 1, 1929, under the presidentship of his Highness the Aga Khan, and as, instead of advancing the present constitution toward self-government, it sets it back in certain respects."[4]

1. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. II, p. 23.
2. Ibid., p. 41.
3. Sir John Simon, *Two Broadcast Talks on India* (London, 1930), p. 23.
4. Quoted by W.R. Smith, op. cit., p. 369.

V

Before the Report of the Statutory Commission was published the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, announced the decision of the British Government to summon a Round Table Conference including all parties and interests in British India and of the rulers of the native states, to consider the constitutional problem in all its aspects. His statement included the famous declaration that the natural issue of constitutional progress in India, foreshadowed in the declaration of August 1917, was "the attainment of Dominion Status."[1]

This announcement failed to satisfy the Congress which remained sceptical of British intentions. Under Gandhi's leadership the Congress declared that they would not attend the proposed Round Table Conference unless a definite assurance was given that its purpose was the drafting of a Constitution under which India would be given Dominion Status immediately. It was obviously impossible for the Viceroy to give such an assurance; and when the discussion between Lord Irwin and Mr. Gandhi failed to produce agreement, the Congress prepared to launch its threatened campaign of Civil Disobedience. The Campaign began in March 1930 and lasted for about a year.

Two Muslim organisations with some local support in the Punjab and the United Provinces supported the Congress. In general, however, the Muslim community not only refused to take part in it but strongly condemned the Campaign. Their views were represented by the popular leader Maulana Muhammad Ali, at one time an admirer and close ally of Mr. Gandhi. Speaking at a meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference at Bombay in April 1930, he said, "We refuse to join Mr. Gandhi, because his movement is not a movement for the complete independence of India but for making the seventy millions of Indian Musalmans dependents of the Hindu Mahasabha."[2]

Jinnah's views on Gandhi's methods had not altered. Ten years earlier when the first Civil Disobedience Campaign had been launched he had condemned it as unconstitutional and futile. In 1930 he repeated the condemnation in equally emphatic terms.

1. *India in 1929-30* (Calcutta, 1931), Appendix II, p. 468.
2. Quoted by R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem, 1833-1935*, p. 111.

In his judgement, as interpreted by one biographer, "Gandhi's influence over the Congress was responsible for this sudden outburst of political hysteria."[1] On the other hand, he enthusiastically supported the plan of a Round Table Conference. Indeed, he had himself suggested such a plan some months before Lord Irwin's announcement. Some passages from a letter to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald dated June 19, 1929, merit quotation. His Majesty's Government, he said, "should invite representatives of India, who would be in a position to deliver the goods . . . to sit in conference with a view to reaching a solution. . . . If such an invitation comes directly from the Prime Minister . . . I feel that it will be irresistible."[2] The All-India Muslim Conference which met at Lahore on December 30 and 31, 1929, also welcomed the idea of the Round Table Conference but added that only those Muslim should be invited for participation in the proposed Conference "who truly represent the community, respect the inviolability of the Islamic law, possess the confidence of their co-religionists and give true expression to their views and sentiments."[3]

The proeeedings of the first session of the Round Table Conference, which was attended by representatives of all parties in India with the exception of the Congress, began with a speech from His Majesty in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords on November 12, 1930. The delegates included 16 from the United Kingdom, 16 from the Indian states and 57 from British India. Prominent among the representatives of the Muslim community were the Aga Khan, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Maulana Muhammad Ali and Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Among the delegates from British India and the Indian states there was unanimous agreement on the necessity of a Federal from a government. The Muslim delegates in particular welcomed this proposal. It was, in fact, the only solution acceptable to them. "In view of the complicated conditions which obtain in India," said Sir Muhammad Shafi, "there is only one form of government, one basis for the future constitution of India,

1. M.H. Saiyid, op. cit., p. 295.
2. Quoted ibid., p. 288 (for full text of the letter, see pp. 282-89).
3. Quoted by Lal Bahadur, op. cit., p. 205.

which alone will suit the circumstances of the case—and that is the federal system."[1] Maulana Muhammad Ali said, "Make no mistake about the quarrels between Hindus and Mussalmans; they are founded only on fear of domination."[2] Because of this fear, he also favoured the Federal structure for India as the best means of establishing the necessary balance. "Luckily," he said, "there are Mussalman majorities in certain Provinces."[3]

Mr. Jinnah stood for full self-government but added: "The first and foremost thing that we have to provide is that the various interests are safeguarded and you cannot possibly frame any constitution unless you have provided safeguards for the rights and the interests which exist in India."[4] This point was reiterated by other speakers. Substituting for the Aga Khan who was absent because of illness, Mr. Fazl-ul-Haq declared:

"We feel that the only course that is consistent alike with the position of our community and its peculiar needs . . . is to reiterate our claim that no advance is possible or practicable, whether in the Provinces or in the Central Government, without adequate safeguards for the Muslims of India, and that no constitution will be acceptable to the Muslims of India without such safeguards."[5]

Writing to the Prime Minister on January 1, 1931, Maulana Muhammad Ali summed up the Muslim case in its entirety. The letter written only two days before Maulana's death, is so important that it must be quoted at some length:

"The real problem before us is to give full power to Muslims in such provinces as those in which they are in a majority, whether small or large, and protection to them in such provinces as those in which they are in a minority, and in order to be absolutely fair to the Hindu community also, precisely the same thing must be done with the Hindus. What is needed is to give power to a community which is in majority in any province no matter how small or how large it may be, and protection to it in a province no matter how large or small it may be. The Muslims

1. *Indian Round Table Conference* (*First Session*), *Proceedings* (London, 1931) p. 55.

2. Ibid., p. 103.

3. Ibid., p. 104.

4. Ibid., p. 148.

5. Ibid., p. 246.

desire—*and this is the crux of their 14 points and* not *separate electorates*—that there should be federal government so that the central unity Government with a permanent Hindu majority should not override them everywhere; that they should have at least a third of the British Indian representation in the Federal Government, that in the provinces or the Punjab and Bengal where they have small majorities in population which are unorganised, and greatly controlled by the banyas and the Sikhs and the Hindu landlords, as in Bengal, those majorities should be reserved (personally I shall be satisfied if for a number of years only such as 20); that in the N.-W. F. P. and in Baluchistan (which is only nominally a Province) where there are clearly huge Muslim majorities full reforms should be extended to the Muslims which have so far been denied by the combination of British military and civil domination and Hindu narrowness characteristically supporting it, and that Sind should be made a separate small province like Assam; and that the Muslims should be allowed to have their majorities in all these as the Hindus have everywhere else. Unless in these few provinces Muslim majorities are established by the new constitution, I submit, not as a threat but as a very humble and friendly warning, there will be civil war in India. *Let there be no mistake about that.*" [1]

After preliminary discussions and presentation of various points of view a number of sub-committees were set up of which the more impartant were those of Federal structure, Provincial constitution, Minorities, Sind, and the North-West Frontier Province. The results of the deliberations in these sub-commitees may be briefly summarised as follows. A Federation was to be established comprising the Provinces of British India and such States as elected to join it; dyarchy was to be abolished in the Provinces and responsible government under Indian ministers was to be introduced; separation of Sind from Bombay was agreed to in principle and the appointment of a committee to examine the financial consequences was recommended; the North-West Frontier Province was to receive the status of a Governor's Province.

In addition to these points on which there was substantial agreement between the various parties, there were two issues of transcendent importance on which no decision could be reached. The first of these related to the principles and conditions on which the All-India Federation would be based. The powers to be

1. Afzal Iqbal, op, cit., p. 479 (for full text of the letter, see ibid., pp. 473-85.

exercised by the Federal Government and the units respectively were considered and determind, but the question of residuary powers could not be decided. The second was the communal and minority question for which no compromise solution could be found. The Muslims would accept nothing less than the separate electorates with weighted representation in the Central Legislature and in the minority Provinces, and majorities in the Punjab and Bengal. The Hindus were equally insistent in their unwillingness to make these concessions and the result was a deadlock. The Prime Minister was thus forced to say at the close of the session that "it is the duty of the communities to come to an agreement amongst themselves on the points raised by the Minorities Sub-Committee but not settled there."[1]

After the conslusion of the first session it was generally felt that a second session would be of little value without the participation of the Congress. In consequence Lord Irwin, despite strong criticism from diehard Tory circles in England, entered into negotiations with Mr. Gandhi. On March 5, 1931, an agreement was reached, which provided for the release of political prisoners and brought to an end the Civil Disobedience Movement. This agreement paved the way for Congress participation in the next session of the Round Table Conference.

The second session of the Conference lasted from September 7 to December 1, 1931. with Mr. Gandhi present as the sole official representative of the Congress Party. The Muslim delegation was much the same as in the first session with the addition of Sir Muhammad Iqbal. In this session most of the work was done by two committees on Federal Structure and Minorities which re-examined the report presented by the corresponding sub-committees at the first session. From the Muslim point of view the second sub-committee was more important as the decisions reached there were bound to affect the shape of the proposed Federation. The discussion soon revealed that the members of the Minorities Sub-Committee were faced with an almost super-human task and, after protracted formal and informal negotiations with a view to coming to an agreement, the Committee was obliged to report failure to reach a settlement. Mr. Gandhi who

1. *Indian Round Table Conference* (*First Session*), *Proceedings*, p. 5

was a member of both the sub-committees, speaking on the morning of Obtober 8, at the ninth meeting of the Minorities Sub-Committee "with deep sorrow and deeper humiliation," announced his "utter failure . . . to secure an agreed solution of the communal question." He attributed the failure to the composition of the Indian delegation. He said, "We are almost all not elected representatives of the parties or groups whom we are presumed to represent; we are here by nomination of the Government. Nor are those whose presence was absolutely necessary for an agreed solution to be found here."[1] He went on to suggest:

"that the Minorities Committee be adjourned *sine die* and that the fundamentals of the constitution be hammered into shape as quickly as may be . . . it [the communal problem] must not baulk or allowed to block the progress of constitution building. Attention must be diverted from it and concentrated on the main part of the structure. . . . I would suggest the addition of a clause to the expected constitution appointing a judicial tribuual that would examine all claims and give its final decision on all the points that may be left unsettled,"[2]

Some of Mr. Gandhi's statements were atonce challenged by Sir Mohammad Shafi. He denied the charge that the delegates were unrepresentative. All the parties in India, he said, were represented by their elected presidents or other leading members.[3] Turning to Mr. Gandhi's main suggestion for going ahead with constitution-making despite the lack of communal settlement, Sir Muhammad Shafi said:

"It is impossible to frame a constitution without settling the communal problem. . . . I venture to suggest that the proposal made by Mahatma Gandhi—that this Committee should adjourn *sine die*—is not acceptable on any grounds, and in consequence I am instructed by the Muslim delegation to oppose it."[4]

Since no agreement between Hindu and Muslim delegates seemed likely, the representatives of minority groups. i.e. the Muslims, the depressed classes, the Anglo-Indians, a section of

1. *Indian Round Table Conference* (*Second Session*), *Proceedings of Federal Structure Committee and Minorities Committee* (London, 1932), p. 530.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. p. 531.

4. Ibid., p. 532.

the Indian Christians and the members of the European commercial community came to an agreement among themselves,[1] endorsing the principle of separate electorates. It was claimed on behalf of the minority groups that this settlement "covered something in the region of 46 per cent of the population of British India."[2] It was presented by the Aga Khan to the tenth meeting of the Minorities Committee on November 13, and immediately rejected by Mr. Gandhi. He continued to insist that "the Congress claims to represent 85 per cent or 95 per cent of the population not merely of British India, but of the whole of India."[3] In effect his claim was that it was the Congress alone which could speak for the minorities and not the minorities themselves.[4]

In these circumstances no further progress was possible and this failure to reach an agreement on the communal question, which impinged on so many aspects of the constitutional problem, inevitably hampered the work of the Federal Structure Committee. The Muslims refused to commit themselves on the basic question of responsibility at the Centre until the minority problem was settled. The British Government placed responsibility for the solution of this problem upon the Indian delegates themselves, but at the close of the second session the Prime Minister warned them of the consequences of their failure to reach an agreement:

"There stands in the way of progress, whether for the Provinces or the Centre, that formidable obstacle, the communal deadlock. I have never concealed from you my conviction that this is above all others a problem for you to settle by agreement

1. See *Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session) Proceedings*, Appendix III, pp. 50-55.

2. Ibid., p. 537.

3. Ibid., p. 593.

4. The Aga Khan has reported the following conversation with Gandhi at one of their informal meetings held by the delegates during this period. "We posed together for the Press photographers, and then settled down to our conversation. I opened it by saying to Mahatmaji that were he now to show himself a real father to India's Muslims, they would respond by helping him, to the utmost of their ability, in his struggle for India's independence. Mahatmaji turned to face me. 'I cannot in truth say,' he observed, 'that I have any feelings of paternal love for Muslims. But if you put the matter on grounds of political necessity, I am ready to discuss it in a co-operative spirit. I cannot indulge in any form of sentiment," (Aga Khan, *Memoirs*, p. 241).

amongst yourselves . . . if you cannot present us with a settlement acceptable to all parties . . . His Majesty's Government would have to settle for you not only your broblems of representation, but also to decide as wisely and as justly as possible, what checks and balances the constitution is to contain to protect minorities from an unrestricted and tyrannical use of the democratic principle expressing itself solely through majority power."[1]

As the Indian communities could not agree among themselves regarding the communal issue, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, "not only as the Prime Minister but as the friend of India, "announced on August 16, 1932, a provisional scheme for communal representation familiarly known as the "Communal Award."[2] Under it separate electorates were conceded and the principle of 'weightage' was maintained with some modifications in the Muslim-minority Provinces. Similar 'weightage' was given to Europeans in Bengal and Assam, to the Sikhs in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, and to the Hindus in Sind and North-West Frontier Province. The Muslims who constituted 56 per cent of the population in the Punjab were given 86 seats out of a total membership of 175. Similarly, in Bengal where they were 54·8 per cent they were allotted 119 seats out of a total of 250. The Award thus did not give the Muslims a clear majority in the two Provinces where the problem was most difficult, as there was a very heavy 'weightage' in favour of the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Europeans in Bengal.

The Muslim reaction to the Award was mirrored in the resolution of the All-India Muslim League Session of November 1933, which declared that "though the decision falls far short of the Muslim demands, the Muslims have accepted it in the best interest of the country reserving to themselves the right to press for the acceptance of all their demads."[3] They remained convinced, however, that they were entitled to statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, particularly when the Hindus were conceded complete control in their majority Provinces. The *Star of India* (Calcutta), for example, condemning the Award,

1. *Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session), Proceedings*, pp. 417-18.

2. For full text of the Award, see M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., pp. 261-65.

3. Liaquat Ali Khan, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

editorially commented, "Juggle with figures how you will, haggle over percentage for ever, the base fact remains that the Moslems of Bengal have not been given the majority to which they are entitled."[1]

The Muslims, although not very hapy over the Award, were none the less prepared to accept it. The Hindus, on the other hand, protested violently and at once organised a campaign against the Award. This campaign culminated in the so-called Allahabad Unity Conference held from November 3 to 15, 1932. to which the Nationalist Muslims and the Hindu and Sikh communities sent delegates. The purpose of this Conference was to reach an agreement on the alteration of the Communal Award by substituting joint for separate electorates. As a result of these parleys a formula on the basis of joint electorates was evolved, which provided for "Moslem majorities in the Punjab and Bengal and the separation of Sind on the condition that Sikhs are granted 20 per cent of the representation in the Punjab Legislature and 5 per cent in the Central Legislature."[2] In connection with the Muslim representation at this Conference, it is necessary to remember that the Nationalist Muslims had assumed the entire responsibility of negotiating a settlement without consultation with the older organisations. The Conference was thus not fully representative of the Muslim point of view. Shortly afterwards, on November 20, 1932, the representatives of various Muslim organisations met at Delhi and issued the following statement:

"The joint conference of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim Conference, the Council of the All-India Muslim League and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind (Cawnpore) have carefully considered the text of the draft resolutions recently passed by the committee of the Allahabad Conference and while registering appreciation of the endeavours made by a wing of Mussalmans to arrive once again at some settlement with the Congress and Mahasabha Hindus and with the Sikhs on the communal problem, desires to place on record its opinion that the proposed basis of the agreement is injurious to Muslim interests, impractical and unacceptable."[3]

1. Quoed in *Round Table Quarterly* (London, 1932), Vol. XXIII, No. 89, p. 147.

2. *The Times* (London), November 16, 1932.

3. Quoted by Mohammad Noman, op. cit, p. 318.

In the meantime the Third Round Table Conference, the last of the series, had assembled and was in session from November 17 to December 24, 1932. It was poorly attended as the Congress and the Labour Party sent no delegates. Nothing constructive was achieved in this session. The Muslim stand remained practically the same as before with a fresh emphasis on their demand that in the proposed Federal structure the residuary powers must go to the Provinces. "Apart from the fact that the Muslims regard it as a safeguard, this is the only arrangement which would reduce to a minimum litigation regarding the validity of Provincial Statutes, and thus enable the constitution to work with the least possible friction."[1] The Conference concluded its session "with appropriate expressions of peace and goodwill, but with hopes perhaps not quite as high as those with which it had begun its work two years before."[2]

VI

BEFORE proceeding further with the record of constitutional changes in India it is time to retrace our steps and look more closely at the internal history of Muslim politics. Although the Muslim representatives were presenting a more or less united front in safeguarding the interests of their community, they were still badly divided among themselves. As has been pointed out before, the All-India Muslim League was split into two sections in 1927. The wing under the influence of Sir Muhammad Shafi had refused to accept the decision of the All-India Muslim League Council and had held a separate session at Lahore in December 1927. The other wing which had the majority support, as was shown by the decision of the League Council, had met at Calcutta. The effort to reunite the two rival sections made in March 1929 had failed. In the meantime an All-Parties Muslim Conference had met at Delhi in the last days of December 1928 under the chairmanship of the Aga Khan. Although this Conference had assembled only to express the Muslim disapproval of

1. *Indian Round Table Conference* (*Third Session*), *Proceedings* (London, 1933), p. 194. (For full text of the Memorandum submitted by the Muslim Delegation, see ibid., pp. 193-94).

2. R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem, 1833-1935*, p. 130.

the Nehru Report and to present other safeguards which the Muslims desired to see incorporated in the future constitution of India, it was later transformed into a permanent organisation through the efforts of Maulana Muhammad Shafi Daoodi, Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Sir Muhammad Shafi. This body soon became, for all practical purposes, the rival of the Muslim League with the result that the League was further weakened.

In December 1931 the Muslim League, which met at Delhi under the presidentship of Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, appointed a committee "to negotiate with the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim Conference with a view to bringing about a union between the two bodies."[1] But these efforts to unite the two organisations failed. Not only was it impossible for the League and the Muslim Conference to sink their differences, but there was yet another crisis in store for the League which was destined still further to divide and weaken it. Early in March 1933 the internal politics of the Muslim League presented a sorry spectacle which soon became a serious situation. There was again a split among the office bearers due to personal rivalries. One party was led by Mian Abdul Aziz, chosen as temporary President in succession to Muhammad Zafarullah Khan who had been appointed as a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and the other by Sir Muhammad Yakub, the Honorary Secretary of the League. Although the Muslim League Council, in a meeting on July 16, 1933, passed a no-confidence motion against Mian Abdul Aziz, he insisted on retaining the presidency. Neither side was prepared to yield, with the result that the League held two sessions in 1933, as it had done in 1927. One of these met at Howrah under the presidentship of Mian Abdul Aziz. The other, following a resolution of the League Council, met at Delhi under the chairmanship of Hafiz Muhammad Hedayat Hussain.[2]

This was the condition of the Muslim League towards the end of 1933. A similar situation existed in the Muslim Conference. It, too, had become an arena of conflicting opinions and clashing interests. "The League and the Conference had become the plaything of petty leaders, who would not resign office, even

1. Liaqat Ali Khan, op. cit., p. 54.

2. Mazhar Ansari, *Tarikh-i-Muslim League* (Urdu), (Delhi, 1940), p. 347.

after a vote of No-Confidence. And, of course, they had no organisation in the Provinces, and no influence with the masses."[1] The state of Muslim politics was indeed desperate and a leader of outstanding ability was badly needed who could unite the Muslims on one platform. Until a few years earlier the Muslims had had the benefit of the guidance of at least four outstanding leaders who could ably and eloquently represent their interests. Of these four men two had died: Maulana Muhammad Ali in 1931 and Sir Muhammad Shafi two years later. The Aga Khan's leadership was not very helpful "as he wanted the palm without the dust, and could not give up the health resorts of France and Switzerland."[2] Mr. Jinnah, after the second session of the Round Table Conference, had remained in England engaged in his legal practice before the Privy Council. His reasons for this self-imposed exile were explained a few years later when he had returned to India and had established his position as the foremost leader of the Muslim community. In an address to the students of Aligarh University in 1938 he said:

"I received the shock of my life at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger, the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity. I felt very pessimistic about my country. The position was most unfortunate. The Musalmans were like dwellers in No Man's Land; they were led by either the flunkeys of the British Government or the camp-followers of the Congress. Whenever attemps were made to organise the Muslims, toadies and flunkeys on the one hand and traitors in the Congress camp on the other frustrated the efforts. I began to feel that neither I could help India, nor change the Hindu mentality, nor could I make the Musalmans realise their precarious position. I felt so disappointed and so depressed that I decided to settle down in London. Not that I did not love India, but I felt utterly helpless."[3]

Jinnah's ability had long been recognised, and the part which he had played at the Round Table Conference in defence of Muslim interests had won the confidence of many of his co-religionists who had not always agreed with him. After the death of

1. Albiruni, op. cit. p. 209.

2. Ibid.

3. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (6th edition, Lahore, 1960), Vol. I, p. 39.

Sir Muhammad Shafi he was perhaps the only man who could give the Muslim community the leadership which they so evidently needed. He was pressed by many to return to India and assume that role. Liaquat Ali Khan, who later became the right-hand man of Jinnah and the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, met him in London and personally explained to him the degraded state of Muslim politics. The Muslims, he said, "need someone who is unpurchasable." "You must come back," he added. "The people need you. You alone can put life into the League and save it."[1] Jinnah agreed and returned to India in 1934. With his reappearance the state of Muslim politics was soon changed.

"The split in the ranks of the All-India Muslim League ended on the 4th March 1934, when at a combined meeting of both sections held at New Delhi under the presidentship of Hafiz Hidayat Hussain, a resolution was passed that the cleavage be made up and Mr. Jinnah be elected President of the united body. His election was hailed from all quarters."[2]

But the League even after these events was not the only Muslim organisation in the field. It had settled its internal differences and strengthened its position; but the All-India Muslim Conference continued as a separate body. However, with the approach of elections to the Legislative Assembly, a compromise was effected which resulted in a joint session of the two organisations at Simla in August 1934. The joint election manifesto issued after the meeting exhorted the Muslims "to present a united front to opponents of the communal decision and the principle of separate electorates, to vote only for such candidates as subscribed to the principle and policy of the All-India Muslim Conference or the All-India Muslim League."[3] In the years that followed the Muslim Conference gradually disintegrated, and very little was heard of it after about 1936.

In the meantime the British Government had reached its conclusions about constitutional reform in India. These were embodied in the 'White Paper' issued on March 18, 1933, which was at once condemned by both major parties in India. The

1. H. Bolitho, op. cit., p. 105.
2. Muhammad Noman, op. cit., pp. 320-21.
3. *India in 1933-34* (Delhi, 1935), p. 34.

disappointment of the Muslims was expressed most forcefully by Jinnah:

"To condemn the White Paper one does not require argument or reason, but one has only got to read the White Paper proposals and understand them . . . the problem of problems which still confronts us is how to avert its being foisted upon India. That cannot be achieved and will not be achieved until there is unity between Hindus and Muslims. Nothing will give me greater happiness than to bring about complete co-operation and friendship between Hindus and Muslims and in this desire my impression is that I have the solid support of the Muslims."[1]

Despite this and many other similar protests in India the British Government proceeded with its plan. The 'White Paper' was submitted to a joint Committee empowered to study the proposals and make recommendations. In framing their recommendations the members of the Committee had the assistance of a number of delegates representing various groups in India. After prolonged sittings and the examination of witnesses the Committee issued its report in November 1934, which was adopted as the basis of the Government of India Bill introduced in the House of Commons on February 19, 1935. It was violently opposed by a section of the Conservative Party led by Mr. Churchill, and for opposite reasons by many of the Indian leaders; but it was successfully piloted through the two Houses and received the Royal assent on August 4, 1935. It was the fruit of the efforts of the Simon Commission, the Round Table Conference and finally of the Joint Select Committee of Parliament. "A great constructive measure," declared *The Times*, "the greatest indeed that a British Government has taken in hand in this century, has passed from project to enactment."[2] Whether it would achieve its purpose and bring peace and orderly self-government to India was yet to be seen.

1. Quoted by M.H. Saiyid, op. cit, p. 314.
2. *The Times* (London), August 3, 1935.

Chapter 3

The Fateful Years

(1936-1939)

THE Government of India Act, 1935, was a voluminous document but, speaking broadly, the content of the new Constitution was twofold. Firstly, it set up a federation in India, in which the British Indian Provinces and the Princely States should participate in a common Central Government, with the Viceroy at its head assisted by a Council of Ministers, all but two, i.e. Foreign Affairs and Defence, responsible to the Legislature.[1] Secondly, it established in eleven Provinces autonomous governments under Ministers wholly responsible to elected Legislatures.

The more important provisions of the Act, from Muslim point of view, were the creation of Sind as a separate province; the introduction of Provincial autonomy; one-third Muslim representation in the Central Legislature; the continuation of separate electorates; and the reservation to the Governor-General of authority to assign the residuary powers at his discretion. Another important provision contained in Clause VII of the Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governors needs to be quoted in full. It ran as follows:

"In making appointments to his Council of Ministers our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgement is most likely to command a stable majority in the Legislature those persons (including in

1. The Federal part of the Act was not to operate until a specified number of Princely States had acceded to it.

so far as practicable members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the Legislature. In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers."[1]

I

THE reaction of the Muslim League to the proposed reforms was embodied in Sir Syed Wazir Hasan's presidential address to the Bombay Session of the All-India Muslim League on April 11-12, 1936. He said:

"A constitution is literally being forced on us by the British Parliament, which no one approves of. After several years of Commissions, Reports, Conferences and Committees a monstrosity has been invented and is being presented to India in the garb of this Constitution Act. It is anti-democratic. It will strengthen all the most reactionary elements in the country, and, instead of helping us to develop on progressive lines, it will enchain and crush the forces making for democracy and freedom."[2]

The presidential speech was followed by a resolution moved by Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah which opened with an "emphatic protest against forcing the Constitution as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935." He recommended, however, that "having regard to the conditions prevailing at present in this country the Provincial scheme of the Constitution be utilised for what it was worth." The Federal scheme was condemned as "fundamentally bad." It was described as "most reactionary, retrograde injurious and fatal to the vital interests of British India *vis-a-vis* the Indian States . . . it will lead to disaster if forced upon the people and persisted in as it is entirely unworkable in the interest of India and her people."[3] In view of the later developments, it is important to note that the Muslim objection to the Act mainly centred around its lack of provision for full self-government at

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., p. 379.
2. Quoted by R. Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942* (London, 1943), p. 8.
3. Liaquat Ali Khan, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

the Centre. But in spite of its denunciation of the Constitution, Muslim opinion was, in the main, ready to try the Act in the Provincial sphere.

The Congress, on the other hand, rejected both the parts with equally strong emphasis. It resolved that "no Constitution which curtails the sovereignty of the people of India and does not recognise their right to shape and control fully their political and economic future can be accepted," and went on to demand a Constitution based on complete independence, drafted by a Constituent Assembly "elected on adult franchise or a franchise which approximates to it as nearly as possible."[1] In spite of its hostility to the Act, the Congress decided to contest the forthcoming Provincial elections. In the following August it issued its election manifesto which still assailed the new Constitution and declared that its entry into the Legislatures was not to co-operate with the Act "but to combat it and seek the end of it." Members would be elected "to carry out . . . the Congress policy of the rejection of the Act and resist British Imperialism."[2]

The Muslim League, too, set up its machinery to contest the elections and Mr. Jinnah was authorised to form a Central Election Board. The League's electoral manifesto issued under the direction of Mr. Jinnah did not differ greatly from that of the Congress. It stated:

> "The main principles which we expect our representatives in various Legislatures to work will be (1) that the present Provincial Constitution and the proposed Central Constitution should be replaced immediately by democratic full self-government; (2) that in the meantime, representatives of the Muslim League in various Legislatures will utilise the Legislatures in order to extract the maximum benefit out of the Constitution for the uplift of the people in the various spheres of national life . . . there will be free co-operation with any group or groups whose aims and ideals are approximately the same as those of the League Party."[3]

The manifesto recalled the Lucknow Pact of 1916 as "one of the greatest beaconlights in the constitutional history of the

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., p. 385.

2. Quoted in *Round Table Quarterly* (London, 1936), Vol. XXVII, No. 105, p. 142.

3. Quoted by Rajendra Prasad, op. cit., p. 142.

country" and "a signal proof of the identity of purpose, earnestness and co-operation between the two great sections of the people of India."[1] This clearly implied that Jinnah who was once spoken of as the 'Ambassador of Unity' wanted to live up to his reputation and that he was still keen to revive the old Congress-League alliance. Events from 1937 to 1939, however, completely shattered this promising prospect.

Since the Princes had raised a number of objections to the proposed Federal scheme, the implementation of the Federal part of the Act of 1935 was postponed. But it was decided to proceed with the other parts of the Constitution, and Provincial elections were held in the winter of 1936-37. The success of the Congress Party at the polls may be considered first. It captured 704 out of 1,585 seats in the lower houses of all the Provinces taken together, and in five (Madras, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Orissa) it was returned with clear majorities. In Bombay it won a little less than half the seats. In Assam it secured 33 out of 108 seats. It did not do as well in the Muslim-majority Provinces, excepting the North-West Frontier Province where it won 19 out of 50 seats. In the Punjab it obtained only 19 out of 175. In Sind it captured only 7 out of 60. In Bengal it won 51 seats out of a total of 250. The Congress electoral success was mainly confined to the Hindu constituencies. In the 491 Muslim constituencies in British Indian lower houses as a whole it won only 26 seats.[2]

Mr. Gandhi's assertion at the Round Table Conference that the Congress represented and spoke for 95 per cent of the population of India had by no means been confirmed by the election results. The Congress gains were great, but not enough to entitle it to speak for the entire country. It had failed to secure even 50 per cent of the total number of seats. In this connection one has to remember that the Congress was the oldest, the richest, the most well-knit and the best organised party in India. Dr. Ambedkar, discussing the Congress electoral victories, remarks:

1. Quoted by R. Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, p. 14.

2. For full details of the election results, see *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937* (London, 1937). The figures given by Coupland do not completely tally with the official election results.

"On the Congress side there were massed all the sinews of war, money and organisation. . . . The non-Congress candidates were represented by the Congress Press—and . . . there is no other press in India—as the showboys of the British, with no record of service to or sacrifice for the country, agents of British Imperialism, enemies of the country, job-hunters, fellows out to sell the interests of the country for a mess of pottage and so on."[1]

The surprising feature of the elections was not that the Congress Party won so many seats but that, with its greater organisation and financial power, it fell so far short of its objective even in some predominantly Hindu Provinces.

The League's achievement in the elections was much less spectacular—nay, it was disappointing. "In 1937 it was still a middle-class organisation which had made little effort to obtain a mass following."[2] The story of its phenomenal rise belongs to a later period. The League fared particularly poorly in the Punjab, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province. In the Punjab, the Nationalist Unionist Party[3] which had come into existence in the early twenties and was revitalised in 1936 swept the Muslim seats. In Sind[4] and the North-West Frontier Province[5] the League was almost completely routed. In Bengal it fared somewhat better but it won only 37 of 119 seats reserved for Muslims.[6] In the Muslims-

1. B. R. Ambedkar, *What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables* (2nd edition, Bombay, 1946), p. 149.

2. R. Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1950), p. 53.

3. Although the Unionist Party was an inter-communal body, the Muslim influence was predominant. In the main it stood for: "the acceptance of the community of economic interests as the true basis of political parties, irrespective of caste, creed or residence; and the provision of equal facilities and opportunities for all, with special solicitude for the backward classes and areas, whether rural or urban" [quoted by Azim Hussain, *Fazal-i-Hussain, A Political Biography* (Bombay, 1946), pp. 344-45].

Main (later Sir) Fazal-i-Husain was the guiding spirit of the Party from its inception till his death in 1936. He was succeeded by Sikandar Hayat Khan who became the first Premier of the Punjab under the new Constitntion.

4. The seats were divided between many small parties, the chief gainer being the Sind United Party which won 18 seat .

5. The majority of the seats went to small independent groups.

6. A majority of the remaining Muslim seats were won by the Praja party under the leadership of Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq. The Party later formed a Coalition Government with the Muslim League under Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq.

minority Provinces the League was more successful. The overall results of the League's achievement were that it won 106 out of a total number of 491 Muslim seats.

The final results of the elections were known in February 1937. They were interpreted by the All-India Congress Committee as an unmistakable proof of the "approval by the electorate of the Congress Policy and Programme"; and on March 18, after recording its high appreciation of the response of the country they decided to accept office. But they wished to impose their own conditicns. The same resolution further stated that

> "the Ministerships shall not be accepted unless the leader of the Congress Party in the Legislature is satisfied and is able to state publicly that the Governor will not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of Ministers in regard to constitutional activities."[1]

Since the Governors were unable to give the required undertaking, the Congress refused to accept office. The non-Congress majority Provinces, i.e. the Punjab, Sind, Bengal and Assam, however, started functioning as autonomous Provinces and the Ministries went into office on April 1. Interim Governments were established in Congress Provinces pending a settlement of the dispute concerning the use of the discretionary powers by the Provincial Governors.

The Congress leaders quickly realised that the power exercised by Provincial Governments was real, and they were anxious to have this matter settled. The Viceroy, too, desired to get the Provincial part of the new Constitution in effective operation as quickly as possible. His carefully worded broadcast message gave no positive assurance to the Congress leaders but made it possible for them to accept office without loss of face. Lord Linlithgow said:

> "In the discharge of the Governor's Special Responsibilities it is open to the Governor and it is indeed incumbent upon him, to act otherwise than on the advice of his ministers if he considers that the action they propose will prejudice Minorities or areas or other interests affected."

He added, however, that "a Governor will spare no pains to make it clear to his Ministers the reasons which have weighed

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., pp. 392-93.

with him in thinking both that the decision is one which it is incumbent upon him to take, and that it is the right one."[1] Similar declarations were made by Lord Zetland and other British statesmen. The Congress Working Committee meeting a few days later declared that, although the declarations "fall short of the assurances demanded . . . the situation created as a result of the circumstances and events that have since occurred warrants the belief that it will not be easy for the Governors to use their special powers."[2]

With the deadlock thus ended, the Congress entered its official career in July 1937. As stated above, the Congress had clear majorities in five Provinces, namely, Madras, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Orissa. In two other Provinces, i.e. Bombay and the North-West Fronties Province, it was also able to form Ministries with the help of small minority groups. Thus there were Congress Ministries in seven out of the eleven Indian Provinces.[3]

The Congress was naturally jubilant over its recent victories but in its celebration of success it went a little too far. Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Congress President, soon after the elections remarked that "there are only two Parties in the country, the Congress and the British."[4] This suggestion to other parties simply to line up was a clear challengc to other organisations and particularly to the league. Jinnah's reply was conciliatory but it left no doubt as to his position:

"There is a third party, namely the Muslims. We are not going to be dictated to by anybody. We are willing to co-operate with any group of a progressive and independent character provided its programme and policy correspond to our own.

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., p. 395.

2. Ibid., p. 397.

3. In Assam the first Ministry war a coalition of non-Congress elements headed by a Muslim, Sir Muhammad Saadullah. The position of his Ministry proved unstable and he resigned in September 1938. The second Coalition Ministry was headed by Mr. Bardoloi, a Congressman, with only two of the eight members belonging to the Congress Party. But it was regarded as a Congress Ministry and continued in office till October 1939. see Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, p. 58.

4. Quoted by Frank Moraes, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography* (New York, 1956), p. 268.

We are not going to be camp-followers of any party. We are ready to work as equal partners for the welfare of India."[1]

During the period from the elections of 1937 to the resignation of the Congress Ministries in the autumn of 1939, a series of events occurred which deepened and intensified the division between the two great communities. The need for unity was obvious, and it was clearly the responsibility of the leaders of both the Congress and the League to do everything in their power to eliminate the cause of distrust and hostility. But in the circumstances that responsibility rested more definitely upon the Congress Party which was now in a position of strength. The Congress, however, showed little or no disposition to co-operate with the League or to work for the removal of the differences which divided the two organisaiions. On the contrary, many of its policies had just the opposite effect.

Mr. Jinnah was still ready to seek a compromise. Even before the Congress Ministres came into power he expressed his belief that the conflict between the two Parties was not irreconcilable and his readiness to co-operate with the Congress in working far unity and independence. There was, he said,

"no substantial difference at any rate between the Congress and the League as [the] plan of the wrecking of the Constitution has disappeared from the Congress programme. I have often said that I am trying to see that Muslims should whole-heartedly and sincerely adhere to the policy and programme of the All-India Muslim Leage, which is both national and partriotic, and we shall always be glad to co-operate with the Congress in their constructive programme."[2]

No notice was taken of this offer. Their own success and the comparatively poor showing of the League in the recent elections evidently convinced the leaders of the Congress that the future lay with them and that such organisations as the Muslim League could be regarded as negligible. Their desire for unity under a single command was natural; but the assumption that the Congress was in a position to secure that unity without regard to the Muslim League was a grave error of judgement. Judged by its numbers the League in 1937 was not yet a formidable

1. Quoted by M.H. Saiyid, od. cit., p. 350.
2. Ibid., p. 351.

organisation. But it had a long history; it represented powerful elements in the Muslim community; and it was unlikely that the Congress could in fact carry out a political and constitutional settlement in total disregard of its claims.

II

THE gulf between the two Parties was revealed and indeed widened by events connected with the formation of the Provincial Ministries. As a preliminary to the formation of the Ministries the High Command of the Congress Party set up a Parliamentary Sub-Committee consisting of three of its outstanding leaders, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Babu Rajendra Prasad. This Committee was entrusted with the task of supervising the formation of Ministries in several Provinces. The test case was that of the United Provinces which was placed under the charge of Maulana Azad. The Muslims constituted about 16 per cent of the population of the Province. In the general elections they had secured 66 seats, 26 of which had been won by the members of the Muslim League. The Congress, which had a clear majority over all other groups, was able to form a Ministry without regard to the League. Nevertheless, the League members expected a share in the Ministry.[1] This expectation was based on the recommendation of the Simon Commission, the discussions at the Round Table Conference and the provisions of the new Constitution. In their view, moreover, the logic of separate electorates, established as an integral part of the Constitution, required some form of coalition rather than single party Government. The Congress leaders took a different view. Adhering to what they regarded as parliamentary orthodoxy, they rejected the overtures of the League and refused to consider a coalition. With a view to detaching members from the League and drawing them into the fold of the Congress Party an

1. Sir Harry Haig, who was the Governor of the United Provinces at that time, later on said, "Actually at the time of the general elections (I speak of the United Provinces with which I am acquainted) there was a widespread belief that after the elections there would be some sort of alliance between the Congress and the Muslim League." See *Asiatic Review* (London, 1940), Vol. XXXVI, No. 126, p. 243.

important statement was issued laying down the conditions under which members elected on the League ticket could have a share in the Cabinet. These conditions, communicated by Maulana Azad to the Provincial League leaders, Choudhry Kaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan, were in part as follows:

"The Moslem League group in the United Provinces Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group.

"The existing members of the Moslem League Party in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party, and will fully share with other members of the Party their privileges and obligations as members of the Congress Party. . . . They will likewise be subject to the control and discipline of the Congress Party . . . and the decisions of the Congress Party . . . shall be binding on them. . . .

"The Moslem League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces will be dissolved, and no candidate will thereafter be set up by the said Board at any by-election. All members of the Party shall actively support any candidate that may be nominated by the Congress to fill up a vacancy occurring hereafter."

To this statement a brief note was appended by Maulana Azad which read: "It was hoped that, if these terms were agreed to and the Moslem League group of members joined the Congress Party as full members, that group would cease to exist as a separate group."[1]

The meaning of this document can scarcely be in doubt. It was signed by Maulana Azad as a member of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee and as a responsible representative of the Congress Party. Yet, in his autobiography published in 1959, Maulana Azad places a different interpretation upon these events. His statement is so important that it warrants quotation at some length:

"Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan were then the leaders of the Muslim League in the U.P. When I came to Lucknow to form the Government I spoke to both of them. They assured me that not only would they co-operate with the Congress, but would finally support the Congress programme. . . . I therefore held out hopes that both would be taken into the

1. *Pioneer*, July 30, 1937, quoted by R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942*, p. 111.

Government. . . . After discussion with me, a note[1] was prepared to the effect that the Muslim League Party would work in co-operation with the Congress and accept the Congress programme. Both Nawab Ismail Khan and Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman signed this document. I left Lucknow for Patna as my presence was necessary for the formation of the Ministry in Bihar.

"After some days, I returned to Allahabad and found to my great regret that Jawaharlal had written to Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan that only one of them could be taken into the Ministry. He had said that the Muslim League Party could decide who should be included but . . . neither was in a position to come in alone. They therefore expressed their regret and said that they were unable to accept Jawaharlal's offer. . . . I tried to persuade Jawaharlal to modify his stand. I told him that he had made a great mistake in not bringing the League into the Ministry. . . . Jawaharlal did not agree with me and held that this judgement was right."[2]

This later account of Maulana Azad, read in the light of the terms proposed to the League leaders in 1937, points to some important conclusions. In the first place, despite the seeming importance of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee, the ultimate decision on the relations of the Congress with the League did not rest with it. Further, it appears that, in his eagerness to promote the interests of the Congress Party, Azad appended his signatures to a statement with which he did not agree. Finally, and most important, this account reveals a sharp difference between the views of Azad and those of Nehru and the High Command of the Congress. Azad evidently desired co-operation of the League with the Congress, not a complete dissolution of the League Assembly Party as required by the terms officially offered. These two things were by no means the same. Had it been simply a demand for co-operation with the Congress, the sequel might

1. Choudbry Khaliquzzaman, however, has a different story to tell. Referring to this episode, he says, "The Maulana had, since we met last, dotted the 'i's' and cut the 't's' so as to make the death warrant of the Muslim League organisation more acceptable and handed the result over to me to have a look at it again to satisfy my conscience. . . . We—Choudhry Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan—handed the document back to Maulana and told him that on 27 July when the Assembly session started we should be sitting in the opposition and would face the consequences" [Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore, 1961), pp. 162-63].

2. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. op. cit., pp. 160-61.

well have been very different. As stated above, Mr. Jinnah was prepared for co-operation but was certainly not willing to sign the death warrant of the League by completely winding up the organisation for the sake of a seat or two in the Cabinet. The net result was that the League remained unrepresented in the Ministry. A Muslim Leaguer, Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim, was offered a place in the Cabinet only after he resigned from the League on whose ticket he had originally been returned. When his acceptance of the office was criticised by the League, he resigned his membership, contested the seat on the Congress ticket and defeated his opponent who was a nominee of the League. Similarly, in the Central Provinces a Muslim Leaguer crossed over to the Congress benches to become a Minister, but in that case there was no re-election.[1]

Defending the action of the Congress in its refusal to accept any form of coalition, Dr. Rajendra Prasad placed the emphasis on the responsibility of the Party to the electorate. He said:

> "The Congress had gone to the Assemblies with a definite programme and in furtherance of a definite policy, and it could not, without being false to the electorate, admit into the Ministry persons who did not accept that policy and that programme. . . . The Congress decided to stick to the well-known and well-understood constitutional principle of having homogeneous Ministries composed of its own members among whom Musalmans were, of course, included."[2]

Acharya Kriplani, another prominent Congress leader, justified the exclusion of the Muslim Leaguers on slightly different grounds. The Congress which he described as a *Political Party* could not in his opinion sacrifice the principle of Cabinet unity by joining hands with the League which was a *Communal Party*. "Such communal and religious organisations," he said, "are not recognized in any democracy as national or Political Parties."[3]

On their premises the Congress arguments were unassailable. From a simple legalistic point of view their action conformed to the Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governors which only required the inclusion of "members of important minority communities." But was it in accord with the spirit of the Instru-

1. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, p 112.
2. Rajendra Prasad, op. cit., pp. 145-46.
3. *Modern Review* (Calcutta, 1940), Vol. LXVIII, No. 1, p. 7.

ment of Instruction? Did these instructions not inted that the Ministers thus chosen should be *representatives* and not only *members* of the minority communities? In the words of an important Indian leader,

"The position taken by the Congress is in direct contradiction with the meaning of this clause and is indeed a covert attempt to break all other Parties in the country and to make the Congress the only political party in the country. . . . This attempt to establish a to talitarian state may be welcome to the Hindus, but it meant the political death of the Muslims as a free people."[1]

The argument used by the Congress leaders, if put forward by the leaders of the British Conservative or Labour Party, would have been perfectly valid. But in a heterogeneous country like India where majorities and minorities were unalterably fixed, such a reliance on legal abstractions and text-book maxims was hardly practical statemanship. No one denied that the British system was the ideal but what most of the people forgot or pretended to forget was that the British system suited condition in England and that India was not England. India was certainly passing through a very critial period and even in England, whose example was never lost sight of, it has been common to resort to Coalition Governments in periods of crisis. Besides, it is evident that in its alleged adherence to British parliamentary and democratic institutions the Congress was not even consistent. On the one hand, it would not admit minority representatives to the Cabinets on the ground that this would vitiate the principles of Paliamentary and Cabinet Government. On the other, it made all the provincial Governments responsible not to their Legislatures or to the electorate but to the Working Committee—a body unknown to the Constitution. There was a further inconsistency in Congress methods. It insisted on the members of the Muslim League signing the Congress Pledge before they would be taken into office in the Congress Provinces; but in a Province like Assam where the Congress Party was in a minority, it entered into coalition with other groups without making any such demand. "The Muslims are entitled to ask," says Dr. Ambedkar, "if coalition is bad, how can it be good in one place and bad in another?"[2]

1. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the partition of India*, p. 27,
2. Ibid., p. 28.

Coalition Cabinets were by no means an ideal system. But in a country like India where the minority had no chance of converting itself into a majority a composite Cabinet with adequate representation of all important parties was perhaps the only practicable solution. There is nothing ethical or sacrosanct about the majority principle. It is at best a rule of expediency and in the interests of unity and political stability the dictates of this rule must be varied according to circumstances. If the Congress wanted to appease the minorities and remove the obstacles standing in the way of mutual goodwill, they could have easily profited from the example of Sir John A. MacDonald's Cabinet in Canada after the passage of the British North America Act, 1867. The Swiss pattern of inter-racial and inter-linguistic composite Cabinets could also fit very well in the sociological conditions of India. In one of the Provinces of India itself a precedent was set by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Muslim Premier of the Punjab, who, in spite of having a clear majority in the House, invited the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha to nominate one Minister. The experiment succeeded, so well that communal tension in the Punjab during those years was less serious than in almost every other Province. Sir Sikandar could claim in May 1939 that "the balanced constructive achievement in the Punjab, during the short span of two years . . . can be mainly attributed to the judicious combination of the various interests in the Cabinet."[1] Certain Hindu scholars were likewise convinced of the necessity and of the value of Coalition Governments. Their judgements of the political balance in 1937 do not agree with the assessment of the political situation made by the High Command of the Congress. "The Congress," according to one, "committed an error of judgement in omitting to take the League members into Cabinets of Hindu-majority Provinces. . . . Some of the ex-Congress Ministers . . . have frankly admitted the mistake."[2] In the words of another, "If the Congress wanted to placate the League, the best moment for doing it was the year 1937 when the Congress was strong and accepted office and when the League was weak and willing to co-operate."[3]

1. *The Indian Annual Register* (Calcutta, 1939), Vol. I. p. 378.
2. V. B. Kulkarni, *Is Pakistan Necessary?* (Bombay, 1944), p. 31.
3. B. M. Chaudhuri, *Muslim Politics in India* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 51

Some foreign commentators, too, have seen in this exclusive policy of the Congress Party a lack of statemanship which contributed greatly to the growth of the Muslim League and to the increasing strength of the movement for a separate Muslim state. Prominent among those was Sir Percival Griffiths whose long experience in various branches of the administration had given him an unusual knowledge of conditions in India. He said:

"Except for a few cranks, nobody in India took the Pakistan idea seriously until after the inauguration of Provincial autonomy; and it is undoubtedly true that the real creators of the demand for Pakistan were the Congress High Command. If they had been prepared to abate their claims to be the sole spokesmen for India and had tried to allay Muslim fears sightly, Pakistan might never have came to birth."[1]

The Congress had in the meantime taken another momentous step when Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru announced in March 1937 that the Congress would soon start a Muslim mass contact movement. There was nothing basically wrong in the Congress desire to bring the Muslims into its fold and thus give it the appearance of a truly National Party which equally represented the Hindus and Muslims. Nehru's announcement reflected a genuine desire for national unity but it was probably inspired at this time by the failure of the Congress to secure the support of any appreciable number of Muslim voters in the recent elections. But that was not all. It was also an attempt to weaken and demoralise the League and to discredit its leadership. The Pandit announced that the policy of pacts and compromises with the communal leaders should be abandoned and the people behind them should be approached directly. The problem, in his opinion, was economic and not communal. "And yet," he declared, "some people still talk of the Muslims as a group, dealing with the Hindus or other as a group, a medieval conception which has no place in the modern would." His suggestion was "to leave top fringe, which is continually talking of percentages of seats in the Legislatures and State jobs and reach the masses." The Muslims without any effective leadership had drifted aimlessly and "they

1. P. J. Griffiths, *The British Impact on India* (London 1952), p. 342; cf. Michael, Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London, 1959), p. 231, The same opinion is held by an Indian Christian; see Frank Moraes, op. cit., p. 268.

resent the helpless position and feel that the communal leadership they have had has weakened them politically."[1]

In spite of this eloquent plea the mass contact movement could not make much headway because the mind of an average Muslim was governed more by religion, which in turn governed his entire life including his politics, than by the lofty ideals of nationalism and the prospects of economic prosperity to which the Congress drew his attention. "True," says Dr. Beni Prasad, "the Congress promised economic prosperity but man does not live by bread alone."[2] Furthermore, since Mr. Gandhi had gone into a temporary retirement, the Congress was almost entirely in the hands of Mr. Nehru whose views on religion in general and Islam in particular were well known. In his *Autobiography*, first published in 1936, he had gone so far as to say that "the spectacle of what is called religion, or at any rate organised religion in India and elsewhere, has filled me with horror, and I have frequently condemned it and wished to make a clean sweep of it."[3] At another place in the same book, he asked, "But what is this 'Muslim culture'?" and frankly admitted a few lines later that "I have tried hard to understand what this 'Muslim culture' is, but I confess that I have not succeeded."[4] It was these threats to the Muslim religion and culture that the League, which claimed to be the guardian and champion of these interests, fully played upon. At any rate, the Muslim mass contact movement was ill-timed and, as one observer has noted, "there can be no doubt that this made plan of mass contact has had a great deal to do with the emergence of Pakistan."[5]

At all events, the twin policy of attempting to wean the Muslims from the Muslim League and to persuade individual members of the League to abandon their allegiance by the offer of Ministerial office had a disastrous effect on the immediate political situation. It stiffened the attitude of Jinnah who, in the words of a biographer of Nehru, was "ready to pounce upon and

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., pp. 422-23.
2. Beni Prasad, *India's Hindu-Muslim Questions* (London, 1946), p. 74.
3. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 374.
4. Ibid., pp. 470-71.
5. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, p. 338.

capitalise on every mistake of Congress. And in this period the Congrese made several mistakes."[1]

The Muslim League thus found itself in a tight corner in the summer of 1937. Its only chance now was to strengthen itself and then bargain with the Congress on fundamental issues from a position of strength. It was under these circumstances that the League met for its historic session at Lucknow in October 1937. Discussing the recent situation in his presidential address, Mr. Jinnah said:

"The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu . . . they have by their words, deeds and programme shown more and more that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fairplay at their hands."

The intentions at the Congress were, he believed, quite clear. "On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus." Appealing for greater support for the Muslim League so that an 'honourable settlement' could be reached between the two communities, he said:

"Offers of peace by the weaker party always mean confession of weakness and an invitation to aggression. Appeals to patriotism, justice and fairplay and for goodwill fall flat. It does not require political wisdom to realize that all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed by power. Politics means power and not relying on cries of justice or fairplay or goodwill."

The mass contact campaign, he declared, was "calculated to divide and weaken and break the Musalmans and is an effort to detach them from their leaders. It is a dangerous move and it cannot mislead anyone."

Analysing the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly on the basis of adult franchise, Jinnah asked:

"Who is to constitute the electorates on the basis of adult franchise, and how many representatives will be chosen by these electorates constituted on the basis of adult franchise, and what will happen to the minorities in such constituencies, and what will the electorates understand, and how will they make their choice of this special body of men with final authority and power

1. Frank Moraes, op. cit., pp. 268-69.

to frame the constitution of this great sub-continent? . . . And, obove all, what will happen to the minorities in such a body? . . . Let the Congress first bring all principal communities in the country and all principal classes of interest under its leadership . . . to convene such a body before even the communal problem has been solved and before all important communities in India have accepted the leadership of the Congress is like putting the cart before the horse."[1]

The speech concluded with a stirring appeal to all Muslims to rally round the League.

This statement by its President would in itself have made this meeting of the Muslim League an important event. But it was significant for two other reasons. First, the League changed its creed from full responsible government to "full independence in the form of a federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the constitution."[2] Second, and more significant, on the very day of Mr. Jinnah's Speech Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Premier of the Punjab, announced that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party would also join the Muslim League and submit themselves to the control of its Provincial Parliamentary Board. An agreement to that effect known as the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact was accordingly concluded.[3] Shortly afterwards, similar announcements were made by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq and Sir Muhammad Saadullah, the Premiers of Bengal and Assam, respectively.[4] These declarations had a powerful effect on the growth of the Muslim League. "Within two or three months after the Lucknow Conference, over 170 new branches of the League had been established, 90 of them in the United Provinces and 40 in the Punjab. No less than 100,000 new members were said to have been enlisted in the United Provinces alone."[5]

1. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 27, 28, 30, 32-34, (for full text, see pp. 24-37).

2. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from October 1937 to December 1938* (Delhi, 1944), p. 6.

3. Mohammad Noman, op. cit., p. 351.

4. R. Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, pp. 182-83.

5. Ibid., p. 183.

III

SHORTLY after the Provincial elections Jinnah approached Gandhi with a view to securing his co-operation in working for a settlement. Gandhi confessed that he could see no solution. "I wish I could do something," he said, "but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is bright as ever; only I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness, and in such distress I cry out to God for light."[1] There, for the present, the matter ended. Five months latter, following Jinnah's statement to the Lucknow Session of the League and the announcement of the Muslim Premiers, Mr. Gandhi re-opened the correspondence, but in a rather different tone. "As I read it," he said, "the whole of your speech is a declaration of war. Only, I had hoped you would reserve poor me as a bridge between the two, I see that you want no bridge."[2] Jinnah replied a few days latter, "I am sorry you think my speech at Lucknow is a declaration of war. It is purely in self-defence. Kindly read it again and try to understand it. Evidently you have not been following the course of events of the last twelve months." Regarding Gandhi's desire of being reserved "as a bridge between the two," Jinnah asked. "Don't you think your complete silence for all these months has identified you with the Congress leadership, although I know you are not even a four-anna member of that body."[3]

The correspondence between the two leaders continued throughout the winter of 1937-38 but nothing was achieved. Mr. Gandhi's contention was that Mr. Jinnah did not want any compromise as he wrote:

"In your speeches I miss the old nationalist. When in 1915 I returned from the self-imposed exile in South Africa, everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest of nationalists and the hope of both Hindus and Muslims. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah? . , . the proposals, to form a basis of unity between the two communities, has surely got to come from you."[4]

1. Gandhi to Jinnah, May 22, 1937, Syed Sharifuddin Peerzada, ed., *Leader's Correspondence with Mr. Jinnah* (Bombay, 1944), p. 37.
2. Gandhi to Jinnah, October 19, 1937, ibid, p. 38.
3. Jinnah to Gandhi, November 5, 1937, ibid., pp. 38-39.
4. Gandhi to Jinnah, February 3, 1938, ibid., pp. 40-41.

The allegation of Gandhi was not entirely baseless. Jinnah was no longer one of the nationalist leaders. He was rapidly becoming *the* leader of the Muslim community. As a prerequisite to all negotiations for settlement he insisted:

"We have reached a stage when no doubt should be left that you recognise the All-India Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India and, on the other hand, you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the conutry. It is only on that basis that we can proceed further and devise a machinery of approach."[1]

A series of letters were also exchanged between Mr. Jinnah on the one hand and Mr. Nehru and other Congress leaders on the other. In the Jinnah-Nehru correspondence which continued from January 1938 to December 1939, Jinnah continued to press for the recognition of the League as the sole authoritative organisation of the Muslims. This contention was evidently based on the Lucknow Pact of 1916. That was the only agreement ever reached between the two organisations. If the Congress could recognise the League as the representative of Muslims, then there seemed no reason why it should not do the same now. "By the Pact, the Congress acknowledged the fact that the Hindus and the Muslims were two separate nations, and that, while the Congress itself was the representative of the Hindus, the Muslim League represented the Muslim community."[2]

This was a plausible argument but it had one serious weakness. In 1916 there was no other Muslim organisation to challenge the claim of the League. Although the League was much weaker at the time of the Lucknow Pact, yet for all practical purposes it was the only organisation to present the Muslim point of view. In the late thirties there were many other Muslim organisations which openly challenged the League's claim to be the sole custodian of Muslim interests. The League was no doubt the largest Muslim organisation but by no means the only one, and as such its claim to be the only authoritative organisation of Muslims could well be questioned. There was much substance in Nehru's argument that there were other Muslim organisations

1. Jinnah to Gandhi, March 3, 1938, Syed Sharifuddin Peerzada, op. cit., p. 46.

2. F. K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan* (Lahore, 1944), p. 84;

too which, "even though they might be younger and smaller, cannot be ignored."[1]

There was some justification for the refusal of the Congress to recognise the League as the sole champion of Muslim interests. Such recognition would have been equivalent to a confession that the Congress was a Hindu Party, a point which it had consistently denied. Yet the Congress, while claiming to represent in conjunction with smaller Muslim parties the bulk of the Muslim community continued its negotiations with the League. Contemporary observers were puzzled by this conduct. "Why," asked an English writer, "does Congress proclaim, day in and day out, that it is with the League that they must reach a settlement? Why does Gandhi address all his pleas, his admonitions, and his scoldings to Jinnah, the leader of the League?"[2] Nehru's contention in this connection was that "obviously the Muslim League is an important communal organisation and we deal with it as such."[3] But the League was not of course the only avowedly comunal organisation. It was matched by the Hindu Mahasahba which claimed to be the authoritative champion of true Hindu interests and which, like the Muslim League, denied the claim of the Congress to be the only representative of the Indian people.[4]

The question naturally arises : why did the Congress leaders make no effort to come to terms with the Mahasabha? Two answers may be suggested. First, the Congress did not accept the claim of the Mahasabha to speak for Hindus, and therefore did not feel called upon to settle terms with that body. If that be accepted, then it would not be difficult to conclude that the very act of negotiations between the Congress and the League was an implied recognition of the claim of the League to represent the Muslims. The other answer was suggested by a contemporary writer. The Congress, he remarked,

"purposely intends to keep that body independent of itself so that it may have free hand in consolidating the Hindu community as a separate entity. . . . [The Congress] intentionally wants that there

1. Nehru to Jinnah, April 6, 1938, Syed Sharifuddin Peerzada, op. cit., p. 124.

2. Beverley Nichols, *Verdict on India* (New York, 1944), p. 226.

3. Syed Sharifuddin Peerzada, op. cit., p. 124

4. See the All-India Hindu Mahasabha Working Committtee resolution, May 1940, *Modern Review* (Calcutta, 1940), Vol. LXVII, No. 6, pp. 625-26.

should be a communal organisation independent of it, to devote attention to the development of those aspects of the life of the Hindus which it is not open to it to touch."[1]

A more or less similar view was expressed by Dr. Ambedkar. He said :

"It is no use saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body. A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to reflect the Hindu mind and support Hindu aspirations. The only difference between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha is that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions while the Congress is politic and polite. Apart from this difference of fact, there is no other difference between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha."[2]

The other issues which figured more prominently in the Jinnah-Nehru correspondence were the questions of the *Bande Mataram* and the *lingua franca* for India. The *Bande Mataram* was used as the 'National Anthem' by the Congress Ministries and the day's legislative proceedings were opened with its recital. On these occasions non-Congress Muslim members registered their protests by walking out of the Assembly till the recitation was over. As early as October 1937 the League had condemned "the attitude of the Congress in foisting *Bande Mataram* as the National Anthem upon the country in callous disregard of the feelings of Muslims," and had characterised the song as "not merely positively anti-Islamic and idolatrous in its inspiration and ideas but definitely subversive of the growth of genuine nationalism in India."[3] This song,[4] it may be mentioned, first appeared in a Bengali novel *Anand Math* written by Bankim Chandra Chatterji, a Bengali Hindu. The song itself was objectionable to Muslims. The source from which it was taken made it even more so. A brief quotation from the author's description of an imaginary rebellion against the Muslim conquerors may help to explain the resentment of so many Muslims against this particular song:

"Some shouted, 'Kill, kill, kill the *mereys*,' some shouted,

1. 'A Punjabi *Confederacy of India* (Lahore, 1939), p. 40.

2. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, p. 30.

3. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from October 1937 to December 1938*, p. 5.

4. For an English translation of *Bande Mataram* song, see R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942*, Appendix II, pp. 322-23.

Bande Mataram, some shouted, 'Brother, will the day come when we shall break mosques and build temples of Radha-Madhav on the sites?' . . . and oft and anon there were great shouts of *Bande Mataram*."[1]

It is not surprising that the Muslims regarded it as a hymn of hate. For the Hindus, more especially for the Congress, it was a living symbol of their struggle for freedom. Nehru's reply to Jinnah's protest against this song was, that

"the Bande Mataram song has been intimately associated with Indian nationalism for more than thirty years and numerous associations of sentiment and sacrifice have gathered round it. Popular songs are not made to order, nor can they be successfully imposed. They grow out of public sentiment."[2]

The Working Committee of the Congress had of course deleted those parts of the song which it thought were obnoxious to Muslims, but Muslims still objected to the idea of a song which had such an odious context being venerated as National Anthem.

Regarding the language question, Pandit Nehru said:

"I want to encourage all the great provincial languages of India and at the same time to make Hindustani, as written both in *Nagri* and Urdu scripts, the national language. Both scripts should be officially recognised and the choice should be left to the people concerned. In fact this policy is being pursued by the Congress Ministers."[3]

It must be said that this was a fair enough solution of the language question. Althogh Urdu had been employed as the Court language since the time of Lord William Bentinck and had been continuously enriched by the joint efforts of Hindus and Muslims both, it was generally described by the orthodox rank and file of Hindus as the language of the Muslims. This was a mere surmise and untrue to facts. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a great scholar and lover of Urdu, speaking on the occasion of the Urdu Day celebrations on December 12, 1938, at Allahabad, said that "the Urdu language is a joint and a sacred inheritance of both Hindus and Muslims, which is absolutely indivisible."[4] And, again, "Urdu is my mother and national tongue. I can never

1. Quoted by F. K. Khan Durrani, op. cit., p. 60; for detailed extracts, see pp. 56-60.

2. Syed Sharifuddin Peerzada, op. cit., p. 116.

3. Ibid., p. 120.

4. *Hamari Qaumi Zaban* [A Collection of Sir T.B. Sapru's Speeches on Urdu], published by Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i Urdu (Delhi, 1941) p. 30.

accept that Urdu is the language of the Muslims. The Hindus should have as much claim on Urdu as the Muslims."[1] Similarly, Dr. Saksena in *A History of Urdu Literature* remarks, "In these days of nation-building, the importance of Urdu, the symbol of Hindu-Muslim *entente*, can never be overrated. It is the pledge of their unity. . . . Urdu is truly the *lingua franca* of India for it is understood all over India even where it is not spoken."[2] Even Pandit Nehru himself was not prepared to recognise Urdu as the exclusive monopoly of the Muslims. "For some mysterious reasons," he wrote to a friend, "Urdu is supposed to be the hallmark of the Muslims. With all due deference, I am not prepared to admit this. I consider Urdu as my language which I have spoken from childhood up. . . ."[3]

It has further to be remembered that Arabic and not Urdu is the religious language of the Muslims. Urdu was confined to India. It was not spoken or understood in Muslim communities anywhere else. According to their opinion, the Muslims had made a sacrifice in the interest of national unity by accepting Urdu and limiting Arabic to the position of a religious language. Maulana Muhammad Ali as early as July 1925 wrote thus in the *Comrade*:

> "The only conclusion at which we can arrive is that neither in the matterr of language nor in that of script can the Muslims afford to concede more than what they have already done in adopting Urdu as their only vernacular . . . unless we take practical steps to safeguard the lauguage and the script, both are endangered by the narrow and exclusive 'Nationalism' which is growing more and more militant every day."[4]

This sentiment was shared by almost all Muslims and they were not willing to see Urdu reduced to a position inferior to that of Hindi.

Pandit Nehru suggested a compromise, viz. the creation of a Hindustani language, a blend of Urdu and Hindi, simplified by the removal of Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit words, to be written in both scripts. As a national language this might have served

1. *Hamari Qaumi Zaban*, p. 33. This extract is from Sir T. B. Sapur's speech at Lucknow on February 12, 1939.

2. Ram Babu Saksena, *A History of Urdu Literature* (2nd edition, Allahabad, 1940). p. 368.

3. Quoted by Michael Brecher, op, cit., p. 235.

4. Afzal Iqbal, ed., op. cit., p. 43.

very well; but this plan was not adhered to. As soon as the Congress Ministries came into power they, instead of allaying the suspicions of Muslims, "adopted active measures for the encouragement of a highly artificial form of Sanskritised Hindi unintelligible to all save those conversant with that obsolete language."[1] Even Mr. Humayun Kabir, a staunch nationalist Muslim and otherwise an ardent supporter of Congress, was constrained to write that "Even orthodox Congress Muslims have complained that the proposal of giving equal status to the two scripts remained only a pious resolution."[2] Mr. K.M. Munshi, a member of the Bombay Minstry, made no secret of his views and openly declared:

> "The national *lingua franca* will be written principally in Devanagri with optional Urdu script. . . . But the medium for the commonwealth of Indian literatures can only be a simplified Sanskrit. . . . Our literary men are dreaming of one language, one script, one literature. Our duty is . . . to surrender ourselves to the spirit of the ancient literary artist—Vyas, the author of the 'Mahabharta.' "[3]

The Hindu mind was revealed even more clearly by the leadership of the Hindu Mahasabha. Mr. Savarkar, the Mahasabha President, in his presidential address delivered at Calcutta in December 1939, said:

> "Hindi, the Hindi which is derived from Sanskrit and draws its nourishment from the latter, is our . . . national language. . . . This 'Sanskrit Nistha' [basically Sanskrit] Hindi has nothing to do with that hybrid the so-called Hindustani which is being hatched up by the Wardha Scheme. It is nothing short of a linguistic monstrosity and must be ruthlessly suppressed."[4]

The negotiations between Jinnah the Congress leaders on this and other subjects continued but, as we shall see presently, the only result was more bitterness and misunderstanding.

1. A. Hamid, "Ten Years of Provincial Autonomy," in *Proceedings of the First All-Pakistan Political Science Conference, 1950*, ed., M. Aziz Ahmad (Lahore, 1950), p. 8.

2. Humayun Kabir, "Even the Muslims Disagree," *Asia* (New York, 1940), Vol. XL, No. 8, p. 436.

3. *Indian Readers Digest* (Bombay, 1937), Vol. I, No. 6. p. 9.

4. Quoted by B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, pp. 125-26.

IV

In order to strengthen its case the All-India Muslim League Council had appointed a Committee in March 1938 under the chairmanship of Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur to inquire into "the numerous complaints . . . of the hardship, ill-treatment and injustice that is meted out to the Muslims in various Congress Government Provinces and particularly to those who are workers and members of the Muslim League."[1] The Report of this Committee was published at the end of 1938 and became known as the *Pirpur Report*. This was followed by the *Shareef Report*, published in March 1939 after an investigation by a special committee of the Provincal Branch of the Muslim League in Bihar. Over and above these two came a lengthy press statement in December 1939 by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, the Premier of Bengal It was also publisheds eparately as *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule*.

To deal with all these Reports in detail would require more space than is here available. But in view of the telling effect these documents had on Muslim opinion, and their importance on later developments, some consideration must be given to them. The basic content of these Reports, with of course a varying degree of emphasis, is more or less the same. These documents range over a wide field from important issues like the maintenance of law and order, the language question and the educational schemes to minute details of such matters as the right of Muslims to sell and eat beef, etc. The evidence of impartial scholars suggests that the details of the grievances were exaggerated. This is probably the case. These Reports were drafted by the Muslim Leaguers and not unnaturally they are at times marked by some extravagance of language. It would have been surprising had it been otherwise. The Rerorts were the result of the efforts of partisans and not of an impartial tribunal. But speaking strictly from an historical point of view the "importance of the period of the Congress Ministries lies not so much in the question of whether the Muslim grievances were great or whether they

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim Leugue, from October 1937 to December 1938*, p. 17.

were exaggerated, but in the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims believed them to exist."[1] This does not, however, mean that they were a jumble of concocted facts and figments of fertile imaginations. A brief summary of their more important parts may indicate the measure of truth which they contain.

Of the Reports mentioned, the *Pirpur Report* is more balanced and less sensational. It charged the Congress administration with the use of those very tactics against the Muslim League which it had been blaming the British Government for using against the Indians as a whole. A policy of 'divide and rule' in the garb of mass contact movement and the encouragement of rival Muslim organisations was pursued "to avoid a settlement with the Muslim community on real isues."[2] It was stated that in day-to-day administration the irregularities of Muslims were severely punished on small pretexts. It was alleged that the Congress administration even attempted to influence the judiciary in cases in which Hindus were involved. To prove this contention the Report quoted a judgement of the Allahabad High Court in a contempt of court case against a Congress M.L.A., Dr. Vishwa Nath Mukerji. In the course of their statement their Lordships had observed:

"We have reason to believe that a large number of communications have been addressed to courts in this Province . . . by persons on behalf of parties to cases and others interested in such cases. . . . It must be made clear to everyone that this court will not tolerate any attempt to bring pressure upon a judicial officer and particularly junior judicial officers who are not in a position to defend themselves."[3]

The Central Provinces Minstry was criticised for not having provided any representation to the Muslims on the Local Boards as had been done by previous Governments by means of nominations. "The Muslims," it was stated, "are thus too much worse off than they were under the previous Government."[4]

1. R. Symonds, op. cit., p. 60.
2. *Report of the Inquiry Committee Appointed by the Council of the All-India Muslim League to enquire in Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces* (n.d. and no place of publication), [Delhi, 1938] p. 16 (hereafter referred to as *Pirpur Report*).
3. Ibid., p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 54.

In order to show that there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the administration to impose Hindu culture and religion on the Muslim) minorities, a circular letter issued by the Chairman of Chandwar Local Board in the Central Provinces to the various Headmasters of Urdu Schools (where the majority of the students were Mulsims) was mentioned. This circular ordered an official celebration of "the birthday of that great personality Mahatma Gandhi, who has given the message of truth and non-violence (*Satya* and *Ahimsa*) to the world." The programme as chalked out in the letter demanded that "the picture of Mahatma Gandhi should be worshipped and his high ideals should be explained to the public."[1] Passing on to other Provinces similar sins of omission and commission on the part of the Governmets concerned were listed so as to prove that the Muslim feelings were injured in one way or another.

The *Shareef Report* may be dismissed briefly. It pertained only to the Province of Bihar and it was in the main a record of petty incidents which the Report insisted were real and genuine but which the Congress authorities, with equal insistence, completely denied. It was one-man's word against another's. The truth or otherwise of the grievances listed could only be verified by an on-the-spot inquiry by some neutral judicial tribunal acceptable to both parties. No such tribunal was ever appointed.

The third in the series was Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq's strongly worded indictment against the Congress Ministries. The Congress policy, said Mr. Huq, had set the stage

> "for the blatant arrogance of the militant Hindu to burst the bounds of restraint which non-partisan Governments had hitherto imposed. . . . They set about to impose their will on the Muslim minorities. And what was their will? . . . 'Mother Cow' must be respected. . . . Muslims must not be allowed to eat beef. . . . The religion of Muslims must be humbled because was not this the land of the Hindus? Hence the forbidding of 'Azan attacks on worshippers in mosques, the insistence on the triumphant passage of noisy processions before mosques at prayer time . . . was it strange, then, that tragedy followed tragedy

1. *Pirpur Report*, p. 59.

and blood flowed instead of the milk of human kindness."[1]

The statement went on to paint the Muslim plight in a language which left the impression that a deliberate reign of terror had been let loose. It contained a description of seventy-two incidents in Bihar, thirty-three incidents in the United Provinces,[2] and forty-three incidents in the Central Provinces which were intended to show the pitiable and helpless position of Muslims in these Provinces. In spite of this pungent language, most of the charges listed and the incidents narrated fall in the same category as those in the *Shareef Report*. One incident, however, needs to be examined. It was the notorious 'Biswa Murder Case.'[3] The facts of the tragedy may be summarised.

In Chandur Biswa, a small village in Berar, a Hindu-Muslim riot took place in March 1939 in which both Hindus and Muslims were injured. One of the Hindus named Jagdev Patel later succumbed to his injuries. The local administration quickly took action and Muslims numbering about 150 men, women and children were collectively accused of murder, although only forty three of these were ultimately prosecuted. A penal tax was,

1. A. K. Fazl-ul-Huq, *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule* (Calcutta, 1939), p. 2; cf. R. Coupland, *India: A Re-statement*, pp. 174-75. The latter source maintains, "*Bande Mataram* was sung to open proceedings in the Provincial Legislatures. The tri-colour was hoisted over local administrative buildings. . . . In some districts Congress police stations were opened and Congress police began to investigate crime. . . . An officers' training camp was started, and bodies of men began drill and march, in uniform with *lathis* for arms, and their flag flying. A less sinister phenomenon, but one which made a deep impression on the minorities, was the demeanour of the rank and file of Congressmen, especially the younger ones, on the morrow of their electoral victory. Many of them behaved as if they were a ruling caste, as if they owned the country."

2. The Governor of the Province, Sir Harry, Haig, declared that on "questions raising communal issues the Ministers, in my judgement, normally acted with impartiality and a desire to do what was fair." He added, however, that "the enthusiasm of the masses for Congress Raj melted imperceptibly into the ideas of Hindu Raj, which was certainly prevalent throughout the Province" ["The United Provinces and the New Constitution," *Asiatic Review* (London, 1940) Vol. XXXVI, No. 127, pp. 428-29].

3. This case was referred to by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq (see p. 16 of his statement), but not fully dealt with as not all the facts were available till some months later. Some later Muslim students have given it great prominence.

however, imposed on the entire Muslim population of the village. When the case went to the Sessions Court, Nagpur, six Muslims were sentenced to death and 24 to transportation for life.[1] On an appeal the Nagpur High Court found that the entire evidence was false and acquitted them all.

Dr. Rajendra Prasad, not finding anything serious in the whole affair, remarks:

"The trial was held after the Congress Ministry had resigned and the judgements of the Sessions Court and also of the High Court were delivered months after the resignation of the Congress Ministry. It is an everyday affair in Courts that the judgement of a Judge is upset by the judgement of an appellate Court and so it happened in this case."[2]

This is correct as far as it goes, but there was more in the judgement of the High Court than is here related. In part that judgement read:

"This is a distressing case. The epithet is justified when we see in this case . . . witness after witness whose evidence is false, improved and tutored going into the box. So far as seven of those witnesses are concerned they are children or young people who have been coached to give false evidence. . . . Human conduct can hardly stoop to anything lower than endeavouring to kill one's enemies through the lips of perjured children. . . . The concoction is transparent and so is the reason. . . . All these fantastic stories would be comic if it were not for the tragedy of it. . . . The case has been treated as some gruesome festival in which witness has vied with witness to see how many Muslims he could be instrumental in sending to the gallows. Truth, honour, respect for human life, regard for one's own sworn word have all been thrown to the winds . . . . When attempts are made to tamper with evidence and to deflect the normal course of justice by such one-sided and in some respects outrageous investigation as we had in this case, such results are perhaps inevitable. . . . We find a deep laid concert on the part of those witnesses to bring in every Muhammadan they possibly can, just because he is a Muhammadan."[3]

1. For details, see *Medina* (Urdu). (Bijnour). August 13, 1939, and Israr Ahmad Kuraivi, *C. P. M. Main Congress Raj* (Urdu), (Nagpur, 1941), p. 171.

2. Rajendra Prasad, op. cit., p. 151.

3. For further extracts of the judgement, delivered on May 2, 1940, see F. K. Khan Durrani, op. cit., pp. 133-34, and M. A. Mehtar, *Whys of the Great Indian Conflict* (Lahore, 1947), pp. 124-25.

The charge sheet of Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq was not allowed to go unchallenged. It was described by Mr. Shukla, the Premier of the Central Provinces, as a "Himalaya of lies." Dr. Khare, the ousted Premier and predecessor of Mr. Shukla, issued a statement listing many cases in which his Hindu colleagues had exerted pressure on him, when he was the Premier, to further the interests of Hindus and even to victimise Muslims. He said:

"Within a fortnight of our assuming office I was requested by my then colleague Mr. D. P. Mishra to transfer Mr. Niaz Ahmad Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was posted at Jabbulpore without any apparent reason. The only reason . . . for this request : . . was that Mr. Niaz Ahmad Khan was concerned in the investigation of the famous Hasina kidnapping case."

Dr. Khare went on to say that his erstwhile colleagues also tried to prevail upon him "not to confirm Mr. Inam-ur-Rahim, I.C.S., who was then Deputy Comissioner of Yeotmal and who happens to be the only Muslim I.C.S. officer in the Province." Dr. Khare complemented himself for not having yielded to these requests "because I wanted to be fair to all." Enumerating further the parallel cases of two Ministers, one Muslim and the other Hindu, having been found guilty of similar administrative lapses, he said that the action of Mr. Sharif (the Muslim Minister) "was condoned by the Congress Assembly Party . . . but the High Command and the Working Committee . . . sacked Mr. Sharif." Whereas in the case of Mr. Mishra (the Hindu Minister) against whom "some twelve or fifteen members of the Party lodged a complaint . . . the High Command gave an *ex-parte* decision in favour of Mr. Mishra and without taking any explanation from the complainants, they asked them to tender an apology to Mr. Mishra." Dr. Khare, after listing another case of partiality by the Central Provinces Ministry, said that he was "prepared to go before any Committee or Commission to state

1. Dr. Khare, due to his differences with the High Command, "was forced out of office not by any decision in the Provincial Assembly, still less by any pressure of the Provincial electorate or its representatives, but by a decision of the Congress Working Committee adopted by the Provincial Congress Party under pressure from some of the Committee's foremost members" (R. Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, pp. 124-25).

in detail what I know."[1]

Closely connected with the grievances mentioned above was the problem of Muslim education in the Congress-governed Provinces. It was maintained that Muslim interests in this field, as in the others, were being wilfully neglected. Even mischievous designs were seen in the Congress educational policy. "Education," said one prominent Muslim leader, "is a very potent and even a dangerous weapon in the hands of a Government if it is actuated by the motive of supplanting one culture and society by another culture and society." The Congress, it was asserted, used this power "to obliterate all non-Hindu cultures and especially the Muslim culture."[2] The main criticism centred around the 'Wardha Scheme' of basic education which was prepared by a committee headed by a Congressite Muslim, Dr. Zakir Husain, but it was inspired, guided and supervised by Mr. Gandhi himself. It was this scheme which was put into operation in the Central Provinces under the name of *Vidya Mandirs*[3] (temples of learning).

To start with, the very name *Mandirs* (Temples) was offensive to Muslim ears. A temple is, as Muslims believe, a Hindu house of idol-worship and idol-worship being most strictly prohibited in Islam, it was considered by Muslims to be a direct affront to their religious feelings. The basic objection was that an educational scheme which made no provision for instructing Muslim children in the principles of their own religion could not meet their approval. The text-books sanctioned by certain Provincial Governments were also found objectionable as "they are mainly devoted to the praises of Hindu religion, philosophy and heroes, and minimise the Islamic contribution to the world, and to India in particular, ignore Muslim culture, history and heroes, and

1. *Star of India* (Calcutta), January 16, 1940. May also see the following: (*i*) S.N.A. Qadari, *A Moslem's Inner Voice* (Lahore 1944), pp. 195-96; (*ii*) Rais Ahmad Jafri, *Hayat-i-Muhammad Ali Jinnah* (Urdu), (Bombay, 1946), pp. 223-25; (*iii*) Israr Ahmad Kuraivi, op. cit., pp. 237-38; and (*iv*) *Medina* (Bijnour), January 5, 1940). (Lahore, 1945), p. 17.

2. Liaquat Ali Khan, *Muslim Educational Problems* (Pakistan Literature Series No. 7).

3. The name *Vidya Mandirs* was objected to by Dr. Husain but he was overruled. See R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942*, p. 191.

speak of them with scant courtesy."[1]

The two main objects of the scheme were to inculcate the spirit of *ahimsa* (non-violence) and territorial nationalism. Both of these ideas were subjected to scathing criticism, as they, it was alleged, were contrary to basic Muslim beliefs. The first was rejected because Islam "enjoins on them [Muslims] the duty to fight in the cause of righteousness and against evil when and wherever necessary. The insistence of *ahimsa* is only meant to root out from the Muslim youths their martial spirit and tradition." The second too was unacceptable because it clashed with "the Muslim view of nationalism which is based on the philosophy of society and outlook on life rather than allegiance to a territorial boundary." A definite political motive was seen behind the scheme. It was designed, as Muslim believed, to disseminate the idea of "the inferiority and impotance of Muslim culture and to establish the revival and supremacy of the primitive Hindu culture of Vedic time."[2] The whole scheme was interpreted as a clever attempt at integration, assimilation and absorption of Muslims. What, it was said, "the Congress as a political organization could not do openly, the Wardha Scheme . . . would have achieved by slow and sure methods."[3]

The criticism of the Wardha Scheme was not confined to Muslim Leaguers. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema, whose political programme was akin to that of Congress, also condemned it. In an open meeting at Delhi on March 5, 1939, Maulana Ahmad Saeed, a top-ranking leader of the 'Jamiat' declared that "if the Wardha Scheme in its entirety was imposed on the Muslim students, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema would resort to civil disobedience."[4]

It seems evident that the Muslim criticism, more particularly the charge that Mr. Gandhi was deliberately planning to exterminate the distinctive culture of Indian Muslims, was often

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolution of the All-India Muslim League, from December 1938 to March 1940* (Delhi, n.d.), p. 15. The above extract is from the League resolution of July 1939.

2. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, in *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution* (being a collection of essays by various author), (Bombay, 1949), pp. 135-36.

3. Liaquat Ali Khan, *Muslim Educational Problems*, p. 19.

4. *Medina* (Bijnour), March 13, 1939.

exaggerated. The sincerity of Mr. Gandhi's desire to do so full justice to the Muslims as fellow citizens of India cannot be questioned. But he was, in Nehru's words, "a Hindu to the innermost depths of his being,"[1] and however earnestly he sought to do so, he could not appreciate the Muslim point of view. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that thc 'Wardha Scheme,' however unpalatable to most Muslims, was prepared by a committee headed by a member of their own community. However secular and nationalistic the approach of Congressite Muslims might be, it is unlikely that they would have concurred in a plan based on such motives as have been attributed to the framers of the 'Wardha Scheme' of education.

Before proceeding to relate the narrative of events, one final comment may be made on the overall Muslim grievances under the Congress Ministries. It must be conceded at once that there was no Congress plot against Muslims rights as such. It is evident, moreover, that the Muslim clamour was a little out of propertion to the injuries received. But it must be acknowledged that the congress as a representative of the majority of Indian peoples failed to appreciate the sensitivities and fears of a cultural minority, and that at times they used their power in such a way as to enhance those fears. The Muslim discontent and the agitation that followed "cannot be dismissed as only the work of an interested clique, for even cliques require some genuine grievance to work up feeling among the masses. Agitation could not have continued without some real discontent or sense of injury behind it. The injury may have been imaginery, but . . . the discontent was real."[2]

V

THE Muslim League, as already noted, had condemned the Federal part of the Act of 1935 because it did not concede full self-government at the Centre, but had supported the Provincial part of the Act. Their experience since the establishment of Provincial autonomy and the appointement of the Congress

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 365.
2. Humayun Kabir, op. cit., p. 436.

Ministries had shaken their faith in the Provincial part of the Constitution as well. This changed attitude was revealed in a resolution of the Working Committee of the League in March 1939, when the Congress Ministries appeared firmly entrenched in power. "The working of the Provincial Constitution," it was declared, "has created grave apprehensions amongst Muslims . . . [it] has utterly failed to safeguard even the elementary rights of the Muslim minorities in various Provinces."[1]

At the annual meeting of the League in the previous December, Mr. Jinnah, who was in a fair way to becoming its perpetual President, had made a slashing attack on the Congress High Command for its treatment of Muslim rights and interests. He had said:

"The Congress High Command wanted the Musalmans to be a mere understudy of the Congress, mere foot-pages of the Congress leaders, to be used, governed and brought under the heels when they had served the purpose of the Congress. . . . The Congress has now . . . killed every hope of Hindu Muslim settlement in the right royal fashion of fascism."[2]

It is not difficult to see why the Muslim League adopted this attitude in rejecting the Provincial part which it had previously accepted. In the Muslim League's view neither separate electorates nor the Governor's Special Responsibility for the protection of minority interests had sufficed to ensure them a fair deal. The reaction of the League to this situation was expressed by Mr. Jinnah in a challenging speech in the Central Legislative Assembly on March 22, 1939. In part he said:

"Co-operation between you [the Congress] and us is not possible. . . . You may be the largest number; you may be more advanced; you may be stronger economically; you may overpower us; you may oppress us; and you can do your worst. But . . . we have now made a grim resolve that we shall go down, if we have to go down, fighting."[3]

With respect to the Central Government as well, the views of the League underwent an important change in these years. That part of the Constitution had been originally condemned on

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions if the All-India Muslim League, from December 1938 to March 1940*, pp. 1-2.

2. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, pp. 69-70.

3. Ibid.. p. 84.

the ground that it made no provision for any measure of responsible government. Since the establishment of the Congress Ministries in the Provinces the League's basis of attack on the Central part had been almost completely reversed. It was henceforth denounced because in the event of the Central Government being established under the terms of the Act, it was more than probable that the Congress Party would control that Government and that the story of 'atrocities' would be repeated no longer in individual Provinces but throughout the whole of India. The belief that a wholly new form of Government was required was expressed in a resolution of the Sind Provincial Muslim League in October 1938. It ran as follows:

"This Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment, and political self-determination of the two nations known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to the All-India Muslim League to review and revise the entire question of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status due to them, and that this Conference therefore recommends to the All-India Muslim League to devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence."[1]

The idea was as once taken up by the All-India Muslim League. At its Session in Patna in December 1938, the President of the League was authorised "to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to exploring the possibility of a suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Mussalmans and other minorities in India."[2] In March 1939, Mr. Jinnah appointed a committee of nine members, with himself at the head, "to examine various schemes already propounded by those who are fully versed in the constitutional developments in India and other countries and those that may be submitted hereafter to the President."[3]

Henceforth the position and policy of the League changed

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from October 1937 to December 1938* (Annexure), p. 81.

2. Ibid., p. 74.

3. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from December 1938 to March 1940*, p. 2.

rapidly. Although the particular form of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, had been rejected by the League, the idea of Federation had not so far been repudiated in so many words. This doubt, too, was soon cleared. In September 1939, the Working Committee declared:

"The developments that have taken place and especially since the inauguration of the Provincial Constitution based on the so-called democratic system of government . . . have established beyond doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minorities whose life and liberty, property and honour, are in danger and even their rligious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress Government in various Provinces."

For these reasons the Muslim League declared its resolute opposition to any 'federal objective.' Provincial autonomy was no longer considered adequate. Under any form of Federation, they declared, the result would be the domination of one community over the other. The present Constitution, or anything like it, was rejected as "totally unsuited to the genius of the peoples of the country which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state."[1]

The federal from of Goveanment which had previously been regarded by Muslims as an adequate safeguard of their interests was now finally abandoned. The Muslims, led by the League, were now beginning to think of Indian independence in terms of self-determination for their community. A Hindu-dominated all-India Federation was completely unacceptable. However weak the Central authority may be, it was observed by one writer, "it is inherent in the nature of a Government at the centre—call it federation, confederation, union or anything else—ultimately to deprive the federating units of authority in all matters."[2] The unqualified Western brand of democracy was considered equally unsuited to Indian conditions. "Experience has proved," said Jinnah, "that whatever the economic and political programme of any political party, the Hindu, as a

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940*, pp. 26-27.

2. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Some Aspects of Pakistan* (Pakistan Literatur Series No. 3), (2nd edition, Lahore, 1952), p. 16.

general rule, will vote for his caste-fellow, the Muslim for his co-religionist."[1]

In the meantime, on September 3, 1939, war was declared in Europe, and on the same day the Viceroy of India proclaimed the country to be at war with Germany. On September 11, in an address to a joint session of both houses of the Central Legislature, Lord Linlithgow announced that in view of "the necessity for concentrating on the emergency that confronts us, we have no choice but to hold in suspense the work in connection with preparations for federations while retaining federation as our goal."[2] The reactions of the Congress and the Muslim League to the Earopean War may be briefly examined. The Congress Working Committee, in its resolution on September 14, declared that "the issue of peace and war must be decided by Indian people." It therefore asked the British Govenment "to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged, in particular, how these aims are going to apply to India and to be given effect to in the present." It was also demanded that "the Indian people must have the right of self-determination by framing their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly without external interference."[3]

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, meeting three days after its Congress counterpart, expressed its satisfaction at the suspension of the Federal Scheme, adding the wish that "instead of its being suspended it had been abandoned completely." It strongly urged the British Government "to review and revise the entire problem of India's future costitution 'de novo' in the light of the experience gained by the working of the present Provincial Constitution of India and developments that have taken place since 1935 or may take place hereafter." It was made clear that the League, too, was "in favour of 'Free India'" but was "opposed to the

1. M.A. Jinnah, "Two Nations in India," *Time and Tide* (London, 1940), Vol. XXI, No. 10, p. 239. Professor Coupland gives the date of this article as January 19, 1940. It appeared in the issue of March 9, 1940.

2. Quoted by A. Chatterji, *The Constitutional Development of India: 1937-1940* (Calcutta, 1958), p. 31.

3. M. Gwyer and A. Appadori, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 486-87.

domination of Hindu majority over Mussalmnas." The Committee expressed their "deep sympathy for Poland, England and France," but pointed out

> "that real and solid Muslim co-operation and support to Great Britain in her hour of trial cannot be secured successfully if His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy are unable to secure to the Mussalmans justice and fairplay in the Congress-governed Provinces where to-day their liberty, person, property and honour are in danger and even their most elementary rights are callously trampled upon."

The Committee went on to demand that no constitution should be framed and finally adopted by the British Governmrnt without the consent of the Muslims. Towards the end of the resolution it was reiterated that if the British Government wanted effective co-operation from the Muslims "it must create a sense of security and satisfaction amongst the Musalmans and take into confidence the Muslim League which is the only organisation that can speak on behalf of Muslim India."[1]

The language of these two resolutions reveals their bargaining character. The Congress was not unwilling to support the British war effort, but that support would be given only in return for a promise of freedom on their own terms. Similarly, the League would throw its weight of influence on the side of the Government only if it could be assured of a better deal for the Muslims than they had so for received. Although the League too endorsed the demand for freedom, it was evidently more concerned with the Muslim position in the future constitutional set-up of the country whether free or still under the British yoke. The League resolution was meant as much for the Congress High Command as for the British Gcvernment. It was in fact demanding from the Congress almost precisely what the Congress was demanding from the British Government.

In this emergency Indian co-operation was essential, and the Viceroy at once undertook the difficult task of quieting the fears and, if possible, winning the confidence of the two great

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from December 1938 to March 1940*, pp. 26-28. Cf. M. Gwyer, and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol, II, pp. 488-90.

Parties. With this object in mind he issued an important statement on October 18. He assured the congress of his sincerity and quoted from the Instrument of Instructions, issued to him as Governor-General by His Majesty the King Emperor, which required "that the partnership between India and the United Kingdom within our Empire may be furthered to the end that India may attain its due place among our Dominions." He could not of course comply with the demand of the Muslim League for an immediate suspension of the Act of 1935, but he went some way to meet their rquest and to assure them of full consultation on future constitutional plans. He said:

"I am authorized now by His Majesty's Government to say that at the end of the war they will be very willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties, and interests in India, and with Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and co-operation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desirable."[1]

This declaration failed to satisfy the Congress. On October 22, the Working Committee refused to give any support in the war, because "it would amount to an endorsement of imperialist policy which the Congress has always sought to end."[2] The Congress Ministries in different Provinces were, therefore, ordered to tender their resignations. A few weeks later the Working Committee meeting from November 19 to 23, reaffirmed its position and charged the British Government with "taking shelter under irrelevant issues, as a desire to maintain imperialist domination in India in alliance with the reactionary elements in the country." The demand for a Constituent Assembly was repeated. This alone, they declared, would be an "adequate instrument for solving the communal and other difficulties."[3] The British Government refused to go beyond the Viceroy's offer and the Civil Disobedience Campaign launched by Mr. Gandhi and the Congress in the following year did nothing to resolve the deadlock.

The Muslim League took an intermediate and a much less definite position. The Working Committee at its meeting on

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 490-91.
2. Quoted by R. Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, p. 218.
3. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol, II, pp. 496-97.

October 22, expressed its satisfaction that "the rights and interests of minorities and other important interests concerned have been duly recognised"; but it took exception to the suggested plan of revising rather than scrapping the whole of the Act of 1935. The resolution stated:

"The opposition of the Muslim League is not merely to the details of the plans embodied in the Act of 1935 and the reconsideration thereof, but their demand is that the entire problem of India's future constitution should be wholly examined and revised 'de novo.' "[1]

Although no definite assurance was given that all the demands of the League would be met, it refrained from any action designed to embarrass the Government during the war.

VI

ACTING under direct orders from the Working Committee, eight Congress Ministries went out of office between October 27 and November 15, 1939. Soon after their exit Mr. Jinnah, a skilful tactician and a hard-hitting opponent, with the intention of dramatising the event, appealed to the Muslims to unite in the observance of a 'Deliverance Day' on December 22. In a statement issued on December 2, he suggested a resolution which should be passed by Muslims at meetings to be held all over the country. Each meeting was to resolve as follows:

"It expresses its deep sense of relief at the termination of the Congress regime in various Provinces and rejoices in observing this day as the 'Day of Deliverance' from tyranny, oppression and injustice during the last two and a half years, and prays to God to grant such strength, discipline and organisation to Muslim India as to successfully prevent the advent of such a ministry again and to establish a truly popular ministry which would do even justice to all communities and interests."[2]

In a lengthy statement to the press on 'Deliverance Day,' Mr. Jinnah attacked the Congress High Command with characteristic vigour. "Since the guilty do not admit their guilt and public memory is short," he repeated the story of 'oppressions

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from December 1938 to March 1940*, p. 29.

2. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad. ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, p. 99.

and atrocities.' All the Charges that have been dealt with above were recounted. Rejecting the Congress offer of an investigation into specific charges by Sir Maurice Gwyer or some other suitable person, he declared that the Congress Working Committee had no authority to make such an offer. They were, he insisted, an outside party without legal or constitutional status. He attributed the wrongs and injustices suffered by the Muslim community largely to the Working Committee, but he maintained that the complaints were against the Governments of certain Provinces "who were responsible to the legislatures and the electorate and not to the Working Committee." The Congress Working Committee obviously could not confer upon such a tribunal the necessary power for administering oaths and summoning witnesses. "Finally," he asked, "to whom the tribunal was to report and who would be the final authority to take action, if any, against the Ministries." If the final authority was to be the Congress Working Committee itself, then no purpose would be served by the proposed investigation as "the Working Committee had already decided that the Muslim League's charges were false and unfounded." Mr. Jinnah insisted that a thorough inquiry could only be made by a properly constituted tribunal invested with necessary powers. He, therefore, asked that "a Royal Commission be appointed by the British Government, of a purely judicial personnel and composed of Judges of His Majesty's High Courts and under the chairmanship of one of the Law Lords of the Privy Council."

Towards the close of the statement, Mr. Jinnah strongly insinuated that the Congress was carrying on a malicious propaganda, in and outside the country, for the purpose of "discrediting the League and attempting to divide the ranks of the Muslims." To support this thesis he produced "a secret letter from the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee . . . addressed to the President of the District Congress Committee, Gaya, which was published in the *Star of India* on the 4th December and which remains uncontradicted." The letter read as follows:

"You are, I hope, convinced by this time that the one outstanding question before us, awaiting solution and thus preparing the pattern for our forward move towards our goal of self-government, is the attainment of Hindu-Muslim unity. To achieve this end, it is essential that Congress-minded and

truly nationalist Musalmans of Hindustan have got to become vocal so that stopper to all progress applied by the League should disappear."[1]

The Congress, as already described, had been consistently demanding the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, on the basis of adult franchise, to frame the future constitution of India. During the period under survey this proposal was placed in the forefront of the Congress programme. It was considered to be the only remedy for the Indian communal and political maladies. Mr. Gandhi who had originally been sceptical about the usefulness of such an assembly was converted to the idea by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. By the end of 1939 he was, as he himself declared, "more enthusiastic than Jawaharlal himself." The idea, interestingly enough, appealed to him because it was not acceptable to many other people. "The more criticism I see of the scheme, the more enamoured I become of it." He did not worry if the masses were incapable of making an intelligent use of their right to vote. "Illiteracy does not worry me. I would plump for unadulterated adult franchise for both men and women, i.e. I would put them all on the register of voters. It is open to them not to exercise it if they do not wish to." On the question of communal representation, he was not entirely clear. He expressed his willingness to "give separate vote to the Muslims," but he added that "without giving separate vote, I would though reluctantly give reservation, if required, to every real Minority according to its numerical strength."[2]

This demand for a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage was resolutely opposed by the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah had already condemned it at Lucknow in 1937. For him such an assembly would mean "a second and larger edition of the Congress." In such an assembly the Muslims would be in a hopeless minority. The decisions emanating from the proposed assembly would not be the voice of popular opinion but the will of one community. It would therefore be nothing short of "a packed body manoeuvred and managed by the Congress Caucus."[3]

1. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, pp. 100, 103, 106-07.

2. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 477.

3. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, pp. 109, 111.

Dwelling on the same theme in an article written for an English weekly, he declared that Muslim India would resist it in all possible ways because it would be only a "means of increasing its [Congress'] rule from over eight Provinces to over the whole of India." The country, in his view, was inhabited by "hopelessly illiterate and consequently priest and cast-ridden" masses and was therefore wholly unprepared for such a step. He asked:

"Is it too much to say that since the vast majority of elected representatives will be illiterate Hindus, the Constituent Assembly will be under the influence of Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress leaders and the constitution that will emerge will be as the Working Committee directs?"[1]

Presumably, the demand for a Constituent Assembly was based on the analogy of the history of some other countries where the task of framing a constitution had been entrusted to a similar body. But the realities of the Indian situation demanded a different approach. The Indian problem was infinitely more complicated than, for instance, the problem faced by the framers of the Australian or the Canadian Constitution. The demand for a Constituent Assembly was perfectly consistent with the ideals of democracy, but these ideals had no real relationship to the communal and sociological conditions of India. Translated into realities, proportional representation would mean that the numerical superiority of the Hindus in the Constituent Assembly would be even greater than under the existing arrangement. If the Muslims could come into the Constituent Assembly on that basis, they could as well have joined the Federation.

Apart from these reasons, it is difficult to see how the different groups could frame an agreed constitution and settle the outstanding communal question when there was complete disagreement between different leaders even on the preliminaries. "One thing, however, can be safely predicted," said Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, "and that is that a country-wide election campaign under these conditions would further embitter inter-communal relations and might even result in open hostilities."[2]

These years of conflict had made the position of the rival parties perfectly clear. The Congress stood for a free and united

1. M.A. Jinnah, *Time and Tide*, p. 240.
2. *Star of India* (Calcutta), December 19, 1939.

India with a strong Government at the Centre. It claimed to represent the entire country including the Muslims. It blamed the Muslim League for unnecessarily introducing communalism in politics and thus trying to hamper the cause of freedom and national progress. Nationalism and unity were its watchwords. Democracy of a Western parliamentary model was its ideal. In the words of Pandit Nehru:

"I cannot conceive of any objective other than democracy in the present state of India. With proper protection and safeguards for minorities, there will be relief for everyone concerned. Of course the majority will remain a majority, as nothing can convert a majority into a minority except a rule by a Fascist or military clique."

The Congress worked for a single composite nation. With regard to the position of the Muslims in the country, the Pandit declared, "It is a little misleading to talk in terms of majorities and minorities. A religious group seventy million strong cannot be considered a minority."[1]

The Muslim League was no less determined to secure the independence of India but it rejected the basic assumptions upon which the Congress plan was based. The ideas of the Muslim League on the form of Central Government were still somewhat negative and indefinite. The essential point in its judgement was complete provincial autonomy, with adequate safeguards to protect the political, religious, cultural, social and economic interests of the Muslims. It rejected the ideal of pure democracy as it did not suit the Indian conditions, and instead wanted some arrangement under which the Hindus and the Muslims could jointly share the executive power at the Centre and in the Provinces. In the words of Mr. Jinnah:

"Having regard to the 35 millions[2] [*sic*] of voters, the bulk of whom are totally ignorant, illiterate and untutored, living in centuries old superstitions of the worst type, thoroughly antagonistic to each other culturally and socially, the working of this Constitution has clearly brought out that it is impossible to work a democratic parliamentary government in India.

1. J.S. Bright, ed., *Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru: being a Collection of Most Significant Speeches Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru from 1922 to 1946* (2nd edition, Lahore, n.d.)) p. 173.

2. This figure is difficult to understand. It may be a misprint for 350 millions.

Under these circumstances, "democracy can only mean Hindu Raj all over India." The Congress, in the opinion of the League leader, did not represent the entire country. It did not represent "even all the Hindus and certainly not the Muslims." The Muslim League alone was the authoritative representative organisation of the Muslims. It was the Congress which was "wholly responsible for blocking the progress of India and unless they give up the fascist and authoritarian basis of their policy and programme which they are vigorously following, there cannot be any peace in India."[1]

The foregoing summary points to only one conclusion. The two communities had drifted too far apart to be reconciled. All the wells of compromise seemed to have been poisoned. India was beginning to appear too small a country to accommodate both the communities on a footing of equality. Correspondence, negotiations and conferences had failed to produce any workable solution acceptable to both the parties.. Jawaharlal Nehru was quite right when he wrote to Muhammad Ali Jinnah on December 16, 1939, that, "Unfortunately we never seem to reach even the proper discussion of these problems. . . . I am compelled to think that the real difficulty is the difference in political outlook and objectives."[2]

There the matters ended till Mr. Jinnah startled the country in general and the Congress in particular in the following spring by a demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims. The story of that demand will be recorded in a later chapter.

1. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, pp. 89-91.

2. Syed Sharifuddin Peerzada, op. cit., p. 151.

Chapter 4

Political Philosophy of Sir Muhammad Iqbal

I

IN much that has been written on Muslim politics during the decade before the outbreak of the Second World War, a prominent place has been given to the work and philosophy of Sir Muhammad Iqbal. In this chapter an attempt will be made to examine his work and to estimate his influence on the political ideas of the Muslim community. The required biographical data can be summarised very briefly.

Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) was born in a deeply religious family at Sialkot in West Pakistan. He received his early education in the local Mission institutions. After his Intermediate from Sialkot he entered Government College, Lahore, where he graduated with the degree of Master of Arts in 1899. He spent some years as a lecturer first at Oriental and then at Government College, Lahore. But his academic career was brief. In 1905 he followed the example of many of his Indian contemporaries and went to Europe to continue his studies. His interests were primarily Philosophy and English Common Law. After three years of study in England and Germany he obtained the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Munich and was called to the Bar in London.

Soon after his return to India he established a legal practice at Lahore, but he does not seem to have taken the profession seriously and after a few years he practically abandoned it. Even in these years he applied his energies more to philosophical and literary studies than to his legal practice. His work in these

fields attracted favourable notice and in 1922 the honour of knighthood was conferred upon him by His Majesty's Government.

A few years later he entered politics on the Provincial level and in 1927 was elected to the Punjab Legislative Council. But he had little taste for political life and he did not allow it to interfere seriously with his literary activities. A series of lectures delivered at Madras, Hyderabad and Aligarh in 1928-29 were published a few years later in a volume entitled *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. He relinquished his membership in the Punjab Legislative Council in 1930 but in that same year he was elected President of the All-India Muslim League, and his Presidential Address at Allahabad was an event of great importance in the history of Muslim politics. He was chosen as a representative of the Muslim community to the Round Table Conference in 1931-32, and in the latter year he presided at the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore. This was almost the last occasion he took a direct part in the political struggle that was then developing. He died on April 21, 1938.[1]

All discussion of Iqbal's political activities and his contribution to Muslim political awakening must begin with the remark that Iqbal was in no sense a politician. His interest and his participation in practical politics was confined almost entirely to the last decade of his life. He was essentially a poet and a political philosopher. In both fields he achieved high repute. Whether he was greater as a poet than as a philosopher can hardly be determined, since the two pursuits were indissolubly linked. It is perhaps correct to say that his politico-philosophical and poetical utterances became "a mixture of the two blended into a political mysticism transcending them both."[2] Although Iqbal was mainly preoccupied with his literary activities, a sensitive mind like his could not remain unconcerned with what was happening around him in the field of politics. It is his role in this latter field which will be the theme of this chapter.

1. For biographical details, see S. A. Vahid, *Introduction to Iqbal* (Karachi, 1952), pp. 1-10.

2. S. A. Latif, *Islamic Cultural Studies* (2nd revised and enlarged edition, Lahore, 1953), p. 119.

The political thought of Iqbal can conveniently be divided into three parts, as each one of these represents a distinct phase in the evolution of his thought. The first of these lasted till he left India for Europe. The second belongs to the period of his stay in Europe, where he was brought into contact with conditions and forces which radically altered his thinking on social and political problems. The third may be dated from his return to India. Each one of these phases requires elaboration.

His earliest poems reveal no interest in politics, but many of those written during his early manhood are marked by a spirit of ardent nationalism. His appeal throughout was for union of the two great communities which together formed what he thought of as one Indian nation. "The great and golden past of India, transmuted by distance in time and space into the very perfection of enchantment, stirred his youthful imagination."[1] His great desire was the extinction of bigotry and fanaticism. In one poem entitled *Tarana-i-Hindi* belonging to this period, he says:

"Religion does not teach people to bear enmity to one another;
We are Indians and India is our motherland."[2]

In another poem called *Naya Shiwala* written during these same years, he made a fervent plea for unity of Hindus and Muslims. In words addressed to the 'Brahmin' but intended for both communities, he expressed his displeasure and disgust with their narrow intolerant outlook:

"Sickened from both your temple and our shrine I have run,
Alike our preachers' sermons and your fond myths I shun,
In every graven image you fancied God: I see
In each speck of my country's poor dust divinity.
Come, let us lift suspicions's thick curtains once again,
Unite once more the sundered, wipe clean division's stain.
Too long has lain deserted the heart's warm habitation . . .
Come build here in our homeland an altar's new foundation."[3]

1. Iqbal Singh, *The Ardent Pilgrim: An Introduction to the Life and Work of Mohammad Iqbal* (London, 1951), p. 23.
2. Muhammad Iqbal, *Bang-i-Dara* (A Collection of Urdu Poems), (13th edition, Lahore, 1949), p. 82.
3. Ibid., p. 88. Translation vide V. G. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal* (London, 1955), pp. 8-9.

This idealistic view of an Indian nation composed of Hindus and Muslims living in amity and brotherhood was not destined to endure. During his stay in Europe he absorbed new ideas which were in effect the antithesis of his earlier political philosophy. He found the idea of nationalism as inadequate to solve the problems of humanity. The absence of religious sentiments on the one hand and the presence of hollow materialism on the other nauseated him. Greedy and selfish competition between man and man and between nation and nation could not be the basis of a society of which Iqbal was dreaming. The following lines, composed in March 1907,[1] revealed his changed attitude:

"O residents of the West, God's earth is not a shop;
The gold which you are thinking to be genuine will now prove to be of low value,
Your civilization is going to commit suicide with her own dagger;
The nest which is made on a frail bough cannot but be insecure."[2]

He condemned the nationalism of the West as binding individuals together not on the basis of mental and spiritual affinity and the harmony of ideals but on the outward and physical ties of race, language and blood. The ideal of territorial nationalism failed to appeal to him. "He found it unsatisfactory for deeper emotional and spiritual reasons. On closer examination the concept of nationalism appeared to be a continuation, even a throw-back, to the tribal mentality."[3] He thus turned away from such a concept of nationalism. Loyalty to the national idea was soon to be replaced by spiritual loyalty to the world of Islam. He had gone to Europe as a nationalist. He returned as an earnest pan-Islamist.

After his return to India, he applied himself unceasingly to the interpretation of Islam and the spiritual value for which it stood. Henceforth the most prominent thing about Iqbal is his passion for Islam, "What strikes one first in Iqbal," says an

1. The date of composition is given by A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India*, p. 172.

2. Muhammad Iqbal, op. cit., p. 150. Translation vide S. A. Vahid, *Iqbal: His Art and Thought* (Lahore, 1948), p. 14,

3. Iqbal Singh, op. cit., p. 50.

English writer, "is the strength and the fervour of his love for Islam as an ideal which if fully realised should suffice for man's every want in this world and the next."[1] His perspective was no longer confined to the limits of India. It had been extended to cover the entire world of Islam which knows no bounds of territory, race or caste. It is non-racial and non-spatial and cuts at the root of nationalism which is based on the idea of race and territorial affiliations. The following lines are a characteristic expression of the new mood:

"Our essence is not bound to any place;
The vigour of our wine is not contained
In any bowl; Chinese and Indian
Alike the shard that constitutes our jar,
Turkish and Syrian alike the clay
Forming our body; neither is our heart
Of India, or Syria, or Rum,
Nor any fatherland do we profess
Except Islam."[2]

In Europe, Iqbal saw for the first time that acceptance of nationalism would mean a negation of the Islamic ideology. The Western political thought and the nationalist theory of the state suggest a dualism and a separation of church and state. Such a concept is foreign to the spirit of Islam which was from the very beginning a civil society. Islam does not confine itself only to the religious aspects of its votaries. It is a religious, political, moral, social and economic system and none of these aspects can be stressed to the detriment of the others. It was this point to which Iqbal referred in his Lectures. He said:

"It is a mistake to suppose that the idea of state is more dominant and rules all other ideas embodied in the system of Islam. In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains. . . . In Islam it is the same reality which appears as church looked at from one point of view and state from another. It is not true to say that church and state are two sides or facets of the same thing, Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies."[3]

1. M. L. Ferrar, in *Whither Islam*, ed. H. A. R. Gibb (London, 1932), p. 204.

2. A. J. Arberry, *The Mysteries of Selflessness* (London, 1153), p. 29. (This work is a translation of Iqbal's *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi*).

3. Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (London, 1934), p. 146.

He had moved from nationalism to Islamic internationalism, or perhaps more accurately supra-nationalism. The main difference between Iqbal and other internationalists is that he bases his internationalism on religion. It is spiritual rather than material. In the words of a student of Iqbal:

"He is essentially internationalist and humanitarian in his attitude and rejects unhesitatingly the claims of the nation-state to regiment and regulate the ideas, feelings and loyalties of its subjects. For this view Iqbal draws his inspiration from the teachings of Islam and its Holy Prophet who stressed in unmistakable terms the oneness of mankind and dethroned ruthlessly the false idols of race, colour and country which had gained ascendancy all over the world."[1]

A great change indeed had taken place in the mental make-up of Iqbal since his return home. He was now looking at Indian politics not as an Indian but as a citizen of the spiritual realm of Islam. The Hindu agitation followed by the partition of Bengal in 1905 and the founding of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 had further strengthened his newly acquired faith in anti-nationalism. Within a few months of his arrival in India he was invited, in March 1909, to attend a meeting of a cosmopolitan organisation the membership of which was open to all communities. He not only declined the invitation but made it clear that the future of the two communities in India did not lie together. In reply to the invitation he wrote:

"I have been myself of the view that religious differences sholud disappear from this country, and even new act on this principle, in my private life. But now I think that the preservation of their separate national entities is desirable for both the Hindus and the Muslims. The vision of a common nationhood for India is a beautiful ideal, and has a poetic appeal, but looking to the present conditions and the unconscious trends of the two communities, appears incapable of fulfilment."[2]

Iqbal was convinced that Muslims had a destiny of their own inside as well as outside India. The events that took place in the few years following his return further added to his belief that Islam was confronted with serious difficulties. A solution

1. K. G. Saiyidain, in *Iqbal as a Thinker* (Essays by Eminent Scholars), (Lahore, 1952), p. 66.

2. Quoted by A. H. Albiruni, op. cit., p. 174.

of its problems required a mustering of its own strength, the closing of its ranks and the union of its world-wide forces.

As has been suggested in an earlier chapter, the Italian attack on Tripoli in September 1911 had done much to convince the Indian Muslims that the non-Muslim forces were bent upon subjugating and crushing the forces of Islam whenever and wherever possible. Iqbal shared this general feeling. The effect of these events on him can be read in a poem written soon after the fall of Tripoli, which he recited at the annual session of the *Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam*, Lahore, in 1911.[1] The poem is entitled *Shikwa* and the poet bitterly complains to God for having forsaken His people—the Muslims—who of all His people rightly honour Him, and yet He suffers them to be the most subjected group on the surface of the earth. In the dialogue between the poet as the spokesman of the Muslims and God, Iqbal asks God the reasons for the lamentable disasters on His chosen people:

For there are those of other faiths
Among whom many sinners be,
Some humble, others puffed with pride,
Drunken in their effrontery;

. . . .

Yet see how still Thy bounties rain
On roofs of unbelieving clans,
While strike Thy thunderbolts the homes
Of all forbearing Mussalmans![2]

The Indian nationalist had become the bard of Islam. Unity of Muslim countries rather than unity of different communities had now become his obsession. Since nationalism tends to divide rather than to unite the Muslims, nationalism must be destroyed. The Muslims belong not to any geographic unit but to a spiritual fraternity. In a short poem entitled *Al-Mulk Lillah* he refers to a dialogue between the Muslim soldiers and their General, Tariq, on the soil of Spain. The soldiers complain of having been marooned in a foreign country, separated from

1. A. H. Albiruni, op. cit., p. 175.

2. Altaf Husain, *The Complaint and the Answer: Being Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal's Shikwa and Jawab-i-Shikwa* (3rd edition, Lahore, 1954), p. XIV.

the homes and cut off from all means of retreat. Tariq replies, "Every country is our country because it is the country of our God."[1]

He was no longer writing for Indian Muslims alone but for his co-religionists scattered all over the world. In the meantime he had switched from Urdu to Persian so as to make his message available to the largest number of the adherents of Islam. His message was the message of Islam. He visualised a world order in which Islamic values would mould the lives of human beings. He was a religious enthusiast "inspired by a vision of a world-wide Islamic state of a unified Muslim Millat, no longer divided by racial or territorial considerations."[2]

II

AFTER this brief introduction to Iqbal and his works, it seems pertinent to refer to his major contribution to Indian Muslim political thought during the period under review. The poet-philosopher of India is generally credited with having conceived the idea of a separate Muslim state. The demand for, and ultimately the achievement of, Pakistan is said to have been born in the Presidential address of Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal which he gave to the All-India Muslim League at its annual session at Allahabad in 1930. How far, if at all, Iqbal was the father of the Pakistan movement needs to be closely examined. In an unusually long address, Iqbal surveyed the entire political situation of the country as it affected the Indian Muslims. In view of its length and importance it warrants examination in some detail.

Iqbal at first diagnosed the ills of the body politic in India and then presented his solution. The ideal of a united nation in which the various sections of the Indian population would have to submerge their cultural individuality was unthinkable in the existing circumstances. There was no inclination on the part of various groups to sink their respective individualities. Each group

1. Muhammad Iqbal, *Payam-i-Mashriq* (Persian), (7th edition, Lahore, 1948), p. 150.

2. Muhammad Aziz Ahmad, "Iqbal's Political Theory," *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1944), Vol. XVIII, No. 4, p. 380.

was too jealous of the other to permit such a fusion. All attempts to find some principle of union under which there could be complete harmony between Indian peoples had failed. They had failed because:

"we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps, in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands, and conceal our egoism under the cloak of nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognize that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions."[1]

There could be, he continued, no internal harmony unless the communal question was amicably settled. A satisfactory solution of the communal issue was possible only if the Muslims were assured of a safe existence as a separate unit:

"I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India."[2]

The Indian political situation was unique in the extent and nature of its complexities. India, unlike European countries, was not divided into territorial units. It was a continent, inhabited by people speaking different languages, professing different religions and belonging to different racial groups. Diversity rather than homogeneity was its chief characteristic. No political arrangement would therefore be workable without a due recognition of communal groups. Referring to the demands of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi in December 1928-January 1929, he said, "The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India is, therefore, perfectly justified."[3] He added however:

"I would go further than the demands embodied in it. *I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government*

1. Shamloo, ed., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* (2nd enlarged edition, Lahore, 1948), p. 10.

2. Ibid., p. 11.

3. Ibid., p. 12.

within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."[1]

This was the pith of Iqbal's address. Before examining the rest of his speech, it is important to note that Iqbal was using the word *state*, not with the meaning of a sovereign independent state but as a component and constituent unit of India. This is clear from the sentences which follow the above quotation. "The proposal," said Iqbal, "was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwiedly state."[2] The framers of the Nehru Report were obviously not entertaining any idea of separating certain areas from the rest of India.

This solution of the baffling Indian problem, in Iqbal's view, was conceived in the best interests of all concerned. It would be to the advantage of Muslims as "the life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory."[3] It would not be contrary to the interests of the country as a whole as "it will intensify their [Muslims'] sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feelings."[4] It would also solve the problem of Indian defence as the Muslims of the North-West "will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion one of ideas or of bayonets."[5] Reiterating these arguments, he said:

> "I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its original spirit and with the spirit of modern times."[6]

While Iqbal was discussing the political future of India at

1. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 12.
2. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
3. Ibid., p. 13.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 15.

home, his co-religionists and fellow-countrymen were grappling with the same problem at the Round Table Conference in London. The idea of an Indian Federation had been accepted by all the parties concerned. Iqbal too stood for federalism, but he wanted a redistribution of Indian Provinces before the Federal Scheme was implemented. He said:

> "In view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous States, based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India."[1]

The proper distribution of Provinces as suggested, in his view, would automatically solve the communal problem. It was the unsatisfactory form of the existing Provinces which was responsible for the demand for separate electorates. If the boundaries were altered and carved afresh to the satisfaction of Muslims, they would be prepared to accept the territorial electorates.

Turning to the details of the proposed federal structure, he insisted on complete Provincial autonomy. He said:

> "'Residuary Powers' must be left entirely to self-governing States, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of federal States. I would never advise the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or Indian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true federation, or fails to recognise them as a distinct political entity."[2]

Iqbal rejected the proposal for any form of unitary state as wholly unacceptable to the Muslims. The Indian problem, he declared, was an international and not a national one, and therefore had to be tackled as such. Any attempt to force a constitution which is opposed to the interests and wishes of the Muslims would be fraught with serious risks. "To base a constitution," he declared, "on the concept of a homogeneous India or to apply to India principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war."[3]

Towards the end of his address he warned his audience that "I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an indepen-

1. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 15.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

dent line of action to cope with the present crisis."[1]

These were some of the main points stressed by Sir Muhammad Iqbal. No apology is required for having quoted this speech at some length. In view of the importance these pronouncements acquired in later years and the close association between this address and ultimate achievement of Pakistan, it is necessary to have a clear idea as to how far Iqbal was the author of the demand for Pakistan.

To start with, Iqbal nowhere in this lengthy speech mentioned the term 'Pakistan.' He did not advocate the division of India. He nowhere suggested the creation of a separate independent state. His main concern was with 'Muslim India within India.' It is quite possible that Iqbal himself had not yet found the correct clue to the Indian political riddle, or, which is perhaps more probable, he did not consider at this time that the situation called for such a solution. Mr. Edward Thompson has, in this connection, introduced a complication which must briefly be examined. Referring to Iqbal and the demand for Pakistan, he says:

"In the *Observer* I once said that he supported the Pakistan plan. Iqbal was a friend, and he set my misconceptions right. After speaking of his own despondency at the chaos he saw coming 'on my vast undisciplined and starving land' (what magnificent English these Indians write!) he went on to say that he thought the Pakistan plan would be disastrous to the British Government, disastrous to the Hindu community, disastrous to the Moslem community. 'But I am the president of the Moslem League and therefore it is my duty to support it.' "[2]

1. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 35.
2. E. Thompson, *Enlist India for Freedom* (London, 1940), p. 58.
3. See, for instance, the following:
   (*i*) Shaukat Ullah Ansari, *Pakistan: The Problem of India* (2nd edition, Lahore, 1945), p. 4.
   (*ii*) Khailash Chandra, *Tragedy of Jinnah* (2nd revised edition, Lahore, 1943), pp. 212-13 (footnote).
   (*iii*) B.M. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 59.
   (*iv*) Rezaul Karim, *Pakistan Examined* (Calcutta, 1941), p. 55.
   (*v*) B.G. Kaushik, *The House that Jinnah Built* (Bombay, 1944), p. 114.
   (*vi*) S. Mukherji, *Communalism in Muslim Politics*, (Calcutta, 1947), p. 137.
   (*vii*) S. Sen, op. cit., p. 84.
   (*viii*) W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 295.

A number of students[3] have quoted Mr. Thompson with approval and reached the quick and comfortable conclusion that Iqbal later disowned what he had said at Allahabad.

This statement of Mr. Thompson calls for certain comments. First, it is not supported by documentary evidence, which, in the case of so serious an imputation, seems necessary. Second, as Mr. Thompson's book appeared more than two years after Iqbal's death, Iqbal's position with reference to the statement attributed to him could not be known. Fortunately, however, there are two letters written to *The Times*, one by Mr. Thompson commenting on Iqbal's Allahabad address, and the other by Iqbal himself in reply to Mr. Thompson's comments. A gist of the two letters will, to some extent, clear the mist surrounding this controversy.

Mr. Thompson wrote: "The accusation of 'Pan-Islamic plotting,' which you deplore in the leading article entitled 'Indian Minorities' in your issue of September 29, has its source in such statements as this, in Sir Muhammad Iqbal's Presidential address to the All-Indian Muslim League last December." After quoting the relevant portion from Iqbal's address, Mr. Thompson goes on to say, "I am not arguing against the establishment of Moslem 'communal provinces in North-West India. But what Sir Muhammad Iqbal demands is a confederation 'within or without' the Indian Federation."[1] Iqbal's reply came a few days later. It read:

"Dr. E. Thompson has torn the following passage from its context in my Presidential address. . . . in order to serve as evidence of 'Pan-Islamic plotting.' . . . May I tell Dr. Thompson that in this passage I do not put forward a 'demand' for a Moslem State outside the British Empire, but only a guess at the possible outcome in the dim future of the mighty forces now shaping the destiny of the Indian sub-continent. . . . I am for a redistribution of India into Provinces with effective Majorities or another on lines advocated both by the Nehru and Simon Reports. Indeed my suggestion regarding Moslem Provinces merely carries forward this idea."

Dr. Iqbal concluded his letter with a pithy and noteworthy statement. "A series of contented and well-organised Moslem Provinces on the North-West Frontier of India would be a

1. *The Times* (London), October 3, 1931.

Thomp... book... two y... Iqbal...

well organised Moslem Province ...th-west

bulwark of India and of the British Empire against the hungry generations of the Asiatic highlands."[1]

Lastly, even at the risk of a little digression, it must be said, that Mr. Thompson's evidence as a rule needs to be taken cautiously. In the same book he makes a statement pertaining to the Muslim League's contention that there are two nations in India. In this case his target is Jinnah. According to Mr. Thompson's version, the following exchange took place between him and Mr. Jinnah:

"Two Nations, Mr. Jinnah! confronting each other in every Province? every town? every village?"

"Two Nations confronting each other in every Province. Every town. Every village. That is the only solution."

"That is a very terrible solution, Mr. Jinnah!"

"It is a terrible solution. But it is the only one."[2]

Luckily both parties to the dialogue were still alive when it was published, and a distinguished Hindu writer has recorded Jinnah's reply. "Mr. Jinnah," says Rajendra Prasad, "has recently in a press statement contradicted that he ever gave a press interview to Mr. Thompson or that he said the words attributed to him."[3]

Turning again to Iqbal and his Allahabad address, there is yet another statement from a more authentic source to the same effect as that of Mr. Thompson. Speaking from the platform of the Punjab Nationalist Muslim Conference at Lahore on October 24, 1931, Malik Barkat Ali, a Punjabi Muslim leader, said:

"The conception of a divided India, which Sir Muhammad Iqbal put forward recently in the course of his Presidential utterance from the platform of the League, at a time when that body had virtually become extinct and ceased to represent free Islam—I am glad to be able to say that Sir Muhammad Iqbal has since recanted it—must not therefore delude anybody into thinking that it is Iqbal's conception of the India to be."[4]

There is no available evidence that Iqbal publicly contradicted this statement. When it was made he was in London attending the second session of the Round Table Conference, and

1. *The Times* (London) October 12, 193'.
2. E Thompson, op. cit., p. 52.
3. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided* (3rd edition, Bombay, 1947), p. 216.
4. *The Indian Annual Register* (Calcutta, 1931), Vol. II, p. 235.

it is possible, therefore, that he may not have seen it or heard of it. In any event, the letter written by Iqbal to *The Times* only twelve days before Malik Barkat Ali's statement covers this criticism as will as that of Mr. Thompson. The important thing, however, is that the entire controversy arises from the misconstrued notion that Iqbal in his Allahabad adress advocated the division of India. As is evident from Iqbal's speech he made no such demand. All that he wanted was a loose federation with maximum Provincial autonomy and an amalgamation of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province Sind and Baluchistan into one Province. This Province was to be a part of the Indian Federation and there was no suggestion of its separation from the rest of the country.

III

IN 1932, Iqbal presided at the annual session of the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore. In his Presidential speech he once again derided the concept of Indian nationalism. For him one's religion and culture were infinitely more important then the love for one's country. Patriotisms, he said, was a worthy sentiment and should be respected, but "that which really matters is a man's faith, his culture, his historical tradition. These are the things wihich, in my eyes, are worth living for and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated."[1] He favoured Hindu-Muslim unity if it could be achieved without sacrificing the distinct existence of the Muslims as a separate cultural unit. In his view:

"The problem of ancient Indian thought was how the One became many without sacrificing its oneness. Today this problem has come down from its ethical heights to the grosser plane of our political life, and we have to solve it in its reversed form, i e. how the many can become One without sacrificing its plural character."[2]

In the same speech, he strongly advised the Muslims to

1. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 38.
2. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

refrain from joining the Civil Disobedience Campaign launched by the Congress. This movement, he said, was the direct result of Mr. Gandhi's untenable contention that he was the sole spokesman of the entire country. The Compaign, he said, was a direct result of the refusal of the British Government to accept this claim. "How can then," asked Iqbal, "a minority join a campaign which is directed as much against it self as against the Government."[1]

He advised the Muslims to expect nothing from others and to depend on their own inherent strength. He said:

"Concentrate your whole ego on yourself alone and ripen your clay into real manhood if you wish to see your aspirations realized . . . our ideal is well defined. It is to win in the coming constitution a position for Islam which may bring her opportunities to fulfil her destiny in this country. . . . The flame of life cannot be borrowed from others; it must be kindled in the temple of one's own soul."[2]

Iqbal's experience at the Round Table Conference had led to no preceptible change in his position. If consolidation of Muslim strength was the dominant theme of his address in 1930, the same note can be discerned in his speech in 1932.

In a public statement on December 6, 1933, he came out sharply against the accusation of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that some of the Indian Muslims were anti-national and that they were afraid of democracy. If nationalism was meant to be understood, he said, as a fusion of different communal groups "in a biological sense," Muslims were certainly against it. And if this be accepted as the criterion and the definition of nationalism, then some of the Congress leaders themselves could not escape the charge of being anti-national:

"In this sense, perhaps, the greatest anti-national leader in India of today is Mr. Gandhi who has made it a life mission to prevent the fusion of untouchables with other communities and to retain them in the fold of Hinduism without any real fusion between them and the caste Hindus. As for as I can judge it his message to the untouchables amounts io this: 'Do not leave Hindusim. Remain in it without being of it.' "[3]

1. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 45.
2. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
3. Ibid., pp. 210-11.

The Muslims were not against co-operation with others but they were opposed to this fusion of the communities which was neither possible nor desirable. Similarly, the Muslim were not opposed to democracy. If they insisted on separate electorates and other safeguards it was not because of any fear of democracy but because they had reasons "to be afraid of communal oligarchy in the garb of democracy even at the expense of its conventional form."[1] If the Muslims were not given due protection in the shape of adequat safeguards and the majority community continued to talk of democracy and "a kind of nationalism which works only to its own benefit," one of two consequences would necessarily follow:

"Either the Indian majority community will have to accept for itself the permanent position of an agent of British Imperialism in the East or the country will have to be redistributed on the basis of religious, historical and cultural affinities so as to do away with the question of electorates and the communal problem in its present form."[2]

IV

IQBAL had come close to the idea of separation but he was still only thinking of *redistribution* on religious and cultural lines, and not of a clean and clear *division* of India. In his correspondence with Jinnah between May 1936 and November 1937. he revealed his mind more clearly. It will be remembered that Pandit Nehru on March 19, 1937, had expressed a desire to approach the Muslim masses on the basis of economic issues and thus bring them into the Congress organisation by drawing them away from the communal groups to which they belonged. On the day following Mr. Nehru's spech, Dr. Iqbal wrote to Mr. Jinnah advising him to hold an All-India Muslim Convention parallel to the All-India National Convention of Congress legislators. "To this convention," suggested Iqbal, "you must restate as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country." He went on to suggest:

1. Shomloo, cit., p, 211.
2. Ibid., 212.

"It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims. . . . It would further make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle, can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural entity."[1]

If there was one objective which transcended all others in Iqbal's mind, it was his determination to preserve and safeguard the separate culture of the Muslims. He was opposed to any compromise on that issue even if it involved the breaking up of Indian unity. The Muslims must solve their problems in their own way and in the light of their own religion. In another letter to Jinnah, two months later, he discussed the problem of Muslim poverty. Completely rejecting the socialistic prescription of Nehru to solve the economic problems of India, he said:

"The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. . . . Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. . . . I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslims riots."[2]

Discussing further the socialistic and democratic remedies for the economic ills of the country *vis-a-vis* the Hindus and Muslims he held the view that such a thing was impossible in the Hindu society, and if introduced it will lead to bloodshed among the Hindus. "It is clear to my mind," he said, "that if Hinduism accepts social democracy it must necessarily cease to be Hinduism." It is, on the other hand, consistent with the tenets

1. Iqbal to Jinnah, March 20, 1937. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, with a Foreword by M. A. Jinnah (Lahore, 1956), pp. 13-14. This correspondence was originaly published in 1943.

2. Ibid., pp. 17-18. The letter is dated May 28, 1937.

of Islam because such a step would not be "a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam." It would, therefore, be easier for the Muslims to solve their economic problems. To do so, however, they must have the means that were denied to them under existing arrangements. "In order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve the problems," he said, "it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim States with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived?"[1]

The pith of Iqbal's views on the Indian political situation were contained in another letter three weeks later. In this he discussed the recent Hindu-Muslim riots and their causes, the threats to Muslim culture and the desire of the non-Muslim elements to intimidate the Muslims. The solution was the same as he has suggested eight years earlier—only the emphasis had become stronger and more direct. He declared:

> "In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities. . . . Some Muslims in the Punjab are already suggesting the holding of a North-West Indian Muslim Conference, and the idea is rapidly spreading. I agree with you, however, that our community is not yet sufficiently organized and disciplined and perhaps the time for holding such a conference is not yet ripe. But I feel that it would be highly advisable for you to indicate in your address at least the line of action that the Muslims of North-West India would be finally driven to take."

The remainder of this letter deserves particularly close attention. It is there that Iqbal finally presented the ultimate solution to which he had been slowly but surely approaching since 1930. He said:

> "To my mind the new constitution with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim Provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?"

1. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, p. 19.

As a first step towards realising this objective he suggested "that the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal ought at present to ignore Muslim minority Provinces. This is the best course to adopt in the interests of both Muslim majority and minority Provinces."[1]

This was, in sum, the contribution of Iqbal to Indian Muslim political thought. His contribution, it must be emphasised, was not to much in making a demand for a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims, but in the fact that he inspired a whole generation of Muslims to think on those lines and ultimately to make that demand. He prepared the ground for Jinnah, who finally led the Muslims to the goal of Pakistan. Jinnah acknowledged his debt to the philosopher in the following words: "His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India."[2]

His fervent zeal and unbounded enthusiasm for Islam fired the imagination of Muslim youth. His firm conviction that "*Islam is itself Destiny and will not suffer a destiny*,"[3] stirred the Muslim intelligentsia. His share in Muslim political awakening came more through his poetry than through his prose writings and public utterances. He inspired rather than actually led his co-religionists. He was the Mazzini and not the Cavour of Muslim India. Maulana Muhammad Ali in his own day had paid him a high tribute. "He," said the Maulana, "was the poet of Islamic reawakening in India in the 20th century, and to no man does Muslim India owe greater debt than to this modest, shy and retiring barrister of the Punjab."[4] Jinnah, for whom Iqbal evinced a great deal of respect and admiration, was even more eloquent in his praise of the great Muslim poet. "He will live," said Jinnah, "as long as Islam will live. His noble poetry

1. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, pp. 23-24. This letter is dated June 21, 1937.

2. Ibid., p. 6 (from Jinnah's Foreword).

3. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 7. (All India Muslim League, Allahabad, 1930).

4. Afzal Iqbal, ed., *My Life: A Fragment, An Autobiographical Sketch of Maulana Mohamed Ali* (2nd edition, Lahore, 1944), p. 126.

interprets the true aspirations of the Muslims of India. It will remain an inspiration for us and for generations after us."[1]

V

THE importance of Iqbal's influence in breaking through Muslim inertia can scarcely be exaggerated. He gave his co-religionists a new intellectual basis and a new vision. He inspired fresh hope and vigorous confidence. He has been called, with some justification, the father of the idea of a separate state for the Muslims of India and the Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan. The important question arises, however, whether Iqbal was not in fact denying his own philosophy of anti-nationalism by his assertion of the right of Muslims to be treated as a nation. He had devoted the better part of his life to combating the idea of nationalism. Some three months before his death, in a New-Year broadcast he had said, "Only one unity is dependable and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language." He rejected nationalism and democracy as obstacles to the true progress of humanity:

"So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life and the beautiful ideal of liberty, quality and fraternity will never materialise."[2]

This statement is apparently not in line with his views contained in the letter of June 21, 1937, addressed to Mr. Jinnah. To repeat his own words, he had asked, "Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?" If the ideal of nationalism is justifiable in the case of Indian Muslims, how can it be wrong and harmful for others to adopt the same principle? This

1. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, p .68. (All-India Muslim League, Patna, 1938).

2. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 222.

apparent inconsistency in Iqbal's thought and in that of others who were influenced by him has been severely criticised. In the judgement of at least one critic the demand for a separate Muslim state appears contrary to the ideal of Islam as expounded by Iqbal himself. His statemant may be quoted:

> "If the remark which Iqbal puts into Tarik's mouth—that 'every country is our country because it is the country of our God'—means what it says, then the demand for the association of Indian Muslims 'with a specified territory' and the carving out of India of a 'Muslim State' is absurd, demagogic, and contrary to the ideals of Islamic polity."[1]

The criticism has some validity. But the critic has evidently missed the keynote of Iqbal's political thought. The demand for a separate state was not based on nationalism but, paradoxical as it may seem to the casual observer, on the negation of nationalism. A separate state for Indian Muslims was not to be an end in itself but simply a means to a higher and nobler end. In his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, Iqbal wrote:[2]

> "For the present every Moslem nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics. . . . Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members."

It will thus be seen that the creation of a separate state was envisaged as a temporary measure. The ultimate objective was the union of this with other similar states to form a larger whole. For him Islam was infinitely more important than a strip of territory. He would gladly sacrifice the latter in the interest of the former. "The construction of a polity on national lines," he said in his Allahabad address, "if it means a displacement of the Islamic principles of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim."[3]

There was obviously a marked difference of emphasis in the

1. Iqbal Singh, op. cit., p. 161.
2. Ibid., pp. 151-52.
3. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 9.

thought of Iqbal and the demand of the Muslim League. With Iqbal "the limiting factor was to be that of ideology and not that of geography."[1] He was thinking in terms of an ideological state for the realisation of the ultimate purposes of Islam. It is against this background of his political philosophy that one can resolve this seeming dichotomy in Iqbal. In his earliest work *Asrar-i-Khudi* (*The Secrets of the Self*) published in 1915, he sounded the same note. In his Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, Nicholson observes, "A free and independent Moslem fraternity, having the *Ka'ba* as its centre and knit together by the love of Allah and devotion to the prophet—such is Iqbal's ideal."[2]

In another long Persian poem, *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi* (*The Mysteries of Selflessness*), published in 1917, and later translated by an English Orientalist, Iqbal preaches the same ideal with a burning sincerity. Referring to the migration of the Prophet of Islam from Mecca to Medina which Iqbal regarded as the symbol of the Muslim freedom from local nationalism, he says:

> "Our Master, fleeing from his fatherland,
> Resolved the knot of Muslim Nationhood,
> His wisdom founded one community—
> The world its parish."[3]

The demand for a separate state was not a mere escape and a refuge from Hindu majority. It was the outcome of his philosophical thought based on his religious belief that Muslims belong to a world-wide spiritual fraternity. The secession from the rest of India would enable them to become a part of the bigger whole to which they belonged. With the Muslim League on the other hand, at least in the earlier stage of its demand for Pakistan, a separate state was an end in itself. With many of its leaders it was the fear of domination by the majority community that was predominant and not the ultimate ideal for

1. H. H. Bilgrami, *Glimpses of Iqbal's Mind and Thought*, brief lectures on Iqbal delivered at London, Cambridge and Oxford (Lahore, 1954), p. 17.

2. R. A. Nicholson, *The Secrets of the Self* (4th edition, Lahore, 1950), p. ix.

3. A. J. Arberry, op. cit., p. 30.

which separation was being demanded. The approach of Iqbal was positive, whereas that of the League leadership was negative.

Towards the end of his life Sir Muhammad Iqbal was engaged in a serious controversy on the issue of nationalism with Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni, an eminent religious scholar and prominent leader of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. Iqbal's contention was that the feeling of belonging to the same territory was not enough to create the spirit of nationalism. Loyalties to religion and to the land of their habitation pull the Muslims in opposite directions. The Muslims, in his judgement, could not treat their religion as a private affair to be confined to individuals. Islam was not only a religion but also a complete social order. For a Muslim, his religion must govern his politics. The two could not be separated. If many different communities and religious groups formed one nation, the inevitable result would be that different groups comprising such a nation would, in due course of time, become extinct. In such a case 'the only common factor that remains in the individuals of that nation is irreligiousness."[1] He advised the Indian Muslims to get rid of such a view of nationalism. It was pregnant with serious threats to their religion and their culture. He said:

> "If Muslims have fallen into the error that religion and nationalism can go hand in hand as a political concept, then I want to give a timely warning to the Muslims that this course will ultimately lead to irreligiousness. And if this does not happen, Islam will be reduced to an ethical ideal with indifference to its social order as an inevitable consequence."[2]

This was Iqbal's last word on politics. He died almost two years before the public demand of the Muslim League for the establishment of Pakistan as a separate state. Had he lived to witness this event he would almost certainly have identified himself with Jinnah and the League in support of this demand. Only by the establishment of such a state could conditions be created for the realisation of his ultimate ideal. It would

1. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 227.

2. Ibid., p. 228. Iqbal's views on this question of nationalism and Islam were shared by other Muslim religious leaders. For the views of one of these who was later to achieve great prominence, see Appendix B.

probably have meant for him the attainment at least in some measure of "the very destiny which he had been striving to create for Muslim India . . . the crowning achievement of his life, the practical vindication of his philosophy, the power and glory of his message, the potential kingdom of God on earth."[1]

The words "potential kingdom of God on earth" must be emphasised. This was the be-all and the end-all of Iqbal's political thought. His main concern was with the establishment of an ideal society based on Islamic values and Islamic virtues. The greater part of his life was in effect a continuous striving for the attainment of that end. He was a Muslim first and a Muslim last. His very entry into politics was motivated by the love of Islam. "It is," he said, "because present-day political ideals, as they appear to be shaping themselves in India, may affect its [Islam's] original structure that I find myself interested in politics."[2] From that position he never deviated. The idea of Pakistan did not originate with him, but in the end he was convinced by the course of events in India that in no other way could his ideal of a truly Islamic community be attained.

1. Iqbal Singh, op. cit., p. 160.

2. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 38: Presidential address delivered at the annual session of the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore on March 21, 1932.

Chapter 5

Schemes of Division and Redistribution

AS has been shown earlier, none of the Muslim delegates in any session of the Round Table Conference had even vaguely hinted at separation from the majority community. The unity of India was taken for granted. An all-India federation was not only accepted but considered to be the only solution of the Indian problem. Even Sir Muhammad Iqbal in his famous address to the Muslim League Session in 1930 had not gone beyond some plan of federation.

I

THERE were, however, some observers among the Muslims who held more extreme views. One of these whose work attracted little notice at the time was Choudhary Rahmat Ali, then a graduate student in the University of Cambridge. A short pamphlet entitled *Now or Never* signed by Rahmat Ali, Khan Muhammad Aslam Khan, Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq and Khan Inayat Ullah Khan, was issued on January 28, 1933. The writers condemned the action of the Muslim delegates in accepting the All-India Federation and demanded recognition of the Muslim community as a distinct nation and "the creation of a Federation of Pakistan as separate from the Federation of India."[1] A body called the Pakistan National Movement was formed "to

1. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation* 3rd edition, Cambridge, 1947), p. 225.

work for Pakistan, for the Pak plan and for the Pak ideology."[1]

Rahmat Ali claims to have coined the word 'Pakistan' and there is good reason to believe that his claim was warranted. At least no evidence has been discovered of the use of the term before the publication of this pamphlet. The need for this name was felt because "the recognition of our nationhood was impossible without a national name for our people and our 'Indian' homelands."[2] Pakistan is a Persian word which literally means the land of the pure. In the words of its author, "it is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands—'Indian' and 'Asian.' That is, Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Katchch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan."[3]

It was claimed that since Muslims were a separate nation, the five 'Provinces,' namely the Punjab, North-West Frontier, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan, in which they constituted majorities should be separated from the rest of India.[4] Although the name came into existence in 1933, the idea of a separate state, according to Rahmat Ali, was presented by him as early as 1915. He claims to have made the following pronouncement in the latter year:

> "North of India is Muslim and we will keep it Muslim. Not only that. We will make it a Muslim state. But this we can do only if and when we and our north cease to be Indian. For that is a pre-requisite to it. So the sooner we shed 'Indianism' the better for us and for Islam."[5]

Whether it was repeated or presented for the first time, the fact remains that the idea of Pakistan attracted no attention in these early years. At the time this demand was made nobody took it seriously, least of all the Muslim leadership. This is evident from the statements made by the Muslim representatives before the Joint Committee in August 1933. When asked if there was any scheme of federating certain Provinces under the name

1. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, op. cit., p. 227.
2. Ibid., p. 224 (footnote).
3. Ibid., p. 225 (footnote).
4. Ibid., pp. 246-48.
5. Ibid., p. 214.

of Pakistan, one Muslim delegate dismissed it as "a students' scheme." Another said, "Perhaps it will be enough to say that no such scheme has been considered by any representative gentleman or association so far."[1]

Halide Edib, a Turkish author, has recorded a lengthy interview with Rahmat Ali in London and later in Paris. It is fairly indicative of Rahmat Ali's views on 'Pakistan' and may briefly be summarised as follows: The only way to solve Hindu-Muslim problem is a clear demarcation between Hindu India and Muslim 'Pakistan.' The Muslims are distinguished from Hindus by history, civilisation and culture. The Muslim case has so far gone by default because the Muslims had no policy of their own. They have been pawns in the hands of either the British or the Hindus. Either they were 'communalists,' in which case they were pro-British but anti-Hindu or 'nationalists' which meant that they were pro-Hindu but anti-British. In one case they were directed by the British, in the other by the Hindus. The Pakistan National Movement was founded to correct this very error. 'Pakistanis' are a nation of 42 million with 32 million as Muslims. They have a vast area, a rich soil and abundant resources. Outside 'Pakistan' there is no future for the Muslims. They are a nation wholly distinct from the other inhabitants of India. "The clash is neither inter-religious, nor inter-communal, nor even economic. It is, in fact, an inter-national conflict between two national ambitions—Muslem for survival and Hindu for supremacy."[2]

India is a vast continent. It is equal to Europe minus Russia. If no less than thirty nations with the same religion, same economic system and same civilisation could live in Europe, "it is not only possible, but highly desirable for our fundamentally distinct nations to live under our own separate national governments in Pakistan and Hindustan."[3] The plan of a single nation embracing Hindus and Muslims is an impossibility. The differences are too sharp to be reconciled:

1. *Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform [Session 1932-33], Minutes of Evidence* (London, 1934), IIc, p. 1496.
2. Halide Edib, *Inside India* (London 1937), p. 358.
3. Ibid., p. 361.

"Geographical division and ethnical distinction apart, please don't forget the 'Himalayas' of human heart and soul. Our religion, culture, history, tradition, literature, economic system, law of inheritance, succession, and marriage are fundamentally different. . . . We . . . do not inter-dine; we do not inter-marry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different."[1]

Referring to the fate of millions of Muslims who will be left in India in case 'Pakistan' is separated from the rest of the country, Rahmat Ali suggested the principle of 'reciprocity.' Since there would be non-Muslims in 'Pakistan' and Muslims in 'Hindustan,' safeguards provided for minorities in one country can be provided for in the other. More than this, the Muslims in 'Hindustan' will have the satisfaction of having a Muslim state, even if they themselves are not living in it. In a way 'Pakistan' would be "as much theirs as it is ours. While for us it is a national citadel, for them it will be a moral anchor. So long as the anchor holds, everything is or can be made safe. But once it gives way, all will be lost."[2]

Two weeks before Mr. Jinnah made his historic pronouncement on 'Pakistan,' Rahmat Ali inaugurated the second part of his programme. Speaking to the 'Supreme Council of the Pakistan National Movement' at Karachi on March 8, 1940, he elaborated his earlier plea and added something new. The fundamental creed of the movement, in the words of its founder, was, "We are Muslims, not Hindoos; Paks, not Hindoostani, and Asian not 'Indian,' . . . in retrospect, the 'India of to-day' is the 'South Asia of yesterday,' but, in prospect, it is the sphere of the individual solidarity of several nations of tomorrow."[3]

There was, he said, no such thing as an Indian nation. Muslims were a separate and a distinct nation. No arrangement would be acceptable to Muslims unless it was based on the principle of their separate nationhood. This was, he declared, "the soul of our political philosophy, the steel of our political strategy and the slogan of our political struggle."[4]

1. Halide Edib, op. cit., p. 362.
2. Ibid., p. 360.
3. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, op. cit., p. 245.
4. Ibid., p. 246.

So far it was the repetition of the original plan of a separate homeland propounded in 1933. But he no longer limited the plan to the Muslim majority areas of the North-West. It was now extended to include Bengal and Hyderabad. Bengal with its hinterland of Assam was claimed as a province in which the majority of the population were Muslims. This was, in Rahmat Ali's opinion, consonant with the principle of self-determination and with the democratic doctrine of sovereignty. "History created it; majority confirms it; and destiny claims it."[1] The state of Hyderabad should also go to the Muslims. It was described as a "part of our patrimony."[2] Since the state enjoyed a *de jure* sovereignty "which is solemnly acknowledged in the treaties"[3] between the ruler and the British Government, therefore the state belongs to the ruler and thus to the Muslims. This point was emphasised in the name 'Osmanistan' which Rahmat Ali suggusted for the territory, Osman being the name of the ruler. He urged that a movement should at once be started to convert *de jure* sovereignty of Hyderabad into her *de facto* sovereignty. Neither the British Government nor the Hindus, he declared, could object to this right of the Muslims as both "profess to be the most devoted supporters of the sanctity of international treaties."[4] According to Rahmat Ali, the three areas, namely, North-West India, Bengal with areas of Assam, and the state of Hyderabad rightly belonged to the Muslims. All three were distinctly marked geographical units and did not involve any redistribution of areas or exchange of population. It merely involved a recognition of the right of the Muslims to have what belonged to them. These territories were widely separate, but in Rahmat Ali's plan they were to be linked together in an "alliance of three Nations."[5]

This was the most drastic solution of the Indian communal problem that had so far been suggested. The ideal of Muslim nationhood had been extended as far as it could go. Although

1. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, op. cit., p. 248.
2. Ib d., p. 250.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 251.
5. Ibid., p. 254.

the Muslim League leadership never acknowledged their debt to Rahmat Ali, the Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, demanding a separate Muslim state was not appreciably different from Rahmat Ali's plan. The one difference in the latter Resolution was the absence of any mention of Hyderabad.

II

In addition to Rahmat Ali's scheme, many other solutions were proposed by eminent Muslims in the late 1930's. The first of these was put forward by Dr. S. A. Latif of Hyderabad. In a series of publications appearing during and after 1938 he developed his so-called 'cultural zone' plan. Like Rahmat Ali, he repudiated the idea of a single Indian nation. In his view there was no common moral consciousness among various religious groups in India. Without the presence of this consciousness a single nation could not exist. On the great vital issues which governed their lives there was no real bond of union between Hindus and Muslims. The Indian nationalists were trying to create an aritificial unity by "creating a countrywide consciousness through a programme of hate against foreign domination."[1] This was evidently not enough. It was a negative and unhealthy approach. It could not give birth to "positive virtues such as may help us to shatter the age-long hideous social obstacles."[2]

The Indian problem, in his judgement, was not so much political as cultrual. Without cultural autonomy for each of the various religious groups, Indian unity was an impossible ideal. Dr. Latif suggested that instead of uniting the Indian states and provinces into one federation, a number of autonomous nationalities, each in its geographical home, should from parts of a loose federal state. He proposed a division of India into fifteen cultural zones, four for the Muslims and eleven for the Hindus. The various Indian states were to be attached to the respective zones according to their interests and affinities.

Dr. Latif's plan was further elaborated in his volume on

1. S. A. Latif, *The Cultural Future of India* (Bombay, 1938), p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 4.

The Muslim Problem in India[1] (1939). According to his scheme, "Each such zone will from a homogeneous State with a highly decentralized form of government within . . . but fitting along with similar States into all-India Federation."[2] The plan as it affected the four Muslim zones was as follows:

(*i*) A North-West Block consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and the Indian states of Khairpur and Bahawalpur, was to constitute a single state, with the component parts united in a loose federation. This zone was to secure to "over 25 millions of Muslims a free home of their own."[3]

(*ii*) A North-East Block comprising Eastern Bengal and Assam with a population of 30 million Muslims was to be similarly "assigned a free political existence."[4]

(*iii*) A Delhi-Lucknow Block was proposed in an area "in between the two above-mentioned blocks."[5] Since the Muslims were unevenly distributed in this region, it was suggested that those living closer to the North-Western and North-Eastern Blocks should go to the one nearer to them for naturalisation. The remaining 12 million were to be concentrated in the new block extending "from the Eastern broder of Patiala to Lucknow and rounding up Rampur on the way."[6]

(*iv*) The Deccan Block was to comprise Hyderabad and certain other areas "down to the city of Madras."[7]

The rest of India was to be divided into eleven similar zones. It was claimed by the author that these fifteen cultural zones "should fulfil the political aspirations of every cultural unit and provide for each a free homeland in proportional extent of the habitable area to its strength in the total population of India."[8]

1. For the entire scheme as contained therein, see M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, eds., *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. II, pp. 444-55.
1. Ibid., p. 444.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 447.

The scheme contemplted an exchange of population under which Hindus and Muslims would migrate to the nearest cultural zone of their own community. Realising the difficulties involved in the mass exchange of population, Dr. Latif was of the view that "it is better that the present generation of them face the ordeal manfully rather than leave the task to their children who may not probably have a chance of a peaceful exchange which at this time may be possible for us to affect."[1]

The constitutional structure proposed by Dr. Latif included the following provisions:

(1) Under the 'Public Law of Indian Nations' a complete security of person and rights of citizenship were to be accorded to all thsose who chose to live in a zone to which they did not culturally belong.

(2) The religious shrines, monuments and graveyards belonging to any community were to be preserved by the local Government under the supervision of the Central Government.

(3) The smaller minority groups such as Christians, Anglo-Indians, Parsis and Buddhists were to be given all the necessary religious and cultural safeguards by the Government of the zone in which they happened to be residing.

(4) The 'Untouchables' were to have perfect freedom to live in any zone and were to be accorded rights similar to those enjoyed by other smaller minorities.

The above scheme was to be the ultimate objective, but for the transitional period Dr. Latif appended the outline of a constitution to replace the one established under the Government of India Act of 1935. Its provisions may briefly be summarised:

Every unit was to enjoy maximum autonomy and the Federal Legislative list was to be reduced to the barest minimum. Regional or zonal Boards were provided to frame a joint policy on "subjects of cultural and economic importance common to contiguous federal units . . . leaving the individual federal units to legislate in the light of common policies so evolved."[2] Three

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 447.
2. Ibid., p. 453.

Muslim zones were suggested as follows:

(1) North-West Zone.

(2) North-East Zone.

(3) The Dominion of Hyderabad.

The rest of India was to resolve itself into linguistic zones as the Congress may decide.

As special safeguards for the Muslims the constitution stipulated the maintenance of separate electorates and the existing proportion of Muslim members in the various Legislatures. Muslims were to from at least one-third of the representatives of the Indian states in the Central Legislature. Similarly, Muslims were to be given effective and adequate representation on the proposed zonal or regional Boards. Only Muslim members of a Legislature, constituting themselves into a special committee, were to be allowed to frame laws on issues concerning their religion, personal law and culture. "The strength of the committee should be augmented by a third by co-opting representative Muslims learned in Muslim law and religion."[1] The decision emerging from such a committee was to be binding on the whole Legislature. In case such a piece of legislation affected other communities, it could be reviewed by the entire membership of the Legislature. No amendment, however, "shall be permissible which should affect the legislative enactment."[2]

In the executive sphere, composite cabinets of Hindus and Muslims at the Centre as well as in the Provinces were envisaged. Dr. Latif regarded the British system of responsible Cabinet Government as unsutied to Indian conditions. He recommended the establishment of a 'stable Executive' on the American model, to hold office during the life of the Legislature, and not to be subject to removal by an adverse vote of the Assembly. Another novel feature was the provision for the choice of the Prime Minister. He was to be elected not by the Party to which ne belonged but by the whole Legesiature. The Muslim members of the Cabinet were necessarily to enjoy the confidence of the whole body of Muslim representatives in the Legislature and they were

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 453-54.
2. Ibid., p. 454.

to be selected from a panel of names suggested by Muslim members of the House. In case of important departments such as Law and Order and Education, two appointments were to be made, the one as Minister, the other as Assistant Minister. One of these was to be a member of the Muslim community to ensure that "the Government may have the benefit of his steadying influence."[1]

One important object of the transitional constitution was "to facilitate and prepare the ground for the migration of Muslims and the Hindus into the zones specified for them so as to develop them into culturally homogeneous states."[2] This would be a difficult undertaking and the hope was that through the efforts of Governments in which Muslim and Hindus Ministers would co-operate, many of the natural obstacles to this extensive migration could be more effectually removed. It was emphasised, however, that during this transitional period migration should be voluntary.

It was regarded by its author as a practicable scheme for a peaceful solution of a problem that was every year becoming more intractable. As such, he believed that it deserved most serious consideration by all the parties concerned. There was, he declared, nothing in it to which exception could be taken by the Congress, by the Indian states or by the British Government. The Congress stood for a united India and "the scheme is a scheme for unity and not for disruption." The Princes too need have no fear as "it leaves the Indian States intact." Lastly, it "does not in the least disturb India's connexion with Great Britain as may be settled between them from time to time."[3]

Although Dr. Latif's scheme did contain certain merits, it also suffered from serious defects. It was essentially a compromise scheme designed to meet the demands of the Congress for a united India, and at the same time to provide more effectual safeguards for the Muslims as a distinct cultural community. However, it satisfied nobody. It was at once rejected both by

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 454.
2. Ibid., p. 455.
3. Ibid., p. 449,

the Congress and the Muslim League. In the correspondence that ensued between Dr. Latif and the Indian leaders over the merits or otherwise of this scheme, it was condemned both by Nehru and Jinnah.

Nehru's objection was twofold. First, he regarded the Indian problems as "one of poverty and unemployment and low production and vested interests,"[1] and he did not believe that this plan of dividing India into cultural zones would in any way facilitate the alleviation of those conditions. Second, he opposed the maintenance of the existing status of the Indian states, which Dr. Latif had taken for granted.[2]

Before Mr. Jinnah made any definite comment on the scheme the Muslim League had adopted the resolution demanding the establishment of a separate Muslim state. Under these altered conditions Jinnah naturally showed little interest in a cultural division of the country. "In my opinion," he wrote to Dr. Latif, "your scheme is fundamentally different from the basic principle laid down in the Lahore resolution."[3]

Apart from the fact that none of the major political parties approved of the 'cultural zone' scheme, it was open to serious objections of a purely practical nature. It contemplated an unprecedented migration of millions of people, a plan which was almost certainly impracticable. It would have entailed an unmanageable expenditure if the migration had been made compulsory. If, on the other hand, it was to be left to the choice of the people to migrate to their appropriate zones or stay where they were, it can safely be said that the earth-rooted and superstitious masses would have stuck to their ancestral homes. The illiterate populace could scarcely be expected to appreciate the ultimate advantages of such a mass exodus, and thus the whole underlying idea of the 'cultural zones' would have been completely frustrated.

1. Nehru to Dr. Latif, December 25, 1939. Quoted by Nazir Yar Jung, ed., *The Pakistan Issue: Being the Correspondence between Dr. S. A. Latif and Mr. M. A. Jinnah on the one hand, and between him and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on the other, and connected papers on the subject of Pakistan* (Lahore, 1943), p. 20.

2. Ibid.

3. Jinnah to Dr. Latif, October 12, 1940, ibid., p. 62.

An even greater difficulty would have been encountered in the anticipated exchange of population between Provinces and States. As has been seen, no immediate change in the government of the native states was contemplated. It is unlikely that the inhabitants of a Province, where relatively advanced form of democratic government was in process of being established, would willingly consent to exchange this for life under the autocratic rule of one of the Princes. Nor was it probable that the Princes, who had rejected the terms offered for joining the Federation of 1935, would welcome the ingress into their territories of thousands of strangers imbued with nationalistic and democratic ideas spread among them by the members of the Congress Party.

Some Muslim students have criticised Dr. Latif's scheme from still another angle. According to one view, "the complete withdrawal of Muslim population from Hindu zones . . . is detrimental to the further spread of Islam in India."[1] There was no opportunity left for preaching of and consequent conversion to Islam. If the two communities were completely separated and segregated, the question of proselytisation did not arise. "The scheme," says another student, "deprives Islam of one of its essential attributes. In fact, it puts Islam in jail."[2]

III

A THIRD plan, more political and constitutional in character, was proposed at about the same time by the Premier of the Punjab, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan. The title of his pamphlet, *The Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, is suggestive. In essence it was a scheme of constitutional reconstruction within the framework of the existing Indian Federation. His basic premise was clearly stated. "A federation of some kind," he said, "is not only desirable but indispensable for the ordered and peaceful progress of the country as a whole."[3] The plan was designed to allay the fears and apprehensions of minorities, and at the same time to

1. 'A Punjabi,' *Confederacy of India* (Lahore, 1939), p. 6.
2. F. K. Khan Durrani, *Meaning of Pakistan*, p. 162.
3. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 456 (for full text of the scheme, see pp. 455-62).

secure the support of the Princes by guarding against any great encroachment upon their authority by a powerful Central Government. Like Dr. Latif and other Muslim leaders of the period, he advocated reduction of the powers of the Central Government to the bare minimum required for the discharge of its functions, and the extension of the autonomy of the Provinces to the maximum consistent with membership in a loose federation.

The salient feature of his alternative federal scheme was the division of the country including the Indian states into seven zones. These were as follows:

(1) Assam, Bengal, Bengal states and Sikkim.

(2) Bihar and Orissa plus certain areas transferred from Bengal, so as to make Orissa rich in area and resources.

(3) United Provinces and the native states within its borders.

(4) Madras and Travancore with the neighbouring Indian states.

(5) Bombay, Hyderabad, Western Indian states, Bombay states, Mysore and C. P. states.

(6) Rajputana states (without Bikaner and Jaisalmer), Gwalior, Central Indian states, Bihar and Orissa states and C. P. and Berar.

(7) Punjab, Sind, N.-W.F. Province, Kashmir, Punjab states, Baluchistan, Bikaner and Jaisalmer.

The proposed constitution included some additional important features. Each region was to be provided with a local Legislature consisting of representatives of the provinces and the states of which the region was composed. Each unit within the zone would have the same number of representatives as that assigned to it in the Central Legislature under the Government of India Act of 1935. The entire membership of the regional Legislatures was to "collectively constitute the Central Federal Assembly"[1] consisting of 375 members, with 250 from British India and 125 from the Indian states. One-third of the members of the Central Legislature were to be Muslims. No bill in the regional Legislature

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 458.

was to become an Act unless it was approved by two-thirds of its members. The regional Legislatures could of their own choice authorise the Central Legislature to legislate on the subjects included in the regional list. Such authorisation, however, could not be given unless four out of the seven zones requested it; and a further safeguard was contained in the provision that, if such an action was not endorsed by all seven zones, it should be put into effect only in those zones which had asked for it.

A somewhat complicated method of election was proposed for the regional Legislatures. Within the Provinces of British India the representatives were to be chosen in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1935 for the election of members to the Central Legislature. In the native states the representatives were to be partly nominated and partly elected. For the first ten years three-fourths were to be nominated by each ruler and one-fourth to be selected by him from a panel to be elected by the State Assembly or other similar body created for that purpose. The proportion between nominated and elected members was to be gradually modified till at the end of twenty years one-third were to be nominated and two-thirds elected.

The principle of territorial or zonal representation was applied to the formation of the Central Executive. Each zone was to have at least one Minister in the Federal Cabinet and at least one-third of the Ministers were to be Muslims. For the first fifteen or twenty years the Viceroy was to nominate two of his Ministers to the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs. Thereafter all Ministers were to be appointed from among the members of the Legislature. During the interim period the Ministers of Defence and External Affairs were to hold office at the Viceroy's pleasure. All other Ministers were to be responsible to the Legislature and were to resign in case of an adverse vote.

In assigning functions and powers to the Central, Regional and Local authorities the sphere of the Central Legislature and Executive was to be severely limited. The subjects assigned to it were those and only those which clearly concerned the government of the country as a whole, i.e. such matters as "Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs, Coinage

and Currency, etc."[1] All other subjects were to be transferred to the federating units, and powers, not specifically included in the Federal list, were to be exercised by these units. In the same manner subjects not specifically assigned to the zonal Legislatures were to be allotted to the Legislatures of the units which comprised each zone. In case of any doubt or difference of opinion as to whether a subject was Federal, Concurrent, Regional or Provincial, it was to be decided by the Viceroy in his discretion.

The Federal Legislature was to be unicameral. In case it was desired to give special representation to those interests which were being looked after by the existing Council of State, the required seats could be added to the Federal Assembly provided that these additional seats were equally divided among the seven zones. A number of safeguards were provided in the proposed draft of the constitution. In the main, they were to protect the culture and religious interests of the minorities; to prevent racial discrimination against British-born subjects; to ensure the treaty and other contractual rights of the Indian states and to protect the British Indian and Indian states units against interference by Federal or regional Legislatures.

This was, in brief, the scheme of Sir Sikandar. He claimed that by bringing together the Indian states and the Indian provinces on a regional basis rather than as two distinct components his scheme would "be conducive to the solidarity of the country and stability of the Central Government."[2] It was further contended that under the proposed arrangements there would be greater collaboration and fewer occasions for friction between the states and the provinces. This form of union of the states and provinces was necessary because "geographical proximity, common language and affinity of economic and other interests form natural ties to bind them together."[3] He further declared that under his alternative federal scheme there would be greater co-operation between the units and the Centre and

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 461.
2. Ibid., p. 456.
3. Ibid., p. 457.

thus "the growth of any fissiparous tendency among the units"[1] would be avoided. He was convinced, moreover, that his scheme would "give to the minorities a greater sense of security."[2]

Owing to the high prestige and position of its author the 'Seven Zones' scheme received wide publicity. It was, however, clear from almost the very beginning that it had little chance of being accepted by any of the important political groups in India. It is not difficult to see why Sir Sikandar Hayat's scheme failed to win the expected support. It did not satisfy the Congress ideal of immediate independence as it was simply an amendment to the Government of India Act, 1935. It did not provide any acceptable solution to the League's anxieties against the probable encroachment of the Centre on the units. The scheme was criticised both by Hindus and Muslims. The Hindu Press subjected it to severe criticism. The real motive of Sir Sikandar was suspected to be "to improve the position of the Muslims at the Centre by a regrouping of constituent units." Some critics suspected an ulterior motive. "The composition of these zones," said one, "is such that the Pakistan plan would be achieved by a sidewind." Sir Sikandar's plan was considered to have been conceived "more to provide for the British Power and for the minority and the Provinces than for the people and the country as a whole."[3] The Hindu fears were succinctly summed up in the editorial columns of the *Times of India*. It was said:

"Some critics go so far as to hint that by establishing a seventh zone of the Punjab, Sind, the N.W.F.P., Kashmir and Baluchistan the way would be paved for Pakistan and that later, if the Muslims were dissatisfied with the working of Federal Government, the administrative nucleus would be already at hand upon which to build a separate political unit."[4]

The Muslims criticised the scheme for opposite reasons. For a clearer comprehension of the Muslim point of view, it is essential

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 457.

2. Ibid.

3. For a summary of the Hindu Press reaction, see *Times of India* (Bombay), August 9, 1939.

4. Ibid., July 31, 1939.

to remember the factors and forces which were responsible for their repudiation of the Government of India Act, 1935, at the Provincial as well as at the Federal level. The rule of Congress Ministries in various Provinces had convinced the Muslims that their interests were not safe against the probable 'tyranny' of the majority community, either at the Centre or in the Provinces. Their experience in the provincial sphere had led them to the belief that any scheme which did not radically alter the provincial constitution and completely eliminate or at least considerably reduce the power of the Centre would be opposed to their interests. From the Muslim point of view, the scheme had two basic defects. It left too much power in the Central Government and proposed no effective solution of the minority problem in the Provinces. Its rejection by the Muslims was, therefore, almost a foregone conclusion. The opinion expressed by Mr. Rashidi, the Secretary of the Foreign Sub-Committee of the All-India Muslim League, was fairly representative. He said:

"Under this scheme . . . the Centre will continue to remain in the hands of the Hindu majority, and although efforts have been made to break the Hindu majority by bringing its position at par with the States, yet when there is anything involving a common interest of the Hindus the Muslim minority will not be able to escape a hostile verdict."[1]

It was also criticised from another angle. It was said that the scheme would work particularly against the Muslims as the balance of communal powers would be completely shifted in favour of the Hindus. It would dilute Muslim majorities in the North-West and the North-East without affecting the strength of the Hindu majority areas, where their overwhelming majorities would remain intact.[2] "It sounds more like a suggestion," said another Muslim, "from jumping out of the frying pan into the fire than a promise of salvation."[3]

Whatever its merits, it seems clear that the scheme of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan came too late. It had much to recommend it, but at the time of its release the two communities had gone

1. *Star of India* (Calcutta), August 4, 1939.
2. F.K. Khan Durrani, op. cit., p. 169.
3. 'A Punjabi,' op. cit., p. 9.

too far to be reconciled on the basis of such proposals, Discussing the outline of the scheme, the *Star of India* editorially commented as follows:

"The background on which Sir Sikandar has tried to paint and demarcate his seven zones is blurred with the mistakes and blunders of the past. No amount of shining paint and attractive colours can make it welcome to the Indian eye. An altogether new canvas is required to put things in a proper perspective."[1]

IV

ANOTHER scheme of division based largely on communal lines was proposed in 1939 by an unidentified writer describing himself 'A Punjabi,' After rejecting the plans of Dr. S. A. Latif and Sir Sikandar Hayat as wholly inadequate to secure the desired end, he proposed an alternative solution. Under this plan India would be divided into five *countries* each with its own federal Government, and the five would then be united to from the 'Confederacy of India.' The provinces and states were to be grouped as follows:

(1) The Indus Region's Federation with the Punjab (excluding certain Hindu majority areas), Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir, Baluchistan and a number of other states of this region.

(2) The Hindu India Federation with the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Bihar with certains portions of Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay and the Indian states excluding Rajistan and the Deccan states.

(3) The Rajistan Federalion with the states of Rajputana and Central India.

(4) The Bengal Federation with Muslim majority areas of the Eastern Bengal, some tracts of Assam and certain states which were cut off by its territories form Hindu India.[2]

Each federation was to have its own Governor-General, with a Governor in each of its component units. The Governors-

1. *Star of India*, (Calcutta), August 4, August 4, 1939.
2. 'A Punjabi,' pp. 10-11.

General were to be responsible to the Central Confederal authority in relation to the Confederal subjects. The Confederal authority was to be vested in the Viceroy who was to be assisted by a Confederal Assembly composed of members representing the various federations. The number of representatives from each federation was to be apportioned according to "its significance to the Confederacy as regards its geographical situation in the subcontinent, population, area and economic position, etc."[1]

The revenue of the Confederacy would be obtained either by contribution from the several federations or by specific assignment of certain heads of revenue to the Confederacy. There was. however, one important qualification. In the event of a second alternative being adopted, the Muslim Federation of the North-West was to retain control of Customs' duty within that region. By surrendering this branch of the revenue the author believed that "the Muslims of the North-West would permanently ruin all their future prospects of industrialization,"[2] and seriously handicap the whole economic development of the area.

The writer was convinced that his scheme would serve the best interests of the country and of all parties in it. "It involves no injusticc to any party or any breach of the canons of justice."[3] There was nothing in it, he declared, to which the Hindus could reasonably object. It conformed to the Congress ideal of a united India. "It simply means," he said, "an internal partition effected between the various members of a joint family without breaking their mutual bond of relationship." The entire purport of his scheme, in his words, was "not division but union, to be achieved by the simplification of the present complicated political situation, in which each community is too much in the way of the other's cultural and economic progress."[4] There was no intention of withdrawing the Muslims from India. The author recognised vital differences which separated the two great communities, but he declared that the destiny of the

1. 'A Punjabi,' op. cit., p. 13.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 12.
4. Ibid., p. 15.

Muslims "lies within India and not outside it."[1] It was, he believed, in the interest of Hindus themselves that they should agree to this plan of Confederacy and so prevent a complete rupture. He stated the Muslim position quite frankly:

"We should be separationists-cum-federationists, and if the Hindus disagree with the idea of a Confederacy of Hindu India and Muslim India, then we should be simply separationists, demanding secession of our regions from Hindu India without any link between them."[2]

The arguments were reiterated at great length. The conclusion was that "the solution of India's problem is not a federation of different units but a Confederation of various states."[3] He estimated that by this scheme about twenty-six million Muslims in the North-West and about twenty-three million in Bengal and Assam would be removed from Hindu domination. Despite these changes, however, threr would still remain about twenty-nine million Muslims scattered all over the country outside the proposed Muslim regions.[4] But he rejected the idea of carving up the country in such a way as to bring all Muslims into regions ruled by their co-religionists. Such a plan, he declared, would involve a huge expenditure "which cannot be met out of ihe Indian revenues."[5] There were other reasons too which made it impracticable. In may cases the distances were so great that an exchange of population was impossible. Finally, the plan which he suggested would, he believed, "help to restore balance of communal powers in India without denying to Islam the prospect of further proselytism."[6]

The author of the above scheme strongly rejected the argument that Hindus residing in Muslim federations would be held as hostages in the interest of the safety of the Muslims in Hindu federations. The balance, he pointed out, was strongly in favour of the Hindu population in Muslim Provinces. The Muslims remaining in Hindu Provinces would be in a hopeless

1. 'A Punjabi,' op. cit. p. 17.
2. Ibid.,
3. Ibid., p. 152.
4. Ibid., p. 204.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 205.

minority as compared with the non-Muslims in Muslim Provinces. After due 'weightage' to the minorities in Hindu and Muslim regions, the position of non-Muslim minorities would be incomparably better than that of the Muslim minorities. "The Muslim minorities in Hindu Provinces, he declared, "are both numerically and economically too weak and the weightage given to them does not help them to the same extent as it helps the Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces."[1]

This was not a plan for dividing India into two independent Hindu and Muslim states, although he recognised the ultimate possibility of this. It was indeed designed to prevent such a separation. The author avoided the use of the word 'Pakistan' because, as he observed, it had "gathered round itself some unwholesome and alien associations which are far from our mind."[2] But in effect his solution differed but little from that proposed by the Muslim League in March 1940. The veneer of a 'Confederacy' which was the main theme of his scheme could any time be set aside and the remainder would have been precisely what he had scrupulously refrained from suggesting—'Pakistan.' Considered as a solution for the minority problem his plan is open to the same objections as can be directed againt the Muslim League's resolution demanding a separate home for Indian Muslims.

These were the more important schemes for solving the inter-communal and political problems of India. The others, with a few changes here and there, were in essence a repetition of the above-mentioned schemes and may therefore be ignored. They were for the most part little more than academic suggestions for the solution of a problem that was rapidly becoming too grave to be solved by any of these constitional schemes. Few of them attracted much notice. None of them commanded the support of any important party in India. The march of events consigned them to the discard as they were being written. The more determined spirit which was developing among large masses of the Muslim population was to be reflected in the resolution of the League in March 1940 which will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.

1. 'A Punjabi,' op. cit., pp. 205-06.
2. Ibid., p. 18.

Chapter 6

The Nationalist Muslims

THE story of the birth, the growth and the rise of the All-India Muslim League has already been told. But this organisation was by no means the only Party through which Muslim India was expressing its political opinions. There were many Muslims who rejected the doctrine of the League and who adopted in varying degrees the nationalist ideology of the Congress. Some of these enlisted as active members of the Congress, others formed Associations which worked in co-operation with it. Like the Congress these men believed in the oneness of the Indian nation composed of both Hindus and Muslims. They recognised that there were differences between Hindus and Muslims but believed that all Indians irrespective of their religious affiliations must work for the freedom of the country before settling their mutual differences. In addition to the Muslims who were members and active workers in the Congress there were, besides certain small groups, three separate organisations which call for consideration, viz. the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Khudai Khidmatgars, and the Ahrar Party.

I

The Congress and the Muslims. It is not easy to explain the role or to determine the significance of the Congressite Muslims. Although a certain number of Muslims had been members of the Congress from its inception or from very early in its history, they did not have any separate existence as Muslims in that Party. Their role was the role of the Congress Party. They were there not as the representatives of their community but as

individuals. Their position in the Congress Party has been neatly described by a well-known scholar in the following words:

"To attempt a comprehensive treatment of the role of Muslims in the Congress would be comparable to attempting to study the role of blond-haired people in the British Labour Party. The absence of such treatises does not mean that there are no blonds in the Labour Party, or that they are unimportant."[1]

While it is true that the membership of the Congress always included a certain number of Muslims, it is equally evident that their numbers were small and that they were in no way representatives of the Muslim community as a whole. To the great majority of the Muslims the Congress philosophy made no appeal. Whether that philosophy was related to or derived from Hinduism as many writers, Indian and European, have alleged or whether it was a secular and nationalist philosophy which took no account of religious doctrines or differences, is not a matter of great importance. The simple fact is that Hindus formed the overwhelming majority of the Congress and that the ideology of that Party had a much more powerful attraction for Hindus than for Muslims. At no times was this more evident than in the years when Mr. Gandhi's influence over Congress policy was at its height. Opinions may differ as to the extent of his influence at different periods in the history of the Congress, but it can scarcely be doubted that in the years under survey it was very great. He did not often hold high office in the Party, but he was invariably consulted on all important issues and it is probable that the final word on most questions of high policy came from him.

The close connection between Mr. Gandhi's philosophy and that of the Congress was explained by Mr. Acharya Kriplani, the General Secretary of the All-India Congress Committee, in August 1939. In an official statement to the Press he declared that the Congress was not only a political Party but a social organisation committee to the carrying out of a great moral and spiritual revolution among its members. The pertinent parts of the statement may be quoted directly:

1. W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 242.

"The philosophy which Mr. Gandhi wishes to preach to the people of India is based on the two fundamental principles of non-violence and truth, and it is not possible to accept the constructive programme or the political technique of the Congress without first believing in them. It should be realized once and for all that every scheme of the Congress will be run in future in accordance with Gandhian principles. It is impossible to work out the Gandhian programme in the light of different ideology. . . . The principles of Mr. Gandhi and the practical programme of the Congress are two complementary aspects of one thing and are so organically related that ignoring one thing means ignoring one and all."[1]

This statement leaves little room for doubt that there could be no place in the Congress ranks for those who did not or could not subscribe to the Gandhian philosophy of life. The central doctrine of Mr. Gandhi's philosophy was non-violence, an admirable theory in the abstract but one that was alien to the Muslim tradition. Mr. Kriplani's statement therefore raised the question whether Muslims who firmly believed in the use of the sword as a mearure of self-defence could remain in the Congress. This is not a mere hypothetical question. Its importance was indicated in an exchange between Mr. Gandhi and a Muslim correspondent in July 1940. "Whom are we to follow," asked the Muslim, "you or the Prophet? If we follow you, we cease to be Muslims. If we follow the Prophet, we cannot join the Congress with its creed of extreme non-violence." The reply was brief but unmistakable. "Since you notice the difference, you should unhesitatingly follow the Prophet."[2] To another correspondent who asked whether "those who openly declare that they do not believe in non-violence" could be Congress members, Mr. Gandhi replied with equal emphasis. "I am quite clear," he said, "that those who do not believe in non-violence cannot belong to the Congress."[3]

Yet, in spite of these clear verdicts there were ardent and

1. Quoted by M. A. Mehtar, op. cit., pp. 131.
32. For comments, see *Medina* (Bijnour), August 17 and 21, 1939.
2. M. K. Gandhi, *Harijan* (Poona, 1940), Vol. VIII, No. 22, p. 193.
8. Ibid., p. 203.

deeply religious-minded Muslims in the Congress.[1] They believed that the Congress was the only organisation through which Indian freedom could be secured. They suspected the sincerity of the Muslim League opposition of which to British rule appeared to them hesitant and lukewarm. The most representative example of this class was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. We have already referred to his earlier activities in rousing the Muslims from the torpor and political inaction into which they had fallen and also to his role in opposing the policy of Sir Syed Ahmad. His early life may briefly be sketched.

Abul Kalam was born at Mecca in 1888 whither his deeply religious Indian father had migrated at the time of the Indian Revolt. Two years after his birth the family returned to India and settled at Calcutta. Abul Kalam was educated in the traditional Muslim fashion with special emphasis on the learning of Oriental languages. Unlike many prominent Indian leaders, he received no Western education. The legend, moreover, that he was educated at Al-Azhar University, Cairo, has no foundation in fact. It has been repeated by almost everyone who has written anything on his career[2] but it is finally deposed of by Maulana Azad himself in his recently published autobiography.[3]

1. Their position has been likened to that of the Irish Protestants in the Home Rule Party. "The Moslems in the Congress ranks are now-a-days very much like the Protestants that used to be found in the Irish Home Rule movement, a facade which did not affect the increasingly passionate opposition of Ulster. Mr. Jinnah is to a certain extent in the position of a Carson" [George Schuster and Guy Wint, *India and Democracy* (London, 1941), pp. 182-83].

2. For some of those who held this erroneous view, see the following:
(*i*) Mahadev Desai, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* (2nd edition, Agra, 1946), p. 13.
(*ii*) H. L. Kumar, *The Apostle af Unity* (Lahore, 1942), p. 18.
(*iii*) K. L. Mitchell, *India Without Fable* (New York, 1943), p. 106.
(*iv*) Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 349.
(*v*) Qazi Muhammad Abdul Ghaffar, *Asar-i-Abul Kalam Azad* (Urdu), (Bombay, 1949), p. 25.
(*vi*) A. B. Rajput, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* (Lahore, 1946), p. 21.
(*vii*) W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 245.

All these books were published in Azad's lifetime. Why he did not correct the error is impossible to say.

3. Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit., p. 6.

Something has already been said of his career as a journalist. He played an important part in the association between the Khilafat Committee and the Congress Party after the First World War; and at the special session of the Congress in 1923 he was elected President. In the years that followed he rose to a prominent position among Congress leaders and in 1940 he was again chosen President.

Azad was essentially a scholar. He was drawn into politics in spite of himself. As a master of fluent Urdu prose and as an exceptionally great religious scholar he was respected and admired even by his political adversaries. True to the tradition of scholarship he was a recluse and retiring man. By character and temperament he was fitted more for the study than for the political arena. "The Maulana," says Nehru, "is an unusual type of politician. He lacks the usual temprament of a successful politican. . . . He is the very opposite of this. . . . He is essentially the scholar whom circumstances have forced into a life of action."[1]

Maulana Azad's contribution to practical politics during the years covered in this study was neither impressive nor significant. Urdu literature suffered a great loss through his preoccupations with politics, but it is doubtful whether he exercised any real influence on the High Command of the Congress Party, and it is unlikely that the political development of these years would have been materially different had he remained at his study. As has been related, he played an important part in the formation of the Congress Ministries in 1937, but that was merely the part of an envoy carrying out a policy determined in the main by such men as Gandhi and Nehru. His most important contribution to Indian politics was not made at this time but in the early years of the century when he had been foremost among those who had laboured to infuse new courage and self-confidence in the Muslim community.

His political principles were explained in his Presidential address to the Congress at Ramgarh in 1940. His statement was addressed as much to the entire Muslim community as to the members of Congress. Maulana Azad was the most eminent

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, in *Aspects of Abul Kalam Azad,* ed. Abdullah Butt (Lahore, 1942), p. 32.

Muslim in the ranks of the Congress Party. For that reason, and because his views were no doubt held by other nationalist Muslims, his statement merits attention. India was, he declared, a united and indivisible nation. Within that nation there were of course minority groups, but the minority problem was, he believed, unreal and simply the result of the British policy of 'divide and rule.' His advice to the Muslim community must be quoted at some length:

"Do we, Indian Mussalmans, view the free India of the future with suspicion and distrust or with courage and confidence? If we view it with fear and suspicion, then undoubtedly we have to follow a different path. No present declaration, no promise for the future, no constitutional safeguards can be a remedy for our doubts and fears. We are then forced to tolerate the existence of a third power. The third power is already entrenched here and has no intention of withdrawing and if we follow this path of fear, we must needs look to its continuance. But if we are convinced that for us fear and doubt have no place, and that we must view the future with courage and confidence in ourselves, then our course of action becomes absolutely clear. We find ourselves in a new world, which is free from the dark shadows of doubt, vacillation, inaction and apathy, and where the light of faith and determination, action and enthusiasm never fails. The confusions of the times, the ups and downs that come our way, the difficulties that beset our thorny path, cannot change the direction of our steps. It becomes our bounden duty, then, to march with assured steps to India's national goal."[1]

This was, in brief, the position of Azad with reference to the future of India. He wanted unconditional co-operation of the Muslims with their Hindu countrymen for the freedom of India. All safeguards for the protection of Muslim interests were to be postponed until the independence of India had been won. The first duty of all Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, was to throw the British out of the country and then settle their mutual differences. In the words of one writer, "he was opposed to divorce before marriage.' He wanted people to make an experiment with living together in an independent India, and there would be time, if only the experiment fails, not before

1. Abul Kalam Azad, *Musalman aur Congress* (Urdu), (Lahore, n.d.), pp. 23-24.

then, to separate."[1]

This was seemingly a fair enough solution for the problem of Hindu-Muslim relations. But it did not touch the fundamental problem—the distrust of the Muslims for the Hindus and their unwillingness to subject themselves to a Government that would inevitably be controlled by the Congress Party. How, it was argued, could they defer their demands till after the winning of independence? So long as the British rule continued they were in a better position to drive a bargain with the Hindus. After the British had withdrawn from India and the substance of power had been transferred to the majority community, what assurance was there that their demands would then be conceded?[2]

A few words must be said about Maulana Azad's position in the Congress Party. His reputation as a scholar, his evident devotion to the religion of Islam and his personal qualities were understandably valued and perhaps exaggerated by the Congress in particular and the Hindus in general. His very presence in the Congress Party was a clear and seemingly convincing proof that the Congress was what it claimed to be, a national Party representing the entire Indian people irrespective of class or creed. Yet it seems probable that his role in the Congress has been exaggerated by some of his more enthusiastic Hindu apologists. One of these has described it in terms that are difficult to accept:

"His influence in the Congress is second to none. He wields a strong rod in the Congress, and has strongly used it. . . . It is an open secret that in the matters of Congress discipline he is rather harsh and autocratic, and even leaders like Mahatma Gandhi dare not interfere with him."[3]

Maulana Azad was certainly respected by the Congress leadership but not to the extent suggested by the above statement. His part in the formation of the Congress Ministry in the United Provinces has already been explained. On the basis of that evidence it is clearly impossible to accept the view that Azad

1. Nursingdas Agarwalla, *The Hindu-Muslim Question* (Calcutta, 1951), p. 61.

2. M.R.T., *Nationalism in Conflict in India* (Bombay, [1943]), pp. 318-20.

3. Kailash Chandra, op. cit., p. 233.

held the position of a dictator or that, on any matter of High policy, his judgement was preferred to that of Gandhi.

On the other hand, certain Muslim students have, with equal persistence, charged Azad with insincerity and treachery. "We can sacrifice. . . . Maulana Sahib and his type," said one critic; "we can ignore the differences in the political views of the Maulana, but we cannot forgive betrayal of the Muslim cause."[1] Another went even farther:

> "I have already challenged Mr. Azad to enter a mosque and swear on the Holy Quran if he is not being maintained by the Congress. If he is, he is no better than a hireling of that body and he cannot pose to be speaking on behalf of Moslems. . . . What is he then but a gramophone of Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Nehru?"[2]

This was no doubt the view of many Muslims but it is too simple. Whatever judgement may ultimately be passed on his conduct and career his sincerity and his moral integrity cannot be questioned. To suggest that his services were for sale and that his support of the Congress was secured by financial reward is simply to betray an ignorance of his true character. His great sacrifice and sufferings for the cause of his country are an unmistakable proof of his sincerity to the cause he championed. He was convinced, it seems, that the communal question was a transitory phase and the communal cobra would die a natural death after independence. How far he was correct in this judgement is a matter of individual opinion. Maulana Azad's personality was not so simple as to lend itself to a clear-cut verdict. "A simple algebric formula," says a Muslim scholar, "does not disclose the secret of his character. It takes a biographer of genius to give us glimpses of so rich, so complex, so cultured and so exquisite a personality."[3] The biographer who can accomplish this task has not yet appeared.

1. M. Hafeezullah, "You Know About Maulana Azad, Maulvi Habib-ur-Rehman and Allama Mashriqi," *Dawn* (Delhi), December 2, 1945.

2. S.N.A. Qadri, *A Muslim's Inner Voice* (Lahore, 1944), p. 47.

3. A.A. Asaf Fyzee, "Islamic Law and Theology in India : Proposal for a Fresh Approach," *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, 1954), Vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 177.

II

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema. Of the separate Muslim organisations which co-operated with and supported the policy of the Congress, Jamiat-ul-Ulema was perhaps the most important. It was organised during the Khilafat agitation in 1919 by a group of Muslim divines and religious scholars, with the object of uniting and giving leadership to the Muslim community in religious and political affairs. Its first formal session held at Amritsar in December 1919[1] was marked by considerable enthusiasm. From its inception its connection with tne Congress was close. It maintained its organisation and pursued its own policy but many of its members and most of its prominent leaders were also members of the Congress Party. But it was not easy to maintain this harmonious relationship. The increase of Hindu-Muslim riots from about 1926 onwards severely strained and at times almost dissolved the bond between the two bodies. Their differences were further deepened by the action of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema in rejecting the Nehru Report in 1928. Their reasons for rejecting the Report were twofold. On the one hand, they agreed with the Muslim League in regarding as wholly indequate the safeguards offered to the Muslim community. On the other hand, they demanded immediate independence for India and rejected the plan of Dominion Status proposed by the authors of the Report. Within a few months. however, the causes of disagreement were removed. In December 1929 the Congress formally abandoned the Nehru Report and in an explanatory resolution offered assuarances on the communal question which satisfied the Jamiat. On this point the resolution declared that "no solution thereof in any furture constitution would be acceptable to the Congress that does not give full satisfaction to the parties concerned."[2]

In these altered circumstances the more intimate relations between the two bodies were resumed. The leaders of the Jamiat were convinced that they could rely upon the Hindu majority to provide adequate safeguards to the Muslims when independence had been won by their joint endeavours. It was

1. Tufail Ahmad Manglori, op. cit., p. 527.
2. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 358.

therefore considered essential that the Muslims should work side by side with the Hindus to achieve their first objective, the expulsion of the British. Unlike Iqbal and Maudoodi, the Jamiat leaders maintained that the Indian Muslims owed a dual loyalty, to Islam and to the country of their birth. They saw no incompatibility between nationalism and the ideal of Islam. One of the prominent leaders of the Party, Maulana Husain Anmad Madni, insisted that the Indian Muslims, equally with the Hindus, were members of a common nation and that it was their duty no less than that of the Hindus to work for the freedom of the country. Only by the united offorts of the two communities, he declared, could the British be expelled:

"Even if united nationality based on common homeland is really a worst and cursed step, Moslems ought to have utilised this cursed weapon to root out the British rule in India just as Europe has rooted out the Islamic empires and Turkish Caliphate."[1]

Despite its active participation in politics, the Jamiat was essentially a religious organisation, as is evident from a statement of its objectives by one of its leading members. These objects are thus classified:

(*i*) To guide the Muslims in their political and non-political matters from a religious point of view.

(*ii*) To achieve and protect the general religious and national rights of the Muslims.

(*iii*) To work for the social and moral reform of the Muslims.

(*iv*) To establish friendly and harmonious relations with the non-Muslims.

(*v*) To fight for the freedom country.

(*vi*) To propagate Islam.[2]

1. Quoted by S. N. A. Qadri, op. cit., p. 55.

2. Muhammad Miyan, *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hay* (Urdu), (Delhi, n.d.), Part I, p. 10.

To achieve these objects the Jamiat was prepraed to co-operate with other groups, but it was clearly distinguished from all other political Parties. Apart from the revolutionary element in the Congress during the early years of the century, it was the first party to demand complete and unqualified independence for India. This demand was made as early as 1920,[1] thus anticipating even the Congress in what would become the primary objective of that Party. On this point its attitude never changed. That is aptly illustrated by a statement of its President Shah Mueen-ul-Din Ajmeri, at the annual session at Amroha n 1930:

"Our greatest enemy is Great Britain who, having India and her vast resources under its tyrannical occupation, is the main cause for our degeneration and destruction in India and for the untold misery and ruin in Islamic countries outside India. It is crystal clear that we will remain subjugated and downtrodden as long as India is under British occupation. That is why the Indian Muslims have only one object regarding the independence of India and that is that India must win complete freedom at all costs."[2]

Although the Jamiat and the League were both Muslim organisations, fighting to secure and sufeguard the rights of Muslims, relation between the two bodies were far from amicable. The leaders of the two Parties suspected and distrusted each other. The *Ulema* were convinced that the League was incapable of giving the Indian Muslims a correct lead. They even suspected and challenged the sincerity of the League leaders and saw the secret hand of the British Government working behind it. Moreover, the League was controlled by Western educated leaders who were regarded by the *Ulema* as not truly representative of Muslims and of Islamic culture. The Jamiat leaders believed that they were the only genuine and orthodox exponents of Muslim principles and that they alone represented Islamic culture. Mr. Jinnah, on the other hand, was no less

1. Tufail Ahmad Manglori, op. cit., p. 542.

2. Quoted by Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Bombay, 1963), p. 72 (footnote).

vehement in his denunciation of these 'reactionary elements' venturing to play a role in politics. In his view it was one of the achievements of the League that it freed the Indian Muslims from the clutches of "so-called Maulvis."[1]

In the circumstances the estrangement between the two groups was natural. Mr. Jinnah may not have had the solution of all the problems which beset the Muslims in these years, but it may be doubted whether the policy of the *Ulema* would have produced more satisfactory results. That at least is the opinion of one recent student:

"It was really unfortunate that the Ulema . . . understood Islam primarily in its legal form. . . . Their scholasticism, couched in the old categories of thought, barred them from creative thinking and properly understanding the problems, social or philosophical, confronting the Muslim society in a post-feudal era. They were intellectually ill-equipped to comprehend the crisis Islam had to face in the twentieth century. In short, they were incapable of giving a new interpretation to Islam."[2]

The activities of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema were virtually suspended from 1931 to 1939. The central organisation continued in form and occasional meetings of local branches were also held, but there was no general session of the Party during these years.[3] The Jamiat was, no doubt, quite popular in the orthodox and more religious sections of the Muslim community, but it was overshadowed by the Congress and, as such, its contribution to the political discussion of the period was unimportant. Even when functioning during the years of the present survey its influence was confined mainly to Delhi and the United Provinces.

III

The Khudai Khidmatgars. The second important group of nationalist Muslims were the Khudai Khidmatgars. This movement was organised, controlled and led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan,

1. Jamil-ul-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, p. 43.

2. Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

3. Tufail Ahmad Manglori, op. cit., p. 534.

a member of a wealthy and aristocratic family of the district of Peshawar. His formal education was limited to that afforded by a missionary school at Peshawar. His early ambition for a military career was abandoned because of the unsatisfactory conditions under which Indian officers were then compelled to serve. It is said that in his youth he had witnessed a severe handling of an Indian officer by a British officer of a lower rank and therefore to have abandoned the idea of army service.[1] Instead, he applied himself to social work among the poor and uneducated Pathans. Although he did not formally join the Congress till some years later, he had shown an increasing interest in its work and had attended its sessions since 1925.[2] In later years he acquired a prominent place in that Party and was a member of the Congress Working Committee for several years.

In 1929 Abdul Ghaffar Rhan organised the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. Like many similar organisations in India, it began in a small way, but it rapidly grew in strength and by 1940 it was said to have a membership of about 1,00,000.[3] In its initial stages the movement was directed towards social reform, with little or no interest in current politics. Even Abdul Ghaffar himself could hardly be described as a politician in the ordinary sense of that term. This was Jawaharlal Nehru's judgement after many years of association:

> "He was, and is, no politician as politicians go; he knows nothing of the tactics and manoeuvres of politics. A tall, straight man, straight in body and mind . . . looking forward to freedom for his Fronties Province people within the framework of Indian freedom, but vague about, and uninterested in, constitutions and legal talk."[4]

But in spite of his distaste for or perhaps his inability to understand the twists and turns of politics, had a tremendous hold over his people and remarkable skill in organising them. His popularity within his own Province was perhaps unequalled

1. J. S. Bright, *Frontier and Its Gandhi* (Lahore, 1944), p. 99.
2. Mohammad Yunus, *Frontier Speaks* (Lahore, 1942), p. 152.
3. Krishnalal Shridharani, *My India, My America* (Now York, 1941), p. 400.
4. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, pp. 278-79.

by that of any other Indian leader, not excepting Gandhi, among any section of the Indian people. In so far as Abdul Ghaffar had any political theory it was compounded of two related ideas, hatred of the British and an ardent desire for the freedom of India. The evils from which India and the Islamic world suffered were in his judgement attributable solely to British rule:

"Englishmen have made us hungry. They have enslaved us. Who has made us naked?—Englishmen. To-day Islam is ruined and destroyed ln the whole world. Who has ruined and destroyed it?—Englishmen. We have arrived at this conclusion, that Hindus, Sikhs and Mussulmans cannot progress unless and until we annihilate these Englishmen. Our Islam cannot progress so long as Englishmen are in this country. Our dispute is with Englishmen. We have two parties; one is the army of God, the other is Satan's army."[1]

This hostility was intensified by the refusal of the British Government to establish representative institutions in the Frontier Province similar to those existing in other Provinces of British India. It was this policy. which was not altered till 1932 when the North-West Frontier Province was given a Legislative Council, which led Abdul Ghaffar to enter the political arena. His movement was popularly known as the Red Shirt movement, but it was in no sense a communist organisation.[2] The red shirt was a cheap and popular uniform which served to identify the thousands of voluntary workers who were endeavouring to better the conditions of life among the ignorant and poverty-stricken masses. Among many of the younger members of the organisation there was a tendency towards some vague and undefined form of socialism, but the movement was essentially one of reform and not of revolution. "As for Socialism," said one of their leaders, "we approve of it generally as we think that it will solve our problems. Our admiration is based on its intrinsic value and not owing to its acceptance by Russia."[3] The varied objectives of the Party,

1. Quoted by E. Thompson, *A Letter From India* (London, 1932), p . 76-77.

2. S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, 1926-1931* (London,, 1957), . 68.

3. Muhammad Yunus, op. cit., p. 158.

political, social, and moral, are indicated by the comprehensive pledge required of all members. It may be quoted in full:

1. I solemnly and truthfully put forth my name for enrolment.
2. I shall sacrifice my life, wealth and comfort in the cause of the motherland.
3. I shall refrain from party friction, grudges, haughtiness, and shall side with the oppressed against oppressor.
4. I shall not enrol myself in any party nor shall I tender an apology when my Party goes to war with the alien rule.
5. I shall always obey my officers.
6. I shall always follow the path of non-violence.
7. I shall serve humanity alike and my object will be to win freedom for my country and religion.
8. I shall always try to be good and be just in my dealings.
9. I shall never except a reward for the services rendered in His name,
10. All my endeavours will be to please God, irrespective of any personal motive, gain or show.[1]

In August 1931 the Red Shirt movement was affiliated with the Congress.[2] Abdul Ghaffar thus explained the reasons for this alignment:

"People complain against me for having joined the Congress. The Congress is a national not a Hindu body. It is a *jirga* (organisation) composed of Hindus, Jews, Sikhs, Parsees and Muslims. The Congress as a body is working against the British. The British Nation is the enemy of the Congress and of the Pathans. I have therefore joined it and made common cause with the Congress to get rid of the British. They [the Pathans] should not be deceived by the tactics of the *feranghi* (foreigners)."[3]

This association with the Congress was in the nature of a loose alliance. Although Abdul Ghaffar fully sympathised with the objects of the Congress and had adopted and imposed upon

1. Mohammad Yunus, op. cit., p. 148.
2. J. Campbell Ker, in *Political India, 1832-1932*, ed J. Cumming, op. cit., p. 245.
3. Quoted by Ela Sen, *Testament of India* (London, 1939), p. 128.

the members of his Red Shirts Gandhi's principle of non-violence, he was unwilling to sacrifice the identity of his own organisation by merging it in the general membership of the Congress. Yet in the circumstances he considered that an alliance with some powerful political body was necessary. The British Government was seriously alarmed at the growing power and prestige of Abdul Ghaffor Khan and the increasing strength of the movement which he led. There was a tradition of hostility to the British among the Pathans, and in the minds of British rulers the growth of such a movement in an area so important for the defence of India presented a danger that could not be disregarded.[1] Abdul Ghaffar and his associates were convinced that the British Government intended to crush the movement before it reached unmanageable proportions. It was against this background that an alliance was made with the Congress.[2]

Such an alliance was obviously to the advantage of both parties. To the Red Shirts it gave an increased sense of stability and support. To the Congress it was a heaven-sent opportunity to extend its influence in an area where it had hitherto been weak and to strengthen its claims to be a nationalist non-communal party enlisting the support of thousands of Muslims. Despite this affiliation the Party theoretically retained its separate existence with the leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan as the link between the two organisations. But in effect the Party became, or was regarded, "somewhat as a north-west military arm"[3] of the Congress.

The advantage of the alliance to the Congress Party was obvious, but it may well be asked what was there in common between the deeply religious Pathans and a political party dominated by a Hindu majority. The point was discussed by a British observer at the time: "Why did they show such enthusiasm for the little half-naked faqir, a Bania by caste, a class for

1. The Red Shirt movement, says a British authority, "is a genuine Pathan nationalist religious movement, having as its ultimate objective the establishment of an Islamic Kingdom under an orthodox Moslem ruler. Afghanistan is the natural nucleus of such a kingdom" [J. Coatman, *Years of Destiny: India, 1926-1932* (London, 1932), p. 367].

2. Farigh Bukhari, *Bacha Khan* (Urdu), (Lahore, 1957), p. 143.

3. W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 256.

centuries regarded with amused contempt by the proud self-reliant Pathan." His answer points to the decline of the British iufluence in the Province. "The attitude," he says, "is explained to some extent by the feeling that educated Pathans can no longer look to the British for moral and material co-operation in achieving their political ideals."[1] So far as it goes, it is a correct analysis. Because of historic and political reasons hostility to British rule had long been a powerful sentiment among large numbers of the Pathans. They were naturally drawn to an alliance with the strongest Party in the country which stood for complete independence from British rule. But there was another and no less important circumstance which enabled them to co-operate with the Congress more readily than their co-religionists in some other parts of India. The Muslims formed 92 per cent of the population of the Province. Communalism as it was understood in other parts of India had no place here. The spirit of communalism as opposed to that of nationalism flourished most strongly in those Provinces where the Muslims were in a minority or where they were too weak to defend their own interests. The very different position of Pathans has been noted by an English writer:

> "The enormous preponderance of Muslims in the Frontier population discounted any fears of Indian domination, and Congress could give what the Pathan needed, namely backing, organizational and financial, to fight the British for his rights."[2]

They had no fear that anyone, whether British or Hindu, could in fact dominate or overpower the Pathans. Should any such attempt be made by the Hindus, they were convinced that they could deal with it in their own way. This is no mere speculation. One of the leaders of the movement declared their position in unmistakable words. "If the Hindus, in an independent India," he said, "really want to dominate the Muslims, than we will fight the Hindus. But first we must unite with them to fight the British."[3]

1. William Barton, *India's North-West Frontier* (London, 1939), pp. 112-13.

2. Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (London 1958), p. 432.

3. Quoted by W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 259.

IV

The Ahrar Party. A third nationalist Muslim group which worked in close collaboration with the Congress was the Ahrar Party. This Party, consisting mainly of ex-members of the Congress Party and of Muslims who had been active in the All-India Khailfat Committee, was formally organised at Lahore in 1929.[1] The need for secession from the two older organisations and for the formation of a new party was felt because of "the growing conservatism of the Khilafatists and growing communalism of the Congressites."[2]

The Ahrar came into prominence in 1931 in connection with the agitation of the Kashmiri Muslims against the Hindu ruler of the state. With the purpose of siding and encouraging their co-religionists the Ahrar Party organised a force of volunteers to infiltrate into Kashmir. According to one authority, the number of such volunteers sent in October 1931 to help the cause of the Kashmiri Muslims was about 4,500.[3] Such a step naturally raised the prestige of the Ahrar Party, and the organination at once attracted wide popular support, especially in the Punjab.

An additional reason for its timely hold on the Muslim masses was its bitter hostility towards the Ahmadis or the Qadianis, a dissident sect which originated in the Punjab in the late nineteenth century, and which was regarded as heretical by orthodox Muslims. The alternative names applied to the sect derived, in the one case from that of its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, and in the other from that of the village of Qadian in which he was born. Although there were many differences of

1. Tufall Ahmad Manglori, op. cit., p. 547.

2. Leon B. Poullada. *Contemporary Political Parties in the Punjab*, an unpublished M. A. thesis (University of Pennsylvania, 1954), p. 162.

3. Prem Nath Bazar, *The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir* (New Delhi, 1954), p. 159. The Muslims in Kashmir constituted about 77 per cent of the population, but due to the communal policy of the Hindu ruler they were "almost entirely excluded from the civil service until the 1930's. . . . The bias in favour of Hindus was also exemplified by the law which provided for ten years' imprisonment for cow slaughter" [Michael Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir* (Toronto, 1953), p. 9].

detail between the Qadianis and the orthodox Muslims, the main point of dispute was the issue of Prophethood. The central tenet of the Ahmadis was that, although Prophet Muhammad was the greatest of the Prophets, he was not the last who held that position, that Islamic teaching provided for the appearance of other Prophets, and that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was one of them. This view ran contrary to the traditional and orthodox doctrine of the Muslims, who believed in the finality of Prophet Muhammad as an important article of their faith. For this and other reasons, the orthodox Muslims regarded the Qadianis as beyond the pale of Islam.

The agitation in Kashmir in 1931 brought this religious issue into the open and led to bitter conflict between the Ahrar and the Qadianis. Shortly after the Ahrar began sending volunteers into Kashmir, another body describing itself as the All-India Kashmir Committee was organised for the same purpose. This group consisted of a number of prominent orthodox Muslims, of whom Sir Muhammad Iqbal was the most eminent. But it also included Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad (successor of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad) and some other members of the Ahmadi group. Religious differences may have sharpened the conflict, but the basic cause seems to have been the desire of each group to gain the distinction of having come to the aid of their fellow Muslims in Kashmir. A Court of Inquiry investigating the cause of the serious disturbances in the Punjab in 1953, which was due in part to the rivalry of these two groups, attributed that rivalry mainly to the differences which had arisen or which had been accentuated by this episode in Kashmir. In their official Report the members of this Court declared that "the subsequent conflict between the Ahrars and the Ahmadis was largely due to the mutual hostility arising from their having been in opposite camps during the period of Kashmir agitation."[1] The confiict thus begun continued throughout the decade and much of the support given to the Ahrar by the Muslim population of the Punjab can perhaps be attributed to their opposition to the Ahmadis.

1. *Report of Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953* (Lahore, 1954), p. 11.

In politics the Ahrar generally supported the nationalist policy of the Congress. Many of their members joined the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930 and suffered imprisonment along with members of the Congress. But it retained its separate organisation and its support of the Congress was always qualified. There was complete agreement on the subject of Indian independence, but the Ahrar regarded the social and economic policy of the Congress as "too halting and half-hearted."[1] Circumstances enabled them to enlist a large measure of religious passion in support of their ideas, but their primary concern was probably with the economic grievances of the humbler classes of society. On this subject they went beyond the nationalism of the Congress. In the words of one of their prominent leaders, "We Ahrars are not fighting for nationalism but for internationalism. In us is awakened a conscience which feels a responasibility for proverty and misfortune not of Indian people but of humanity as a whole."[2] More specifically, he defined the objectives of the Party under there general heads:

1. Equal distribution of the wealth of the country.
2. Removal of untouchability.
3. Respect of every religion and complete autonomy to live according to Shariat.[3]

Although the Party gained a great hold over the minds of lower middle class Muslims in the 1930's, its popularity was shortlived. Its strength was due in large measure to the skill with which its leaders appealed to the prejudices and aspirations aroused by the current political struggle. But its programme was too indefinite to make any distinctive mark on the politics of the time. During its early years it attracted a good deal of attention but as one writer has observed, from about 1936 its "organisation has shown a tendency to disintegrate."[4] Its programme and its activities were always marked by a certain element of vagueness and negativity. One of its principal leaders himself confessed that the Party lacked a "scientific course of

1. Humayun Kabir, *Muslim Politics (1906-1942)*, (Calcutta, 1944), p 7.
2. Ch. Afzel Haq, op. cit., p. 131.
3. Ibid., p. 163.
4. W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 261.

action" and "a definite political objective"[1] to realise its programme. Among its leaders were men endowed with unusual ability as popular orators, and one source of its seeming strength was the skill with which these men played upon the religious passions of their hearers and roused them to fever heat. But something more than the forceful oratory or the demagogy of its leaders was required to keep a political party alive and active. Their position in relation to other groups of the period has been summed up in a single sentence by a recent student: "The Ahrars were a Muslim communal offshoot of the Congress, noted for the instability of their ideology, the spell-binding power of their speakers, and their victimisation of the Ahmadiyya."[2]

Towards the end of the decade the Ahrar directed their attack against the Muslim League and condemned it with all the fury of confirmed nationalists and rigidly orthodox Muslims. In particular, they denounced some of the more prominent leaders of the League for their un-Islamic way of life. One of the more interesting and curious features of their position was that when they sided with the Congress they treated their religion as a private affair, but when they opposed the League they placed religion in the forefront of their politics. Such inconsistencies added nothing to the strength of the Party or to the coherence of its political doctrines. Its association with the Congress may have been of some advantage to that Party but the Ahrar themselves contributed little that was original or significant to the political discussion of the period.

V

THIS brief account indicates the character of the more important Muslim organisations which supported or co-operated with the Congress during these years of struggle. Their existence itself is a proof that the League was far from representing the entire Muslim community. Considered individually, these organisations were weaker than the League. They were less well organised

1. Agha Shorish Kashmiri, in *Maulana Maudoodi Apni Aur Doosron Ki Nazar Main* (Urdu), ed. Muhammad Yusaf (Lahore, 1955), p. 536.

2. Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley, 1963), p. 261.

and less ably led. Their combined strength cannot be estimated with any accuracy but had they been able to unite on a common policy and to produce a leader of the stature of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, they might well have chanllenged or even caused the downfall of the League. Such an attempt to unite the nationalist Muslims was made immediately after the Lahore Session of the Muslim League in March 1940. A body called the Azad Muslim Conference was quickly organised. It held its first session at Delhi in April 1940 under the presidency of Mr. Allah Bakhsh, a pro-Congress Muslim leader of Sind. Its purpose was to protest against the claim of the Muslim League to speak on behalf of Muslim India, and also to record its disapproval of the suggestion to divide India into two separate Hindu and Muslim states. The Conference was attended by representatives of practically all Muslim groups except the League and the Khaksars.[1] The position of the Conference on these vital issues was explained in one important resolution:

"India will have geographical and political boundaries of an individual whole and as such is the common homeland of all the citizens irrespective of race or religion who are joint owners of its resources. All nooks and corners of the country are hearths and homes of Muslims who cherish the historic eminence of their religion and culture which are dearer to them than their lives. From the national point of view every Muslim is an Indian. The common rights of all residents of the country and their responsibilities in every walk of life and in every sphere of human activity are the same. The Indian Muslim, by virtue of these rights and responsibilities, it unquestionably an Indian national and in every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of every Indian national in every sphere of governmental, economic and other national activities and in public services. For that very reason Muslims own equal responsibilities with other Indians for striving and making sacrifices to achieve the country's independence. This is a self-evident proposition, the truth of which no right-thinking Muslim will question. This Conference declares unequivocally and with all emphasis at its command that the goal of Indian Muslims is complete independence along with protection of their religion and communal rights, and that they are anxious to attain this goal as early as possible. . . .

1. For a brief account of this organisation, see Appendix C.

"The Conference unreservedly and strongly repudiates the baseless charge levelled against Indian Muslims by the agents of British Imperialism and others that they are an obstacle in the path of Indian freedom and emphatically declares that the Muslims are fully alive to their responsibilities and consider it inconsistent with their traditions and derogatory to their honour to lag behind others in the struggle for independence."[1]

It was recognised, however, that within this united India a solution of the communal problem must be found without delay. With that object in mind the Conference appointed a Board of twenty-seven members to study the whole problem of communal relations and to submit its recommendations within a period of two months. The report was in fact never submitted.[2] The Board did meet on several occasions but the Conference itself held no further meeting.

The reasons for the frittering away of this enthusiasm were obvious. The Conference was composed of many groups which were united in opposition to the League but were unwilling to submerge their separate entities in a large whole. Although the Conference originally met in an atmosphere attended with glaring publicity, and with the avowed support of all those who were opposed to the League, the enthusiasm quickly waned and it was unable to maintain its position as the representative of a united body of Muslim opinion. It was the result of a series of compromises among many divided groups and compromises notoriously lack the vitality of a single-minded action in politics. Even Mr. Humayun Kabir, a thoroughgoing nationalist Muslim, has frankly acknowledged its failure. "The Conference," he says, "attracted wide notice from its very foundation, but could not for obvious reasons achieve success commensurate with its promise."[3]

In any event it was too late for any such Assembly to challenge the popularity of the League. To an increasing number of Muslims the prospect of life in a separate independent state freed from the threats of Hindu domination had a stronger

1. Quoted by B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, p. 192-93.

2. Dr. Ambedkar writing in 1946 says that the report of the Board "has not appeared even now," ibid., p. 194.

3. Humanun Kabir, *Muslim Politics (1906-1942)*, p. 50.

Chapter 7

The Lahore Resolution and Its Implications

I

IT has already been noted in a previous chapter that the Muslims League in September 1939 had 'irrevocably' opposed the 'federal objective,' and that the Viceroy soon after the oubreak of the War had declared that the proposed Indian Federation would be postponed for the time being and in any future constitutional structure of the country the views and wishes of the Muslims would be taken into consideration. But the League had so far not proposed any constructive plans to replace the federal scheme. It was under these circumstances that the All-India Muslim League met at Lahore, in March 1940, for its most fateful session since its inception. The meeting lasted only three days but out of it came the League's first positive proposal for a solution of the Indian problem.

Mr. Jinnah opened his Presidential address on March 22 with a survey of the events which had taken place during the last few months. In language that had become familiar to his audiences during the past few years he denounced the Congress and all its plans and proposals. He referred again and again to the two and a half years of Congress administration in various Provinces. His main purpose, however, was to clarify the position of the League with regard to the future constitution of the country. Rejecting once again the Act of 1935 and the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly, he presented his own solution. He was no longer content with asking for safeguards for the Muslims as a minority community. "The problem in India," he declared, "is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly

of an international one, and it must be treated as such." The Muslims, in his view, were a distinct and separate nation. Until all parties recognised "this basic and fundamental truth," he said, "any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Musalmans but to the British and Hindus also." He, therefore, suggested that "the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into 'autonomous national states.' "

In support of his plan for partitioning the conntry. Mr. Jinnah said that it would eliminate the existing antagonism between Hindus and Muslims. There would be peace for all concerned as there would be no fear of the domination of one over the other. The minority problem, he declared, could be solved "by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India." This could not be done in an undivided India because the Muslims were a nation with clear and compact majorities in certain areas of the country. For a development of their spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life, it was essential that the Muslims should be conceded those areas in which they predominated. The differences between Hindus and Muslims, he believed, were so sharp and basic that their respective developments under one Central Government were not possible. The two communities differed from each other not only in their religious beliefs but also in their entire outlook on life. Their continued union was, he declared, impossible and harmful to both:

"The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state."

Towards the end of his speech Mr. Jinnah strongly repudiated the suggestion that India was ever united or that it had ever been a single nation. "The history of the last twelve hundred years," he said, "has failed to achieve unity and has witnessed, during the ages, India always divided into Hindu India and Muslim India." The only unity that had ever existed, according to him, was the unity imposed by the British conquest. This artificial unity, he believed, would collapse with the termination of the British regime, and would result in a worse disaster than India had ever witnessed. "Surely," he said, "that is not the legacy which Britain would bequeath to India after 150 years of her rule, nor would Hindu and Muslim India risk such a sure catastrophe."[1]

The League concurred in his judgement and, on March 24,[2] adopted the following resolution:

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

"That adequate and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them."[3]

1. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Writings and Speeches of Mr. Jinnah*, pp. 143-63.

2. The Resolution was proposed on March 23 but was autually passed on March 24. See Syed Sharif-ud-Din Pirzada, *The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session*, (Karachi, 1968), p. 26.

3. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, from December 1938 to March 1940*, pp. 47-48.

Thus the Muslim League reached its ultimate position. Beyond this it was not possible to go. The policy was now quite simply the repudiation of the unity of India in any form. The essence of the Resolution was that certain areas, namely, the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the North-West and Bengal in the East, should no longer remain as Provices in British India, but should be constituted as independent states outside British India.

The Resolution is not free from ambiguity. The reference to "Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign" contains an element of self-contradiction. There is evident incompatibility between 'Independent States,' which would presumably possess full sovereign authority, and the autonomy or sovereignty assigned to their component units. The language of the resolution suggests that the new states would be governed under some sort of federation although that term was nowhere used. The Resolution simply laid down the basic principle. The details were to be worked out by the Working Committee which was "to frame a scheme of costitutlon in accordance with these basic principles,"[1] and one of its tasks would no doubt be to define more precisely the autonomy or sovereigntly of the units to be included in the federation.[2]

This contradiction, however, was simply a matter of phraseology. The import of the Resolution is unmistakable. In a word, it is an assertion of the right of the Muslims to self-determination on the ground that they were a separate and distinct nation. The same argument by which the Congress justified its claim to freedom from British rule was now used by the League to vindicate the right of the Muslim community to be freed from subjection to Hindu rule.

Before considering the implications of the resolution it will be pertinent to examine the basis of the Muslim demand. Were the Indian Muslims constituting local majorities in certain areas a separate nation? To start with, it may be pointed out that

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, op. cit., p. 48.

2. The name 'Pakistan' was not given to these proposed states, but it was adopted shortly afterwards. The two states described in the Resolution were to be in fact one state under one Central Government. It will, therefore, be rcferred to as a single state undcr the name of Pakistan.

Jinnah was by no means the author either of the 'Two-Nation Theory' or of the demand for the diving the country. That the Hindus and the Muslims were distinct communities with many of the attributes of nations, has been suggested by Englishmen, Hindus and Musims alike long before Mr. Jinnah reached this conclusion. The disunity of India had been pointed out by Sir John Seeley as early as 1883. "India," he said, "is not a political name, but only a geographical expression like Europe or Africa. India does not mark the territory of a nation or a language, but the territory of many nations and many languages."[1]

At the height of the controversy in 1937 Mr. Savarkar, the president of the Hindu Mahasabha, described the situation in even more forcible terms. His analysis may be quoted:

> "Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is alreay welded into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. . . . But the solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When the time is ripe you can solve them, but you cannot suppress them by merely refusing recognition of them. . . . India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India.[2]

Reference has already been made to the statements of Sir Syed Ahamd Khan on the latent conflict between nationalities, races and creeds within the Indian community.[3] His conviction that the Hindus and Muslims were distinct nationalities was fully shared by Dr. Muhammad Iqbal.[4] In official statements and in most of the political discussions of the period, Hindus and Muslims were generally described as commuual groups, but by the late 1920's the consciousness of their separate national character was becoming more widespread among the Muslims leaders. At the meeting of the All-Parties Muslim Conference

1. J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, (Boston, 1909), p. 222.
2. Quoted by M.R.T., *Nationalism in Conflict in India*, pp. 6-7.
3. *Supra*, pp. 7 and 10.
4. *Supra*, pp. 142-43.

in December 1928, the Aga Khan insisted that the Muslims should be referred to not as a community but as a nation,[1] and this view of their position, although vigorously denied by the Congress, became more widely accepted in the decade that followed.

So far as the division of India was concerned, this too had been suggested long before the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League. As early as 1887 John Bright had recommended that India should be divided into a number of provinces, wholly separate from one another, but all of them under the direct control of the British Government. He said:

"You would teach the people of these Presidencies to consider themselves, as generations passed on, as the subjects and people of that state . . . when the power of England . . . is withdrawn from India, then each of these states would be able to sustain itself as a compact, as a self-governing community. You would have five or six greate states there, as you have five or six great states in Europe."[2]

This proposal took no account of religious divisions in India. A number of Hindu writers—Bhai Parmanand in 1904[3] and Lala Lajpat Rai in 1924[4] are prominent examples—went further than Bright and advocated a division of India specially between Hindus and Muslims. The idea was reduced to more precise terms by Sardar Muhammad Gul Khan, a Muslim witness before the North-West Frontier Committee appointed by the Government of India in 1923. His proposal foreshadowed the Lahore Resolution:

"We [Muslims] would very much rather see the separation of the Hindoos and Muhammadans, 23 crores of Hindoos to the south and eight crores of Muslims to the north. Give the whole portion of India from Raskumari [Cape Comorin] to Agra to Hindoos ahd from Agra to Pashawar to Muslims."[5]

These statements do not stand alone. Sir Muhammad Iqbal's assertion of the right of Muslim self-determination in 1937 has

1. Abdul Mojid Salik, *Sarguzasht* (Urdu), (Lahore, 1955), p. 258.

2. Quoted by G.M. Trevelyan, *The Life of John Bright* (London, 1914), p. 266.

3. Humayun Kabir, "Muslim Swing to Nationalism," *Hindustan Standard* (Calcutta), October 17, p. 3.

4. Syed Sharif uddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, (Lahore, 1963), p. 99.

5. Quoted by Choudhary Rahmat Ali, op. cit., p. 215.

already been discussed.[1] The same demand was made by Rahmat Ali in 1933[2] and again in 1940,[3] only two weeks before the Lahore Session of the League. To sum up, there is enough evidence to show that the idea of separate Muslim nationhood was held by a number of influential leaders before 1940, and that the proposal to divide India had frequently been made by men whose motives differed greatly, before its formal adoption by the Muslim Leagne.

II

TURNING from these suggested solutions of the communal divisions in India, some consideration must be given to the question whether the Indian Muslims could properly be regarded as a nation in themselves. The question is by no means an easy one to answer. It depends upon one's interpretation of the the concept of nationalism. Judged simply by outward signs and physical characteristics, it is difficult, in some areas impossible, to differentiate between Hindus and Muslims These two communities had lived side by side for centuries. They were children of the same soil. Racially there was practically no diffdrence between them, as most of the Indian Muslims, particularly among the lower ranks of sociaty, were descendants of converts from Hinduism. Apart from the Muslim preference for Urdu and the Hindu preference for Hindi as the *lingua franca* for India, the members of both these communities spoke the same provincial dialect depending upon where they came from. But such matters as these are of minor importance in determining the basis of nationalism. A few definitions by recognised authorities may be mentioned. According to J. S. Mill:

> "A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other peoples, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of

1. *Supra*, p. 141.
2. *Supra*, p. 149.
3. *Supra*, p. 151.

themselves exclusively."[1]

A similar definition has been given by Professor Cobban:

"Language, religion, traditions, territorial contiguity, natural frontiers, economic interests, race—extensive exceptions can be found to every proposed test, except the subjective one. The best we can say is that any territorial community, the members of which are conscious of themselves *as* member of a community, and wish to maintain the identity of their community, is a nation."[2]

E. Renan likewise rejects such physical tests as race, language and even common country as essential requirements. However important these things may be in some cases, they are no certain test of the presence or the absence of the spirit of nationhood. Something more fundamental is required:

"A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common possession of a rich heritage of memories; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve worthily undivided inheritance which has been handed down. . . . A heroic past, great men, glory,—I mean glory of the genuine kind—these form the social capital, upon which a national idea may be founded. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have done great things together, to will to do the like again—such are the essential conditions for the making of a people. . . . The Spartan hymn, 'We are what you were, we shall be what you are,' is in its simplicity the national anthem of every land."[3]

This test must be applied to the situation in India. Was there a geunine desire between Hindus and Muslims to become parts of the same nation? Did the basic differences between Hinduism and Islam admit of such a degree of spiritual fusion as was necessary to constitute a single nation? The Congress leaders, Gandhi and Nehru foremost among them, believed that such a fusion was not only possible, but that in essence it already existed. Jinnah and the Muslim League were convinced that the differences were

1. J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government* (Everyman's Lib.ary Edition, London, 1957), pp. 359-60.

2. Alfied Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (London, 1945), p, 48.

3. E. Rehan, "What Is a Nation," in *Poetry of the Celtic Races and Other Studies* (New York, [1896], pp. 80-81.

irreconcilable. The Congress emphasised those feature of the situation which pointed to unity. The Muslims, conscious of their minority position, emphasised the difference stemming from religion and culture. In this connection it is imortant to remember that the Hindus could afford to be less communal in their outlook, because of the inner assurance that they were the majority community, which was certain to retain the substance of power under any form of self-government. Even Nehru himself acknowledged that the "Communalism of a majority community must of necessity bear a closer resemblance to nationalism than the communalism of a minority group."[1]

The communal differences could not be so easily disposed of. It would indeed be difficult to imagine two religions the fundamental concepts of which differed so widely as those of Hinduism and Islam. Hindu writers, particularly those who are impressed with the more definitely secular aspect of Congress nationalism, have some times underestimated the importance of those differances. Thus, in his discussion of the 'Two-Nation Theory, Mr. K. P. Dutt remarks:

"It is obvious that this attempt to base nationality on religion (together with a degree of common culture associated with religion) runs contrary to every accepted historical and international experience of the character of a nation. It would be as practical to regard the Catholics of Europe as a 'nation.'"[2]

This is evidently a misplaced analogy. There have been, and no doubt still are, important differences between Catholics and Protestants. But these are two branches of a common religious stock, and while they differ in many things they have much in common. To suggest a comparable relationship between Hindus and Muslims is manifestly to misread the minds of these two communities. Neither in their origin nor in their historic development have Hindus and Muslims shared a common body of religious ideas as the Christian communities have done. The differences between Indian religions derive, not from conflicting interpretations on points of detail, but from their fundamental

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Recent Essays and writing* (2nd edition, Allahabad 1237, p. 52.

2. R. P. Dutt, *India Today* (2nd revised edition, Bombay, 1949), p. 440.

beliefs and from their respective outlook on life which are rooted in these beliefs. Commenting on the outlook of the Muslims, Mr. Percival Spear remarks:

"They are sufficiently different to consider themselves as a seprate nation; they differ from Hindus not only in belief, but also in culture, traditions, and, above all, in their sense of values. A Methodist may feel at home with a Roman Catholic on almost everything except theology and worship, but a Muslim must make an effort to feel at home with a Hindu on anything outside business. Dress, customs, food, codes of conduct, and ideals are all different, and it is only when these have been successfully relegated to the background that the average Muslim can be at ease with the average Hindu."[1]

As has been suggested, the Congress leaders were naturaly led to assert the principle of nationalism and to gloss over, or entirely to ignore the communal differences. They hoped to solve the communal differences by refusing to face them squarely. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's views on that point may be taken as a characteristic expression. At one place he remarked:

"Today in India there is absolutely no cultural or racial difference between the Muslim and Hindu masses. Even the handful of upper class Muslims in North India, who perhaps think themselves apart from the rest of the country, bear the impress of India on them all over the place. . . . Would any of them be more at home or more in harmony with their surroundings in Persia or Arabia or Turkey or any other Islamic country?"[2]

This analysis of the position of the India Muslims contains two important points. First, that the differences were confined to the Muslim upper classes and that the masses were unaffected by them. Second, that the Muslims could feel more at home in India than in any Islamic country. With respect to the first, a single instance will suffice to show that the facts did not accord with the

1. Precival Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, (3ad edition, London, 1958), p. 76. "The difference between the two," remarked the joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, "is not only one of religion in the stricter sense, but also of law and of culture. They may be said indeed to represent two distinct and seprate civilisations"—*The Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform* [Session 1933-34], (London, 1934), Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.

2. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Recent Essays and Writings*, pp. 66-67.

sincerely cherished but wishful beliefs of the Congresss leaders. The Moplah rising during the period of the Khilafat agitation clearly showed that Hindu-Muslim amity was more evident at the top than among the lower levels of society. The Moplahs could by no stretch of the imagination be described as belonging to the uper classes. They were in fact one of the most impoverished groups to be found anywhere in the country. This incident and the many tragic outbreaks of the kind in the years that followed afford abundant proof of the latent hostility between the two communities among the humbler classes. Despite some measure of co-operation between the Congress and certain individuals and groups among the more prosperous and educated Muslims, it is clear that the spirit of unity did not penetrate deeply among the great mass of the population. As regards the second point, Sir, Abdur Rehman, an eminent Muslim, clearly did not agree with Mr. Nehru. From his own experience he said:

> "Any of us Indian Muslimsg travelling for instance in Afghanistan, Persia, and Central Asia, among Chinese Muslims. Arabs and Turks, would at once be made at home and would not find anything to which we are not accustomed. On the contrary in India we find ourselves in all social matters total aliens when we cross the street and enter that part of the town where our Hindu fellow townsmen live."[1]

There were no doubt contributing causes but it can scarcely be doubted that the fundamental difference between the two groups was religious. They could have coalesced to form one composite and united Indian nation only if Hindus and Muslims had been willing or able to separate religion from politics. Since this was not possible, fusion was destined to remain incomplete and unrealised. For the Muslim the religious beliefs of Islam held first place. Among the Hindus the institution of caste was equally important. The gulf between Hindus and Muslims was hardly wider or more unbridgeable than that fixed by the inflexible rule of the Caste System between such groups as the Brahmins and the 'untouchables.' These conditions were of the essence of Indian society, and in the years under survey the spirit of nationalism

1. Quoted by T. Morrison, inJ. Cumming. op. cit., p. 104; cf. F. L. Ahmad Durrani, *Communalism* (Lahore, n.d.), p. 7.

did very little to remove or modify them. Western education in time might produce a change, but even Mr. Gandhi was disposed to regard caste as natural and beneficial. "I am one of those," he declared on one occasion, "who do not consider caste to be a harmful institution. In its origin caste was a wholesome custom and promoted national well-being."[1] His views on inter-dining and inter-marriage were equally firm. "In my opinion," he said, "the idea that inter-dining or inter-marrying is necessary for national growth is a superstition borrowed from the West."[2]

Closely connected with these points of discord was the question of killing the cow. The Muslims slaughtered the animal for food and sacrificed it on religious occasions. The Hindus reverenced it and its protection was an article of faith with them. The importance of cow-protection for the Hindus can be judged from the following warning of a Hindu writer:

> "If the Hindus have any self.respect, they ought to be able to see that no cow . . . *is ever again allowed to go to the slaughter-houses at any cost or under any conditions whatsoever! For with the cow we like as a nation—without her we fall!*"

Mr. Gandhi's views on this question were no less definite. "Cow-slaughter and man-slaughter," he declared, "are in my opinion the two sides of the same coin."[4] This was for him a matter of fundamental importance. "I regard the question of cow protection," he said. "as greater even than that of Swaraj."[5]

III

A STATE is built on political unity and a nation on cultural unity. The political unity was present because of the unitary traditions of one Central Government imposed by the British conquest. It was, in Professor Toynbee's words, "perhaps the

1. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity* (Ahmadabad, 1949), p. 6.
2. Ibid.
3. R. T. Agarwala, *The Hindu-Muslim Riots: Their Causes and Cures* (Lucknow, 1943), p. 143.
4. M. K. Gandhi, *Communal Unity*, p. 16.
5. Ibid., p. 18.

most precious British gift to an Indian sub-continent."[1] But a political unity could be imposed by artificial means, whereas a cultural unity had to be indigenous, springing from the soil of the country and the hearts of its inhabitants. "A political compromise," said one observer, "will be necessary for the achievement of unity, but it will be but a brittle unity if not vitalized with a unity of thought."[2] No student of Indian politics can honestly say that this 'unity of thought' was present among Hindus and Muslims. Their basic ideas were not only different but antagonistic. They could not look back upon any period of their history when the two communities lived on a footing of equality. If one was the ruler, the other almost invariably was the ruled and the subjected. Indian had never known a truly national ruler. Even those kings and emperors who had achieved the greatest power and imposed the greatest measure of unity were regarded as communal rulers, to be remembered as heroes or as despots, depending upon the religion of the monarch concerned.[3] "If the Hindu," says an eminent historian, "looks upon pre-Muslim past as his golden age, the Muslim replies by idealizing the achievements of his ancestors in India."[4] The pride of one was the cause of humiliation for the other. Even in the realm of literature this division prevailed. There has never been a truly national poet or a great writer who appealed equally to the minds and hearts of both communities. "Had we any national poets and national poetry, the great question of today would have been a solved problem."[5]

But it is not only to such manifestations as these that we

1. A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1954), Vol. VIII. p. 202.

2. Atulananda Chakravarty, *Not By Politics Alone* (Calcutta, 1944), p. 113.

3. An attempt to weld the two communities into one was made by the great Mughal Emperor, Akbar, but the fact that his work had no enduring influence is sufficient proof of the difficulty or the impossibility of the task.

4. I. H. Qureshi, *The Development of Islamic Culture in India* (Pakistan Literature Series No. 9), (Lahore, 1946), p. 15.

5. Shaikh Abdul Qadir, *Urdu Literature of the Ninteenth Century* (Lahore, 1941), p. 25. This book was originally published as *The New School of Urdu Literature*, first in 1898 and again in 1921.

must look if we wish to gauge the extent to which Hindu-Muslim antagonism injured and poisoned the life of the whole country. These divisions were writ large in Legislative Chambers, Government Departments, private concerns, newspapers, universities, colleges, schools, sports, amusements and social gatherings. India was clearly divided into two social spheres. "On thousands of railway platforms," says one contemporary, "millions of Hindus every day establish the fact of two nations by insisting on Hindu *Cha* [Tea] and Hindu *Pani* [Water]."[1] Communal riots were an everyday occurrence. They were in many cases the result of absurdly trivial incidents. But they were nevertheless a part of Indian life. The following item from the *Evening News* of June 4, 1935, is typical of scores or hundreds that could be cited:

"News is hand from Abbur of a riot having taken place there on Friday night between the Muslims and the Hindus following a wrestling match between a local Muslim and a Punjabi Hindu. . . . During the fight that ensued forty persons are said to have been injured."[2]

IV

WHETHER the Indian Muslims were a nation or not, it is evident that there were differences of a very acute and unique nature. The nationalist might deplore these differences but they were a costant feature of the daily life of Indian people, which the student cannot ignore. The charge has often been made that these differences were an artificial result of British rule. This allegation has been so constantly repeated by Hindu leaders that it would scarcely be an exaggeration to describe it as an article of their nationalist creed. It has also been suggested that these differences were of a recent growth and came to the

1. K. L. Gauba, *The Consequences of Pakistan* (Lahore 1946), p. 13.

2. Quoted by Clifford Manshardt, *The Hindu-Muslim Problem in India* (Lodon, 1936), p. 46. Describing the causes of two serious riots a British historian remarks, "The first arose from a quarrel between a Sikh soldier and a Moslem shoe-maker who had sold him a bad pair of slippers. The second occurred because a Mohammadan boy had stolen a handful of sweets from a Hindu shopkeeper, and slipped and hurt himself when running from an irate owner" [G.T. Garratt, *An Indian Commentary* (London, 1938), pp. 178-79.]

surface only when the question of the transfer of authority from British to Indian hands was being mooted. For the latter accusation too, the British Government has openly been held responsible. Mr. Gandhi's views on this point were clear and unequivocal. His statement at the second session of the Round Table Conference is typical:

"I dare to say it [the communal question] is co-eval with the British advent and immediately this relationship . . . between Great Britain and India is transformed into a natural relation ship. . . . You will find that Hindus, Mussalmans, Sikhs, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, Christians, Untouchables, will all live together as one man."[1]

This is a misleadingly simple view of the situation, which simply does not accord with the historical record. Communalism in India was embedded in the very mental make-up of the Indian people. It was in their blood. The evidence that is now available on the relations between these two communities leaves little doubt that their mutual differences were fundamental and of very long standing. Had the two parties really desired unity, it is difficult to believe that a third party could have prevented it, particularly if the two parties were aware that the third party was bent upon profiting from their divisions. It may be conceded that the task of establishing and maintaining British rule in India was facilitated by this communal division, but the division resulted from antagonisms which existed long before the British conquest. The situation was tersely summed up by Maulana Muhammad Ali: "It is the old maxim of 'divide and rule.' But there is a division of labour here. We divide and you rule. The moment we decide not to divide you will not be able to rule as you are doing to-day."[2] From a rather different point of view Dr. Ambedkar's analysis points to the same conclusion: "Every town, every village has its Hindu quarters and Muslim quarters, which are quite separate from each other. . . . They meet to trade or they meet to murder. They do not meet to befriend one another."[3]

1. *Indian Round Table Conference* (*Second Session*) *Proceedings*, p. 398.
2. *Indian Round Table Conference* (*First Session*) *Proceedings, p.* 102.
3. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, p. 339.

The charge that the British Government was responsible for creating these divisions was perhaps an unconscious effort to realise two purposes. The first was to arouse harted against the foreign rulers and thus indirectly arrive at unity. The second was that since all efforts to bridge the gulf had failed, this charge was used to convince the world that this failure was due to the machinations of their alien rulers. The British Government could obviously not be blamed for the religious calendars of each community. If *Muharram*, an occasion of mourning for the Muslims, happened to clash with *Holi*, an occasion of rejoicing for the Hindus, there was almost invariably a deadly riot. The differences between the two were religious, historical, cultural, social and economic, and all these differences manifested themselves in their politics. Discussing the charge of 'divide and rule, a Hindu author says:

"Heaven preserve me from the dishonesty, so general among Indians, of attributing this conflict to British rule, however much the foreign rulers might have profited by it. Indeed they would have been excusable only as gods . . . had they made no use of the weapon so assiduously manufactured by us, and by us also put into their hands."[1]

It is clear that the mutual fear and hatred were a legacy of history handed down from generation on to generation on. A European observer has thus summarised the relations between the two communities :

"Like oil mixed with water, they lived together and yet apart; and two different cultures developed cheek by jowl with fundamentally distinct sense of values, divergent attitudes towards even some of the most elementary matters of life in this world, and, of course, diametrically opposed beliefs in the life hereafter."[2]

1. N. C. Chaudhuri, *An Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (London, 1951), p. 229; cf. Beni Prasad, *India's Hindu-Muslim Questions* (London, 1946), p. 143, and B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India* pp. 323-24. For accounts of Hindu-Muslim antagonism in the centuries before the British conquest, see:

(*i*) R. C. Banerjee, "A Hindu-Muslims Riot in the Fifteen Century," *Modern Review* (Calcutta, 1939), Vol. LXVI, No. 1, pp. 55-56.
(*ii*) Abdul Hamid Lahori, *Badshah Namah* (persian), (Calcutta, 1867), Vol. I, Part II, pp. 57-58.
(*iii*) Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan, the Formative Phase* (Karachi, 1960), p. 2.

2. Hedwig Maria Schymiczek, "Why Pakistan," *Pakistan Quarterly* Karachi, 1950) Vol. I, No. 4, p. 1.

There can be no doubt, however, that tension and open conflict between Hindus and Muslims greatly increased during the decade of the 1930's. But the conflict cannot be attributed to the efforts of the British Government, determined at all costs to retain their power. The more obvious explanation seems the correct one. The Indians knew that the British Government would soon transfer authority to Indian hands. It was this knowledge and the fear that it awakened among the Muslims and among other minorities which intensified the antagonisms that were latent in the very structure of Indian society. No minority could regard with equanimity the transfer of power to a majority party inspired by ideals; religious and political, diametrically opposed to their own. Some support is given to this conclusion by the fact that communal trouble was much more acute in British India than in the Indian states where establishment of popular control over the government could not be foreseen to the same degree.

It is further to be remembered that India had never known a truly national government. With the prospects of a national and largely democratic government opening before them the anxieties of the various communities were entirely natural. The importance of the change was clearly recognised by Maulana Muhammad Ali in 1930:

> "I want you to realize that for the first time you are introducing a big revolution in India; for the first time majority rule is to be introduced in India. In the days of old Rama there was no majority rule . . . . The old Pandu and Kuru rulers . . . Mahmud of Ghazni and Akbar and Aurengzeb did not have majority rule, nor did Sivaji. . . . When Warren Hastings and Clive ruled India, they did not have majority rule; and even in the days of Lord Irwin there is no majority rule."[1]

To sum up, one would have to establish two things before a charge of 'divide and rule' could be successfully proved. First, that there were no fundamental differences between the Hindus and the Muslims or that, if such differences existed, they were unreal and temporary. Second, that the Muslim leadership in general, more particularly during the years under survey, was insincere and was acting as an agent of British Imperialism.

1. *Indian Round Table Conference (First Session) Proceedings* p. 104.

With respect to the first, enough has been said to suggest that in the judgement of most observers these differences were far from being imaginary. As to the second, a brief comment on the character of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the most prominent Muslim leader of the period, may be appropriate. No one, including his severest critics, has ever charged him with hypocrisy. Dr. Ambedkar, by no means a friendly critic, says of him:

"It is doubtful if there is a politician in India to whom the adjective incorruptible can be more fittingly applied. Anyone who knows what his relations with the British Government have been will admit that he has always been their critic, if indeed, he has not been their adversary. No one can buy him. For it must be said to his credit that he has never been a soldier of fortune. The customary Hindu explanation fails to account for the ideological transformation of Mr. Jinnah."[1]

Looking at its possible consequences, the Lahore Resolution was a startling event but one which could have been foreseen. The demand for partition and for the establishment of a separate Muslim state was perhaps the logical conclusion of the communal conflict which had grown more bitter with the passage of time, and which had reached its height during the period of Congress administration in several of the most important Provinces of British India. The solution of this problem proposed by the Resolution was one which the British Government could not and would not willingly accept. Many Hindu writers have emphasised the deep underlying unity of the Indian people, and have insisted that this unity continued through all their history despite the superficial divisions between rival parties struggling for power. But the weight of historical opinion is against this view. Such unity as India possessed in 1940—political, administrative, legal and economic—was entirely, or in very large measure, the direct result of British rule. Even in the days of India's most powerful rulers in the earlier centuries nothing of the kind had existed. Professor Coupland's conclusion may be cited:

1. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, p. 323. According to Griffiths, Jinnah "has been rightly described as the 'sea green incorruptible' of India . . . he is one of the very few Indian politician who are, in the widest sense, incorruptible" [P. J. Griffiths, *The British in India* (London, 1946), p. 160].

"Even under the greatest of the Moguls the subjection of India to one government had never been so close or so complete, and with the collapse of the Mogul Empire India reverted to a political fragmentation which, though more erratic and unstable, was not otherwise very different from that of Europe."[1]

Whatever criticism may be made of certain aspects of British rule, it is impossible to doubt the reality of this one great achievement of imposing unity upon a deeply divided country. Not unnaturally the British took some pride in this achievement; and, in the absence of convincing proof to support the charge, it is scarcely to be believed that they would have deliberately fomented a conflict which threatened to destroy that unity. As one writer has expressed it, to suggest that the British Government was encouraging a conflict which would almost certainly lead to the division of India "is stretching oratory too far."[2] The British view was more aptly expressed by Sir Percival Griffiths. "The wisest and the most generous of the British rulers of India," he said, "have always hoped that some day they would be able to boast of having found India in a state of fragmentation and left it a united whole."[3]

V

AFTER having examined the course of events which led to the demand embodied in the Lahore Resolution, it is time to consider the implications of that demand. The wide support given to the Resolution by Muslims in all parts of India was no doubt due to their fear of permanent subjection to a Hindu majority. They were confronted with the danger of assimilation by, or subjection to, a numerically more powerful community with whose creed and way of life they totally disagreed. Considered in that view, their action proceeded logically from their judgement of the events of 1928 and 1937. But fear of Hindu domination was not the only consideration. In the minds of all ranks of society the Resolution was also "a demonstration of pride on the part of a people conscious that they ruled India for

1. R. Coupland, *The Future of India* (London, 1943), p. 101.
2. R. A. Smith, *Divided India* (New York, 1947), p. 171.
3. P. J. Griffiths, *The British in India*, p. 167.

centuries when power was not determined by the counting of the votes in a ballot box."[1]

Like most things of the kind the Lahore Resolution was perhaps inspired by mixed motives in the minds of those who framed it; but there can be no reasonable doubt that it was presented as a practical solution of the communal problem. Opinions may differ as to whether it was the only or the correct solution. Mr. Jinnah himself had no doubts. "Pakistan," he said, "is the only solution for the final and lasting settelement of the communal problem in India."[2] It was clear, however, that even with partition the solution would not be simple or automatic. The Resolution called for "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards" for the protection of the minorities in both Hindu and Muslim states. This plan was open to the criticism that if safeguards could be made effective in the two sections of the divided India, there was no reason why they could not be made equally effective without proceeding to the drastic step of partition.[3] Within limits this was a sound objection, but it disregarded the central point in the argument of Jinnah and other League leaders. Their view, stated on many occasions by influential leaders during the preceding decade, was that the Muslims were not a minority but a distinct and separate nation. As they judged it, this Resolution was the necessary prelude to a territorial separation that would accord with spiritual and cultural separation which already existed. It was tacitly recognised that, because of the intermingling of the two communities in different parts of India, separation could not be complete. But in the North-West and the East the Muslims formed about two-thirds of the population, and it was maintained that here at least "they were entitled to the rights of a sovereign nation."[4]

The Resolution was at once subjected to severe criticism by

1. H. A. Waston, "The Indian Deadlock, "*Great Britain and the East* (London, 1940), Vol. LIV, No. 1506, p. 237.

2. M. A. Jinnah in Foreword to M. R. T.'s *Nationalism in Conflict in India*, p. xi.

3. This criticism was made by a hindu writer a few years later: Balraj Madhok, *Hindustan on the Crossroads* (Lahore, 1946), pp. 64-65.

4. M. R. T., *Pakistan and Muslim India* (2nd edition, Delhi, 1946), p. 119.

representative Congressmen on various grounds. In particular, the claim of the Muslims to separate nationhood was firmly denied. Because of Mr. Gandhi's position and influence, his criticism may be considered to be most important. One passage from an article published shortly after the adoption of the Lahore Resolution contains the gist of his argument:

"The 'two-nations' theory is an untruth. The vast majority of Mmslims of India are converts to Islam or are descendants of converts. They did not become a separate nation, as soon as they became converts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same tongue that a Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food and has the same amusements as his Hindu neighbour. They dress alike. I have often found it difficult to distinguish by outward sign between a Bengali Hindu and a Bengali Muslim. The same phenomenon is observable more or less in the south among the poor, who constitute the masses of India."[1]

To the Muslims this criticism appeared superficial and irrelevant. National unity, it was declared, had little or nothing to do with such trivial matters as similarity of clothing, diet and amusement. Social and political conditions in other parts of the world afforded sufficient proof that nationhood depended on something deeper and more enduring. If these outward signs were to be treated as marks of a common nationality, said one of Mr. Gandhi's critics, then "there is practically no difference between one European and another or between a German and an Englishman." The real test was at once more simple and more profound. The spirit of nationality derived, not from the similarity of customs to which Mr. Gandhi referred, but from "the desire on the part of the members of a nation to group themselves under a separate government of their own, provided they are a compact majority in a compact unit of land."[2] The existence of Canada and the United States as two separate nations, despite marked similarity "in thier ideals, in their way of life and even in language,"[3] was taken by another critic as a convincing proof of this argument.

1. Quoted by D.G. Tendulkor, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi* (Bombay, 1952), Vol. V, p. 334.

2. M. R. T., in *India's Problems of Her Furture Constitution*, p. 56.

3. "A Student of International History," *Are the Indian Muslims a Nation?* (Pakistan Literature Series, No 13), (Lahore, 1947), p. 6.

The important question which was not answered, or not answered satisfactorily, was that which concerned the position of the Muslim minorities which would be left in Hindu majority areas. From the wording of the Resolution it is clear that the migration of all Muslims into the new state fo Pakistan was not contemplated. That was indeed a patent impossiblity. The League leaders recognised that under any plan of partition a large number of Muslims would remain in areas subject to the rule of a Hindu majoriiy. It is evident, therefoie, that the division of India was not and could not be a complete solution of the minority problem. It was in the Provinces where Muslims were numerically and economically weak, not in those where they formed a substantial majority of the population and were able to look after their own interests, that the problem was most serious. Pakistan promised independence and complete security to those Muslims who were already able to look after themselves, but it might well expose those whose position was most precarious to further danger and inscrurity. To meet this situation the Resolution proposed "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards" for the protection for Muslim interests in the non-Muslim states. The arrangement would be reciprocal. The same safeguads were to be provided of the non-Muslim minorities living within the borders of Pakistan. There were obvious difficulties in the way of such an arrangement. What the resolution envisaged was the establishment of two sovereign independent states unconnected with one another except by normal diplomatic methods. The proposal that 'mandatory safeguards' should be adopted could therefore be little more than an aspiration. At least it is difficult to see what sanctions could be devised to ensure the enforcement of such a provision.

The framers of the Resolution probably anticipated some from of treaty between the two states. But a treaty by definition is a mutual agreement, and it is clear that no such treaty could be imposed upon either of the states without the willing agreement of its rulers. The difficulties were suggested by a Hindu writer shortly before partition :

"What will happen in case of non-conformity, on the part of one of the contracting parties to a treaty in India, to the terms of the treaty? And who will adjudicate in a dispute arising

from such a treaty? Further, what will be the value of such adjudication, assuming that a machinery is set up for this purpose, without a sanction behind its awards?"[1]

Mr. Jinnah's answer to all such questions was contained in a statement issued soon after the Lahore Session of the Muslim League:

"I may explain that the Musalmans, wherever they are in a minority, cannot improve their position under a united India or under one central government. Whatever happens, they would remain a minority. They can rightly demand all the safeguards that are known to any civilised government to the utmost extent . . . on the other hand, they can, by their attitutde of obstruction, bring the Muslim homeland and 60,000,000 of the Musalmans under one government, where they would remain no more than a minority in perpetuity. . . . The question for the Muslim minorities in Hindu India is whether the entire Muslim India of 90,000,000 should be subjected to a Hindu majority Raj or whether at least 60,000,000 of Musalmans residing in the areas where they form a majority should have their own homeland and thereby have an opportunity to develop their spiritual, cultural, economic and political life in accordance with their own genius and shape their own furture destiny, at the same time allowing Hindus and others to do likewise. Similar will be the position of the Hindus and other minorities in the Muslim homelands."[2]

This statement suggests that Mr. Jinnah had in mind some sort of reciprocal arrangement between the two new states as a solution of the minority problem. His statement is not entirely clear but he was evidently thinking of some scheme of checks and balances which would ensure the greatest measure of security to the minorities on both sides of the border. It seems probable that this arrangement was acceptable to those supporters of the League who lived in Provinces where the Muslims formed a minority. The Lahore Resolution was moved by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, a resident of Bengal, but it was seconded by Mr. Khaliquzzaman, the Muslim leader in the United Provinces, and seven of the twelve supporters whose names appear on the Resolution

1. D. N. Banerjee, *Partition or Federation?* (Calcutta, 1945), pp. 21-22.
2. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah*, pp. 165-66.

were residents of Hindu majority Provinces.[1] Dr. Ambedkar, interpreting the mind of the Muslims of Hindustan, remarks:

"They say, 'we are not weakened by the separation of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindustan. We are better protected by the existence of separate Islamic states on the eastern and western borders of Hindustan than we are by their submersion into Hindustan.' Who can say they are wrong?"[2]

Their reaction towards this proposal to create a separate Muslim state was not unlike that which inspired their support of the Khilafat agitation twenty years earlier. There was of course an obvious difference between the two cases. The Khilafat agitatian was primarily a protest against changes which threatened the integrity, if not the very existence, of the religious centre of Islam. But religious motives can never be wholly distinguished from other considerations, and Indian Muslims in 1920 had rallied to the defence of Turkey partly because they saw in the maintenance of that power some guarantee for the protection of their own interests. For obvious reasons this latter motive was much more important in 1940. Turkey was a distant state whose rulers probably had little interest in the affairs of their co-religionists in India and had no means of aiding them or exercising any influence upon conditions in that country. The borders of the new state of Pakistan, however, would march with those of India itself. The men who ruled it would in a very real sense be members of their own community, familiar with their problems, and able, or so it was believed, to intervene more effectively to protect their interests.

Although Mr. Jinnah himself never openly subscribed to it, many of his followers frankly advocated the 'hostage thory.' "It is quite natural," said one of them, "if the Muslim minorities are oppressed in Hindu India, it will lead to repercussions in Muslim India."[3] "One cannot believe," said another, "that the Hindus would be so short-sighted as to invite an onslaught from the Muslim regions by ill-treating Muslims in their territory."[4]

1. Liaquat Ali Khan, com., *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940*, p. 103.

2. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, pp. 48-49.

3. M. R. T., *Pakistan and Muslim India*, p. 166.

4. Jimil-ud-Din Ahmed, *Muslim India and Its Goal* (Delhi, 1940), p. 37.

From the point of view of Muslims themselves this was a dangerous theory. Under the suggested plan of partition, the Hindu minorities in Pakistan would be larger and economically more powerful than the corresponding Muslim minorities in Hindustan. In a battle of retaliation, should such an unfortunate situation arise, the Muslims would be at a serious disadvantage.

Moreover, as some the more moderate Muslims recognised, the theory itself was immoral. Had it ever been adopted it would not only have intensified the hostility between the two states, but would also have opened an era of persecutions of innocent persons in both states. As one distinguished Muslim stated, "the hostage principle . . . will not work, and if it does, it will shift the basis of politics from civilization to barbarism."[1]

The 'hostage theory' was both impracticable and undesirable. The only alternative was a mutual agreement between two states guaranteeing fair and equal treatment of their religious minorities. In the circumstances such an agreement was hardly possible. The emphasis was on independance and sovereignity. Neither state was likely to recognise the right of the other to act as a protector of any religious group within its borders.

In conclusion, it may be said that the proposed separation was perhaps the only possible solution of the communal problem. At least as the events of the next few years demonstrated, it was the only one acceptable to the great majority of the Muslims. It was far from being an ideal solution, but after a generation of increasing strife and bitterness it seemed to most Muslims the only way of escape from the dangers to which they were exposed in an undivided India.

1. Syed Sulton Ahmed, *A Treaty between India and the United Kingdom* (2nd edition, New Delhi, 1945), p. 84.

Conclusion

THE Nehru Report is one of the most important landmarks in the history of Hindu-Muslim relations. It was the result of a determined effort to frame a constitution more acceptable to all parties than the existing plan of dyarchy, and an expression of a sincere desire to reach an agreement on the communal question. Without such an agreement there was no possibility that the prosposed constitution could be put into operation. But the Report wholly failed to provide the basis of agreement. Far from eliminating or lessening the differences between Hindus and Muslims, it served still further to strengthen and intensify them. Even on the basic issue of the nature of the future constitution the two parties were diametrically opposed. The Report proposed a unitary constitution based on universal suffrage and majority rule. The Muslims demanded a federal constitution with the greatest measure of autonomy in the Provinces, and a guarantee of adequate representation for the members of their community in all branches of the Central or Provincial Governments. These demands formed the substance of Mr. Jinnah's proposed amendments and of his plea for generous treatment to the Convention which finally adopted the Report. But the Congress, no doubt sincere in its belief that co-operation between the two parties in working this constitution would end their differences and bring true national unity, refused to make any concessions.

The adoption of the Report by the Congress and its rejection by almost all shades of Muslim opinion crystallised the Hindu-Muslim differences as no previous event had done. This was indeed the parting of the ways. It not only convinced Jinnah, who was soon to emerge as the greatest Muslim leader since Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, that an enduring unity between Hindus and

Muslims was not possible, but it also led the Muslims to the conviction that they must compose their own differences if they wanted to make their political existence felt.

At all three sessions of the Round Table Conference the Muslims continued to press their demands which were in substance the same as those proposed by Jinnah and rejected by the Congress at the All-Parties National Convention in 1928. The result was again a deadlock. Neither party would concede what was required to accommodate thc other. In the absence of any mutual agreement between the two communities the British Government was forced to arbitrate and issue the Communal Award in August 1932. The Award was followed by the 'White Paper,' the Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms and ultimately by the Government of India Act of 1935.

In the general elections that followed the Act of 1935, the Congress won substantial majorities in five Provinces and later with the help of some minority groups was able to form Ministries in eight of the eleven British Indian Provinces. The Muslims League was much less successful. Its strength lay more in the Muslim minority Provinces than in those where the Muslims predominated. But despite its poor showing in the elections it expected a share of Ministerial appointments in the Congress majority Provinces. This expectation was based on the recommendations of the Simon Commission, on the discussions at the Round Table Conference and on certain provisions of the new Constitution. Indeed, as the Muslims interpreted it, it lay in the logic of separate electorates which had been accorded to them in all Constitutions since 1909. Separate representation in the Legislatures, they believed, was a useless concession if it did not lead to a corresponding share in the Executive. But the Congress adhering to the strict letter of parliamentary practice refused to admit members of the League as such to any share of the Executive. There was no doubt some justification for this policy. But in effect it was to disregard the existing communal divisions, and to assume the reality of that national unity which it was the chief purpose of the Congress to promote. On the wisdom or unwisdom of the Congress decision there is room for disagreement, but there is a wealth of historical evidence to suggest that

the Muslim demand for a separate state in 1940 was the direct result of this refusal on the part of the Congress to share power with the Muslim League.

The League was not the only organisation which claimed to speak for the Indian Muslims. There were many other smaller organisations political creeds and objectives of which accorded fairly closely with those of the Congress. But events from 1937 onwards made it increasingly clear that such influence as these Nationalist Muslim groups had ever had over their co-religionists was rapidly being lost. The Muslim League, on the other hand, was becoming more powerful every day. From a middle-class organisation which appealed to a small section of the Muslim community it was being transformed into a people's party. Its strength had previously been chiefly in the Muslim minority Provinces, but the decision of the Muslim Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam in October 1937 to join the Muslim League made it a power which could no longer be ignored.

The rule of the Congress Ministries in various Provinces added further to the strength of the League whose leaders lost no opportunity of capitalising on the mistakes of their opponents. A number of Reports purporting to show that the Congress was essentially a Hindu body, bent on destruction of Islamic culture and the establishment throughout the whole of India of the rule of the Hindu majority, were issued and widely circulated. The detailed charges listed in these Reports may have been exaggerated, but the fears which gave birth to such charges cannot be lightly dismissed. At least large numbers of Muslims in all parts of India firmly believed in the truth of these Reports. The Reports and the frequent assertions by the leaders of the League that the Muslims, once the proud rulers of the country, were being reduced to the status of second-class citizens increased Muslim apprehensions and raised the prestige of the League as the custodian of Muslim interests. The end of Congress rule in the Provinces following the bitter dispute with the British Government over India's participation in the War was dramatised as a day of deliverance from the tyrannical yoke of Hindu domination.

In spite of the long-standing division and the increasing antagonism between the two communities, no Muslim leader of

any standing had expressed a desire to create an 'Ulster' in India until Provincial autonomy was carried into effective operation. When such an idea of a separate Muslim state was presented in 1933 by a group of Muslim students studying in England, it was dismissed by all the responsible Muslim leaders as impracticable and chimerical. It was not until 1937 that Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the most eminent interpreter and defender of Islamic culture, suggested that the Muslims must have the right of self-determination on the ground that they were a distinct nation; even then this suggestion was confined to his private correspondence with Mr. Jinnah. But Jinnah and his associates were not quickly converted. Three more years of struggle and futile negotiations were to pass before Jinnah startled the Congress in particular and the world in general by his declaration that the only solution of the Indian political problem was a partition of the country into Hindu and Muslim states. Nothing less than this, it was said, would be acceptable to the Muslims. They were a separate nation and must have a homeland of their own.

On the validity of the claim that the Muslims scattered through all parts of India constituted a distinct and separate nation, opinions will continue to differ. But the historical record leaves no doubt as to the reality of the differences between them and the members of the majority community. This situation has no exact parallel in the history of two racial or religious communities in any other country. Many attempts were made to narrow down their differences and to reach some agreement by which they could live together in greater amity and understanding, but all of these had failed. These attempts had failed not because of any lack of sincerity on the part of those who made them, nor as has very often been alleged because of the presence of a third party, whose interests were served by maintaining or encouraging this antagonism. They failed because of the fundamentally different outlook of the Hindus and the Muslims towards the whole problem of unity and self-government.

The majority community did not appreciate or give due weight to the susceptibilities of a religious and cultural minority. It emphasised homogeneity which clearly did not exist. It overlooked religious, cultural and economic considerations which,

to the minority, were of vital importance. On the other hand, the Muslims, keenly conscious of their numerical and economic inferiority and fearful of the results of self-government 'pure and simple,' could never be brought to trust the majority. In these circumstances the responsibility rested primarily upon the majority party to show magnanimity and generosity in meeting the demands of the minority. Their position was assured. Even under a plan of government which gave to the Muslims a greater measure of representation than that to which they were entitled by their numbers in the population, the interests of the majority would not have been seriously prejudiced.

Such a plan did not commend itself to the Congress party. They regarded the existing communal divisions as irrational and artificial, and they found an explanation of it, not in the condition of Indian society itself but in the sinister policy of their British rulers. They were in consequence less disposed to consider measures which might allay the fears and suspicions of the Muslims and of other minorities. The charge against the alien rulers was no doubt an effective political slogan, but it did not accord with the facts of history. The distrust and hostility between the two communities had existed long before the British set foot in the country. The deep underlying unity of the country which was unduly emphasised by the majority was refuted at once by historical record, and by the mounting communal tension which was becoming more bitter every day. Fear, suspicion and hatred rather than trust, goodwill and brotherly feelings were the dominant features of Indian life. It is possible that this antagonism between the two great communities in India enabled the British Government to maintain its power over the country longer than would otherwise have been possible. Some eighty years ago, Sir John Seeley pointed out that, if the peoples of India should ever unite in opposition to their foreign rulers the British would have no choice but to surrender. But that is not to say that the British were responsible for a situation from which they may to some extent have profited. The historical evidence as we have it lends little or no support to the charge that they were in fact the creators of these divisions.

This analysis is supported by the fact that the four men who emerged as outstanding leaders of the Muslim community

in these years began their careers as ardent nationalists and with one exception ended as bitter opponents of the Congress and its leadership. Maulana Muhammad Ali began his career as a confirmed nationalist. His position in the Congress and the confidence reposed in him by its members are attested by his election to the Presidency in 1923. At this time he regarded Gandhi as almost a heaven-sent prophet and leader of united Indian nation. In a moment of enthusiasm he described him as "the most Christ like man of our time."[1] But within a few years he was denouncing Gandhi and other Congress leaders in bitter terms, and in 1930 he wrote to his daughter that "the only way in which Muslims could live was to rule in the Provinces where they were in a majority and the Hindus to rule where they had a similar position."[2] Two days before his death, in January 1931, he wrote to the Prime Minister of England that if the Muslim rights were not conceded, there would be civil war in India.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal, though not a politician in the stricter sense of the term, wielded a tremendous influence over the minds of his co-religionists. His earlier poems reveal his ardent sincerity to see India as one country and its inhabitants as one people. He was, however, soon disillusioned, in part by his experiences in Europe; in part by his analysis of the situation in India. Before the end of the 1920's he was convinced that a united Indian nation, however desirable in theory, was impossible of realisation. He is to-day regarded in Pakistan not only as a great poet and philosopher but also as the originator of the idea of Pakistan.

The case of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, popularly known as the creator of Pakistan, is even more striking. Throughout his public life he was an active politician, a critic of British rule, and for many years an ardent advocate of Indian national unity. In the earlier part of his career he was a member simultaneously of the National Congress and the Muslim League. As a representative of the latter body he played a prominent part in the negotiations which led to the Lucknow Pact of 1916. He continued

1. Afzal Iqbal, ed., *Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali*, p. 276.

2. Quoted by S. Fareed Jafri, *The Spirit of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1951), p. 15.

his membership in and his support of the Congress until his open disagreement with Gandhi on the question of Civil Disobedience and Non-Co-operation in 1920. In these years he was frequently and justly described as the greatest ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. But Gandhi's influence over the National Congress and his readiness to resort to unconstitutional methods to achieve his end disturbed and finally alienated Jinnah. He continued to insist, no less firmly than the Congress leaders themselves, on the right of India to self-government. But his energies were henceforth directed less to the task of uniting Hindus and Muslims, and more to that of securing adequate safeguards for Muslim rights and interests. Even after the final breach with the Congress in 1928, he did not abandon the idea of political unity of the country, although he would have had that unity in a form rather different from that favoured by such men as Gandhi and Nehru. He was the last of the Muslim leaders to be converted to the idea of separate Muslim nationhood, and, possibly for that very reason, he became the greatest critic of the Congress which he was never tired of denouncing as a totalitarian Party bent upon the establishment of Hindu rule.

The last to be mentioned is Mualana Abul Kalam Azad. He never abandoned his loyalty to the Congress and continued to work in that organisation in the belief that after independence had been won the Hindu-Muslim difference would automatically be eliminated. But even he, in his posthumously published autobiography, has criticised the Congress leaders for their narrow sectarian outlook;[1] and some passages in these memoirs throw a curious light on Azad's position and activities as a Congress leader in the critical years before 1939.

None of these leaders was in any sense an apologist for British rule in India. Non of them has ever been criticised for the insincerity of his motives. Their conversion must be taken as a proof that there was something unsatisfactory in the way in which the majority community handled the minority problem. The attitude of the Muslims exposed them to the criticism that they were at least lukewarm in their opposition to

1. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 15.

British rule. In the case of many members of the Muslim community that charge may have been justified. Their leaders and most of those who took any interest in politics were sincere in their demand for independence. But they were faced with a difficult choice, and they dreaded Hindu domination more than the continuance of British rule under which they did enjoy a substantial measure of protection. The Hindus could afford to work with single-minded devotion for the expulsion of the British. The Muslims, on the other hand, required a greater assurance for their furture safety before they could co-operate in the overthow of the present regime. The presence of a neutral power was more welcome to them than the rule of the Hindus. It was not love of the British rule but fear of Hindu hegemony which was responsible for this attitude.

Surveying the events discussed in this study it is clear that the demand for a separate Muslim state was neither inspired by the British Government, nor prompted by a desire to impede the progress of India towards self-government and independence. It was a direct result of the conflict between two powerful communities whose culture, ideals and way of life differed so widely that reconciliation and compromise seemed impossible. That conflict was sharpened and brought clearly into the open by the events of 1928 and 1937. Whether the demand for a separate state was a genuine political aspiration of the Muslims or a tactical move by their leaders to win larger concessions in the new India was not entirely clear in 1940. There were observers at the time who believed that it was the latter, but there is no reason to believe that Jinnah, last of the Muslim leaders to adopt the idea of partition, was merely looking for a useful counter in the political battle with his Congress opponents. If the contention of the Muslims that they were a nation was correct—the large and increasing number of them believed that it was—who was there to set bounds to their march? "Of all the forms of tyranny," said Macaulay long ago, "the worst is that of a nation over a nation; the heaviest of all yokes is the yoke of a stranger." Many questions were still unanswered in March 1940, but the decisive, and, as it proved, the irrevocable step which would lead to the decision in 1947 had been taken.

Appendix A

Mr. Jinnah's Fourteen Points[1]

(1) The form of the furture Constitution should be federal with the residuary powers vested in the Provinces.

(2) A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all Provinces.

(3) All Legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every Province without reducing the majority in any Province to a minority or even equality.

(4) In the Central Legislature, Mussulman representation shall not be less than one-third.

(5) Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present: provided it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate.

(6) Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and the Nort-West Frontier Province.

(7) Full religious liberty, i.e. liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.

(8) No Bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any Legislature or any other elected body if three-

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, Vol. I, pp. 246-247.

fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a Bill, resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or, in the alternative, such other method is devised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.

(9) Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

(10) Reforms should be introduced in the Nort-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces.

(11) Provision should be made in the Constitution giving Muslims as adequate share, along with the other Indians, in all the Services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.

(12) The Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws and Muslim charitable institutions and for their due share in the grants-in-aid given by the State and by local self-governing bodies.

(13) No Cabint, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim ministers.

(14) No change shall be made in the Constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the Indian Federation.

The draft resolution also mentions an alternative to the above provision in the following terms:

That, in the present circumstances, representation of Mussulmans in the different Legislatures of the country and other elected bodies through the separate electorates is inevitable and, further, the Government being pledged over and over again not to disturb this franchise so granted to the Muslim community since 1909 till such time as the Mussulmans chose to abandon it, the Mussulmans will not consent to joint electorates unless Sind is actually constituted into a separate Province and reforms in fact are introduced in the North-West

Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces.

Further, it is provided that there shall be reservation of seats according to the Muslim population in the various Provinces; but where Mussulmans are in a majority they shall not contest more seats than their population warrants.

The question of excess representation of Mussulmans over and obove their population in Provinces where they are in a minority is to be considered hereafter.

Appendix B

Maudoodi and Nationalism

SYED Abdul 'Ala Maudoodi in the earlier phases of his career was in many respects a successor of Iqbal. His views on nationalism *vis-a-vis* the Indian Muslims were remarkably close to those held by the poet-philosopher.

Maudoodi started his public life as a journalist and after working for various journals he started a monthly periodical of his own called *Tarjumanul-Quran* in Hyderabad (Deccan) in 1932. According to one report, Sir Muhammad Iqbal invited him to the Punjab to "co-operate with him in the gignatic research work of the reconstruction and codification of Islamic jurisprudence."[1] According to the same source, Maudoodi shifted to the Punjab in March 1938, " 'But alas,' in the words of Maudoodi himself, 'he [Iqbal] was in the last days of his life. The very next month he breathed his last and I was left alone for the uphill task we had decided to undertake jointly.' "[2]

According to Maudoodi, Islam and nationalism are incompatible with one another. The progress of one means the decay of the other. " 'Muslim Nationalist' and 'Muslim Communist' are as contradictory terms as 'Communist Fascist,' 'Socialist Capitalist', 'Chaste Prostitute'!"[3] A Muslim as such cannot champion nationalism, as the latter is antithetic to the very idea of Islam. In his words: "One ultimate goal of Islam is a

1. Khurshid Ahmed, ed., *Islamic Law and Constitution, by Syed Abdul 'Ala Maudoodi* (Karachi, 1955), p. 203.

2. Ibid., pp. 203-04.

3. Sayyed Abdul 'Ala Maudoodi, *Nationalism and India* (2nd edition, Pathankot, 1947), pp. 9-10. Several parts of this book had already been published separately in *Tarjumanul-Quran* (Lahore). See *Tarjumanul-Quran* for the following issues: (*i*) Vol. 14, No. 6 (1939), pp. 471-80, (*ii*) Vol. 15, No. 1 (1939), pp. 59-76, (*iii*) Vol. 15, No. 4 (1939), pp. 306-20.

world state in which the claims of racial and national prejudices would be dismantled and all mankind incorporated in a cultural and political system, with equal rights and equal opportunities for all."[1]

Nationalism, on the other hand, tends to divide humanity and to breed localism. It inculcates the love of a particular territory rather than the love of humanity in general. It develops an aggressive and imperialist spirit of world domination. It is "the greatest curse in the world, it is the greatest menace to human civilization; it makes man wolf to all other nations except his own."[2]

A common nationhood for India can come into being only if a common nationality is already present as "nationalism is indeed another name for nationality inflamed."[3] There are two kinds of nationalities, namely, political nationality and cultural nationality. The first is present in India because the country is governed by one political system. The foreign Government holds the people together by common social and economic laws. Such a concept of nationality can exist even without any homogeneity of thoughts, religion, language and traditions. But this from of nationality in itself is not sufficient to give birth to nationalism. The second type, i.e. cultural nationality, is essential for the formation of one nation. It does not exist in India and is possible only if there is complete unanimity, among the members composing it, on fundamental and basic problems of life. "It is found only among those who mentally, morally, culturally and socially have become one people, one organic whole."[4]

There are only two ways to bring about one common nation in India. Either the major nation may conquer and absorb the minor nation or a new culture may be evolved by the fusion of different cultures. The first is ruled out "because the advocates of Indian nationalism cannot make it their cherished goal."[5] The second is equally impracticable as it cannot be realised in a

1. Sayyed Abdul 'Ala Maudoodi, op. cit, pp. 10-11.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 45.
4. Ibid., p. 47.
5. Ibid., p. 50.

day or two but "it evolves through centuries in a natural order."[1] Maudoodi's own remedy for these cultural conflicts is this:

"The permanent status and individuality of every nation should be recognised; every one of them should be allowed autonomous and sovereign control over its national 'subjects,' and the different nations should agree upon a joint action only in so far as the common interests of the country were concerned."[2]

1. Sayyed Abul 'Ala Maudoodi, op, cit., p. 52.
2. Ibid., p. 61.

Appendix C

The Khaksar Movement

THE Khaksar movement which attracted wide notice towards the end of the 1930's cannot properly be described either as political or as an exclusively religious body. Considered as a product of the confused politics of the period, however, it was an interesting phenomenon and a few words may be said about its general character and history.

It was organised in 1932 by Inayat Ullah Khan familiarly known as Allama Mashriqi who had had a distinguished career in the University of Cambridge, and had subsequently held important positions in the Indian Educational Service.[1] He is reported to have met Hitler in Berlin in 1929,[2] and this meeting may explain his decision to launch the Khaksar organisation.[3]

The word 'Khaksar' literally means humble, and in its programme the organisation put some emphasis on social service. But if the extensive literature produced by Mashriqi to explain the objectives of his Party is to be believed, political aggression and world domination were more important objects than social reform. Military discipline was the keynote. Mashriqi said:

"My object is to create a body of at least a million young-

1. For biographical details, see Hira Lal Seth, *The Khaksar Movement under Searchlight and the Story of Its Leader Allama Mashraqi* (Lahore, 1943), pp. 14-16.

2. "The Khaksar Movement," an article by An Indian Student of Political Science in *Modern Review* (Calcutta, 1940), Vol. LXVII, No. 6, p. 712.

3. For a comparison of the Nazi and Khaksar organisations, see Hira Lal Seth, op. cit., pp. 34-36.

men organized on military but non-political lines—Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Parsis, Harijans, all included—who will live whole-heartedly together and will know how to obey implicitly."[1] The intention was clearly to create a non-communal organisation, and according to one report about six hundred Hindus and Sikhs joined the movement.[2] But in other statements the founder explained his objects in language that could hardly appeal to non-Muslims. Expounding the Party creed in an official publication in 1935 he said:

"In brief the one aim of the Khaksar movement is to raise, once again after a lapse of thirteen centuries, soldiers for God and for Islam . . . our aim is to become once again kings, rulers, world conquerors and supreme masters on earth. This is our religion, our Islam, our creed and our faith."[3]

Many similar statements by the leader could be cited. In a comprehensive statement of principles issued in 1936, members of the Party were "to acquire strength, and to be ever ready to sacrifice property and life and even children and wife for God and for Islam." Again, a Khaksar was required "to keep before him as the goal the domination of the whole world and the ultimate general triumph of Islam."[4] The point was reiterated in the following year and Mashriqi described the movement as "literally and decisively Islam."[5]

Little more need be said about the character and objectives of the movement. Its organisation was distinctly military. Its members were divided in groups roughly corresponding to military rank, or to the importance of their service to the organisation. The essential point was implicit obedience to the

1. Allama Inayat Ullah Mashriqi, "The Khaksar Movement: What it Stands For," *The Light* (Lahore), December 24, 1936, p. 7.

2. Amiya Chakravarty, "Mystery of the Khaksars," *Asia* (New York, 1939), Volume XXXIX, No. 8, p. 436.

3. Inayat Ullah Khan Mashriqi, *Qaul-i-Faisal* (Urdu), Lahore, 1935), pp. 17-18.

4. Inayat Ullah Khan Mashriqi, *Maulvi Ka Ghalat Mazhab*, No. 3 (Urdu), (Lahore, 1936), p. 14.

5. Ibid., No. 6 (Lahore, 1937), p. 13. The Islamic character of the movement was further emphasised in another statement of its creed in 1937. See ibid., No. 4, (Lahore, 1937), p, 26.

commands of the leader. The Khaksar soldiers were not even supposed to know the policy and programme of the Party. "Our 'Khaksar,'" said Mashriqi, "does not know what he stands for. He has but 'to do and die' as he is ordered."[1]

The Khaksars were not directly opposed to the Muslim League. In fact that was the only organisation which they were permitted to join.[2] Their hostility was directed towards the Congress, and the leader was vehement in his denunciation of Congress policies and more particularly of the principle of non-violence. Such methods, declared Mashriqi, sapped the martial energies of its members and unfitted them to engage in the battle for freedom. His language was at times violent. He dismissed the Congress as a group of "impotent Babus," and scoffed at the pretensions of a "ladies' debating club to lay claim to the achievement of freedom."[3]

The Khaksars came into prominence in 1939 when, in defiance of an order issued by the Government of the United Provinces, they organised a march on Lucknow with the intention of establishing peace between *Shias* and *Sunnis*, two mutually hostile sects of Muslims. The Police opened fire on them, some casualties resulted and the incident was given a good deal of publicity. A few months later, in March 1940, they come into conflict with the authorities in the Punjab, following an order by the Government banning all semi-military organisations. In this encounter several Khaksars were killed and their leader was lodged in jail.[4]

This was, in brief, the history of the Khaksar movement during the decade. The reasons for its popularity are not far to seek. It appealed to the vague romantic idealism of Muslims by the promise of making them the rulers of the world. It gave them a smart uniform and a glittering weapon[5] to parade about

1. Allama Inayat Ullah Mashriqi, *The Light* (Lahore), December 24, 1936 p. 7.

2. W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 280.

3. Inayat Ullah Khan Mashriqi, *Qaul-i-Faisal*, pp. 106-07.

4. "The Khaksar Movemeni, Its History, and Its Aims and Objects," *The Bulletin of the Henry Martyn School of Islamic Studies, Aligarh*, Series No. XXVIX [*sic*] July-August 1941, pp. 2-3. Professor Smith has identified the author of this article as John A. Subhan; see W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 382.

5. The Khaksars used to carry a *Belcha* (spade) on their shoulders.

and thus feel socially elevated. Although the presence of non-Muslims in such an organisation appears a little curious, it can perhaps be explained by the fact that there was always a sentence or two in the utterances of Mashriqi to suggest that there was nothing inimical to the interests of any other community in their programme. The desire to wear a military uniform, moreover, and to be part of a great fraternity bound by military discipline was a strong temptation to otherwise frustrated youth.

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The year book, or annual chronicle of events published under the name of *India* with appropriate dates has been used as a constant guide to the course of events. Among the many accounts written by contemporaries, some of whom played an important part in the events which they narrate, the volumes by Maulana Azad, Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, B. R. Ambedkar

and Rajendra Prasad deserve special notice. A few accounts by British officials, who witnessed the events which they describe and analyse, have been published. Of these the work of Sir Percival Griffiths has been the most useful. Biographies of several of the Indian personalities engaged in the controversy have appeared, but, with few exceptions, these are so obviously partisan, in one direction or the other, that they must be used with caution. Some of these have been useful for the letters and other documents which they contain. Among the secondary books Sir Reginald Coupland's work on *Indian Problem* has been an invaluable aid. On many points in his narrative additional evidence has become available since 1943, but this has on the whole served rather to reinforce and supplement his interpretation than to alter it in any material way. Several of the works here listed are in Urdu. A few are in Persian. This is indicated by the use of the word Urdu or Persian following the title. The spelling of names and places varies widely in the text. In all these cases the original form has been retained. In other cases the form currently used in India and Pakistan has been adopted.

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